1978 Cryptosystem Resists Quantum Attack 185
KentuckyFC writes "In 1978, the CalTech mathematician Robert McEliece developed a cryptosystem based on the (then) new idea of using asymmetric mathematical functions to create different keys for encrypting and decrypting information. The security of these systems relies on mathematical steps that are easy to make in one direction but hard to do in the other. Today, popular encryption systems such as the RSA algorithm use exactly this idea. But in 1994, the mathematician Peter Shor dreamt up a quantum algorithm that could factorise much faster than any classical counterpart and so can break these codes. As soon as the first decent-sized quantum computer is switched on, these codes will become breakable. Since then, cryptographers have been hunting for encryption systems that will be safe in the post quantum world. Now a group of mathematicians have shown that the McEliece encryption system is safe against attack by Shor's algorithm and all other known quantum algorithms. That's because it does not depend on factorisation but gets its security from another asymmetric conundrum known as the hidden subgroup problem which they show is immune to all known quantum attacks."
Hidden subgroup problem is under active research (Score:5, Informative)
It is worth noting that solving hidden subgroup problem is a subfield of quantum computing that has been active for a while. Although we can't figure out how to solve it in general, we can solve specific instances of it; for example, I think that factorizing is one such instance.
Thus, I suspect that we will eventually figure out a way to break this encryption. Even if we do, though, these mathematicians still get credit for giving us a new instance of the hidden subgroup problem to try and solve, which may give us additional insight into the extent to which the general problem can be solved by a quantum computer.
The article agrees with you (Score:5, Informative)
Thus, I suspect that we will eventually figure out a way to break this encryption. Even if we do, though, these mathematicians still get credit for giving us a new instance of the hidden subgroup problem to try and solve, which may give us additional insight into the extent to which the general problem can be solved by a quantum computer.
From TFA:
However, it's worth pointing out that while the new work guanratees safety against all known quantum attacks, it does nothing of the sort for future quantum attacks. It's perfectly possible that somebody will develop a quantum algorithm that will tear it apart as easily as Shor's can with the RSA algorithm. "Our results do not rule out other quantum (or classical) attacks," says Dinh and co.
Re:The article agrees with you (Score:5, Funny)
You read the article?!
Feed him some cat food (Score:4, Funny)
Maybe he did, maybe he didn't.
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You read the article?!
No, I used my quantum computation abilities to tell me what must be in it.
ElGamal?? (Score:4, Interesting)
Re:ElGamal?? (Score:5, Informative)
No - both prime factorization and discrete logarithms can be done in polynomial time with a quantum computer. [arxiv.org]
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Interesting. I wonder if this extends to elliptic curves as well?
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No, but Merkle trees + Lamport signatures are: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lamport_signature [wikipedia.org]
conspiracy theory (Score:4, Interesting)
I wonder if "THEY" already have one of these quantum computers and are keeping a lid on it so they can snoop on the PGP of our enemies. Would it be possible to develop one of these in secrecy?
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No. Nothing to see here.
If you want to test it (Score:5, Funny)
Re:If you want to test it (Score:4, Funny)
Send a bunch of encrypted e-mails containing questionable content and see if anyone comes knocking at your door. And be sure to not send any questionable content unencrypted, or to give any other reasons for them to show up.
But how will I know they're not just knocking at my door out of a desire to make my acquaintance?
Re:If you want to test it (Score:5, Funny)
But how will I know they're not just knocking at my door out of a desire to make my acquaintance?
Easy. If they use your door knocker, they want to make your acquaintance. If they bring their own [gaam.com.au], they're coming for more than tea and crumpets.
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Yes, please have jam and marmalade.
Re:If you want to test it (Score:5, Interesting)
Even then, they would probably spend a long time creating other circumstances in which to pick you up that would give plausible deniability as to how they caught on.
One can google one's own references as I'm sort of lazy today, but a good example: the British had thoroughly broken Enigma during WWII, and at one point in the war knew where -every- German U-boat was. This created a dilemma for them: should they act on this information, and if so, how to do it without tipping their hand? If they just went and rounded up every single one, it would be pretty obvious that the code had been broken.
What they did, according to the stories, is send out disinformation that a) they had ramped up production of a bunch of new long-range sea-spotting planes (they didn't, they only had the resources for a few); and b) these planes would fly near where they already -knew- the U-boat was, and 'spot it' (making sure it was obvious they'd been seen by the U-boat itself before flying back). The British were also careful not to find too many U-boats -- only the ones that they needed out of the way for critical operations. The Germans were convinced they just had really bad luck and were the victim of a very expensive and thorough patrol system by the British.
If the guys in dark suits can crack PGP, Blowfish, etc. easily, they won't obviously act on it until they first get dirt on you via other means. :p
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But the fact remains: To hide an invetion they used misinformation. And they did it so well, that it is still effective today.
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The U-Boats (for most of the war) were under orders to report contacts (via Enigma machines). Doubts about broken encryption would have been enough to put them into "communicate only if attack is impossible" - which would have been a huge problem, considering there weren't enough patrols to cover everything.
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Surely they used Enigma for other critical long-distance communications as well!
Indeed. It was also used to communicate with the Luftwaffe, hence the widespread myth that decrypting Enigma meant that the devastating attack on Coventry could have been prevented (it couldn't: the Germans used a defence-in-depth system that used codewords to identify particular targets; that a massive attack was planned was known, the identity of the target was not).
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That's a great idea. However, I'm not sure what you mean by 'questionable content'. Would you mind emailing me a few examples?
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Within the realm of imaginable possibility, yes. Within the realm of possible possibility, no.
Re:conspiracy theory (Score:5, Insightful)
Simplistically:
If THEY bought out 50% of the researchers in the field, without arousing suspicion amongst those who turned down the offer, THEY would only have a 50% chance of having one first.
More realistically,
If THEY bought out a significant percentage of the researchers in the field, without arousing suspicion amongst those who turned down the offer, THEY would likely only be a few months / years (at best) ahead.
And since the outlook on the QC front is rather bleak (in terms of a functional QC with any real power) the odds are strongly in favor of THEY not having squat.
Especially in today's world it isn't like top researchers are fragmented and isolated. In the past it was possible for a governmental organization to use its greater vision to collect isolated researchers and be the first to introduce them to each other, magnifying their individual efforts. Today everybody who is anybody in these fields is at least aware of the others, if not following closely.
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Despite that, I seem to recall hearing stories of various encryption ideas the NSA developed in the '70s and '80s which weren't developed in the open until the late '90s and early 2000s (sorry, no citation).
Of course, the late 90s and early 2000s were also when the serious speed and ease of communication issues were really addressed for the majority of researchers. So this fact, if anything, decreases the probability that a major player has managed a serious breakthrough that it's successfully kept hidden.
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Simplistically: If THEY bought out 50% of the researchers in the field, without arousing suspicion amongst those who turned down the offer, THEY would only have a 50% chance of having one first.
Unfortunately, that same 50% chance collapsed to a more stable 0 once observed.
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So what you are saying is that both the possibilities exist but we won't know until the cat is out of the box, where did I hear this before?
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Real World:
The NSA creates a front company called Quantum Research and funds it with black project money.
DARPA creates a front company called Skynet Research Ltd and again funds it with black project money which is unreported to congress or the public.
Both companies then hire CEO's from the public sector and give them no knowledge who they really work for. Quantum Research then gets "VC Money" from Skynet Research and goes on a hiring spree to develop quantum computers and hires and provides grants to 50% o
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Only 50,000 sq. ft.? Times have changed, computers are getting smaller as they get bigger. Back in the day, that was a mid-size corporate server farm. Of course now, that's a lot more computing power.
As for power, most secure computing facilities have their own power generation capability - if nothing else then just a motor-generator to assure clean power all the time. An old Army base's power system is not likely to be up to the standards of today for this purpose.
There's a facility in the wilds east o
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So the top five people in QC go to the international conference in Hawaii. Two of them have cooperated on a revolutionary new method, but since it's so new they have made some hints, but haven't been able to share any of the details with their colleagues but they will be doing a short intro at the conference.
While they are in Hawaii they all 'happen to' all be winners of a conference-provided free sightseeing helicopter ride around Kauai. The tourists on the cliffs see that the helo, instead of staying clos
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They are estimated to be 20 years ahead of the civilian world in when it comes to encryption research in the opinion of AC posters on slashdot.
It seems to be some sort of hero-worship of the US government that's prevalent here. I'm sure they do a lot, and we know that they find weaknesses in some stuff before others do, but I do not believe for one second that they have access to hardware types that are not even in the experimental prototype stage yet.
Optimist (Score:2)
I think you are too optimistic. I do not mean that "THEY" have one (I do not know/not answer). The issue is that the statement should read:
After all, why limit it to only "ours" enemies after spending so much on it?
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Of course we don't have any of the quantum computers the grey aliens ga... eh, I mean, we haven't come that far yet.
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I wonder if "THEY" already have one of these quantum computers
Pardon my lack of paranoia. It's because "they" are out to get you, not me.
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Alright, damnit! You caught us, us being they. Our representatives will be contacting you shortly to see about how you came by this wonder.
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With the crypted Echelon IP I just published, if NSA has a way to decrypt the message and want to track me, Slashdot will be offline in 5, 4, 3...2......1
127.0.0.1? Why am I able to log into that with my current username and password?
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Damn! They got to him before he posted!
New assymetric algorithms needed? (Score:5, Interesting)
Symmetric algorithms are at least in their second generation (DES/Lucifer now AES) of production use, with decades of study and close analysis by a lot of good minds.
Asymmetric algorithms are still essentially the first generation. Take RSA. It has been out for so long that its patent has expired more than 15 years ago. Even elliptic curve cryptography has been out at least 20 years, because the NeXT had it in NeXTStep 3.0 (and ended up getting pulled out of the OS due to ITAR).
Even cryptographic hashes have been through a number of iterations. We had MD4, then MD5, then SHA-1, then SHA-256, now are looking for something to replace SHA, similar to how Rijndael replaced 3DES and DES.
Maybe it is time to have a contest to have a standard asymmetric algorithm to replace RSA, DSS, and ElGamal? Something fundamentally designed to resist quantum computer attack as well as other threats.
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If we had a fundamental understanding of problems that aren't solvable by quantum computing, some insight into whether P != NP or not then maybe. But we don't and until then, RSA has a lot going for it - for one it's extremely simple. So simple we went through and did examples on paper, of course with reduced bits. People have been trying to find an algorithm to factor integers for the last 2000 years, it's not a trivial task using conventional computers.
Shor's algorithm is impressive but it needs registers
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Umm, TWIRL and TWINKLE are essentially flashing lights in cardboard tubes, and an awful lot of handwaving by the "inventor".
I know one instance of RSA-768 that was broken using NFS, but hadn't heard anything more recent than that, certainly nothing using a glorified kaleidoscope.
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Umm, TWIRL and TWINKLE are essentially flashing lights in cardboard tubes, and an awful lot of handwaving by the "inventor".
Yup. Though I'd consider it possible that the NSA can brute force a 1024 bit key, given enough interest. However, that's no reason to abandon the algorithm as you can just increase key length to 2048 or 4096 bit. It's essentially just the same as increasing a symmetric key from 64 to 128 or 256 bit, huge difference in security.
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Three reasons:
1: Public keys are not just used for real time exchanges. Public keys are sometimes used for data archiving where the private keys are held in an offline area. Same with keys that sign programs to detect tampering.
2: Quantum links are really, really slow. Instead of a one time pad, realistically you want to generate a key through the secure channel via a Diffie-Hellman handshake that is used for some time then chucked (like for a transaction or for a chunk of data.) Then send the bulk da
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5: There is the issue of trust. You can set up a quantum exchange with another machine and come up with a key that you know hasn't been touched... but is that really your bank, or is it some site in Elbonia that is patched in? Quantum key selection won't help you here in knowing that you are talking to the right host.
Actually, yes it does. You'll need a shared secret, but that shouldn't be too hard to arrange with your bank, right? It doesn't even need to be particularly secure, as there's no practical bru
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With my bank, yes, there is a shared secret. However, what if I'm buying a new vend-a-goat machine from a bovine supply house's website, some place where I have had no previous dealings, so establishing a shared secret, even a 4 digit PIN is not possible? My only other avenue would be to find the bovine supply house's phone number and set up a preshared secret over the phone. However, if the only info about the phone number's location is on the Web, then that becomes pointless.
Of course, we could get int
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What you're describing is a NP-complete problem -- assuming P != BQP != NP. But I'm guessing that you already know that :)
Still, it's still very hard to build a cryptosystem that exploits the hardness of solving NP-complete problems. The main problem is, NP-completeness only guarantees that some instance of the problem is hard, it says nothing about a specific instance. So, for instance, if you have a specific 3-SAT formula, there's no guarantee someone can't come up with a solution for it in polynomial t
It's "Caltech", not "CalTech" or "Cal Tech" (Score:3, Informative)
Seriously, Slashdot gets it wrong EVERY TIME. Next time, would it kill the editor to go to http://www.caltech.edu/ [caltech.edu] and, you know, read any of the words on the page?
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Pidantic much? {sic}
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Slashdot has editors? You do realize that the guys who post stories on the front page aren't editors in the classic sense, right? They have only the "content controller" role, and don't do the sort of editing one associates with "edited prose". Your UID is low enough that none of this should be news to you.
Also, no one cares how you spell Cal Tech.
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Well, they sure as hell have changed around the wording for every story I've ever had accepted. If that's not editing, what the hell is it?
Early connection? (Score:5, Interesting)
A sociological observation is that Shor was an undergrad at Caltech when McEliece was a professor there formulating the cryptosystem that would resist the quantum algorithm that Shor would develop years later. I wonder if knew each other.
Secure encryption (Score:2, Interesting)
The only encryption method I've heard about that has not been found to be breakable is the one time pad. This method has the problem of exchanging the pads beforehand.
All of the major encryption machines used during WWII appear to have been broken. The new encryption methods are currently much harder to break, but the spooks are likely to discover some innovative method to break such algorithms.
Current methods using large prime numbers sounds like they are soon (next few decades) to be broken. If we got int
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I'm not convinced that all these major breakthroughs in computing are just sitting right out of reach, waiting for a little war funding to make it happen. Computer technology has been moving so quickly the past couple of decades, and there's so much money to be made in these various fields, I'm sure the best and brightest are already working plenty hard on it.
I'm sorry, I'm an idiot- (Score:2)
In the simplest of terms
I thought the whole point of the quantum computer was was it did the equivalent of brute forcing every single possible answer simultaneously
instead of checking a password say from
a ..z ..az ..bz
b
c
aa
ab
ac
ba
bb
bc
so a one letter password (normal computer) can be checked in 26 steps, and a 2 letter password in 676 steps..
each once then proceeding,
and on a quantum computer, I thought it threw the equivalent of the OED (all possible answers, all possible combinations) at the same time.
but on
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No, it doesn't brute force every possible combination. You can perform an operation on a superposition of all possible k-bit strings, but you can't actually get all of the 2^k outcomes of that operation. If you measure the result, you'll get one of the 2^k outcomes at random.
Basically you start from that superposition of k-bit strings, then you apply some operations to that state so that all of the the correct answers are in phase with each other and constructively interfere. Effectively, you can only apply
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Simplistically: there are only certain algorithms it can perform such a search over. One of them is factorization (Shor's algorithm), and this can be applied to most current asymmetric ciphers because they're essentially isomorphic to one another.
Introduction to post-quantum cryptography (Score:2, Informative)
There is an old paper, written by DJB, which gives a quick introduction to some (this and) other quantum computer resistant encryption methods: Introduction to post-quantum cryptography [pqcrypto.org]
Arxiv paper (Score:2)
Here is a link to the paper on the arxiv:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1008.2390 [arxiv.org]
Reading through the abstract, I see that a significant feature of this cryptosystem is that it cannot be solved by "strong Fourier sampling", which makes the situation more interesting because it is only a slight exaggeration to say that quantum Fourier transforms are the only trick we know of that lets us get exponential speed-ups in quantum algorithms.
This doesn't rule out other methods (Score:2)
Quantul coputers ? (Score:2)
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> If it can be engineered, it can be reverse-engineered.
How does that apply to this article, in any way?
Re:Timeless saying applies here... (Score:5, Insightful)
It doesn't apply to this article. The way that one typically breaks a cryptosystem is not by reverse engineering (which is not even meaningful here, given that the algorithm is already completely open), but by finding a clever new way to solve the mathematics underlying the system using less information than the designers of the system had thought was needed.
Re:Timeless saying applies here... (Score:5, Insightful)
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Actually, with really hard-core crypto systems there are three traditional ways to break them: 1) rubber hose; 2) dumpster diving; or 3) box of chocolates/bouquet of roses.
What no wad of Cash xor hookers & blow?
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W8, why both of them wouldn't work?
Re:Timeless saying applies here... (Score:4, Funny)
WTF... OK... I can deal with slashdot being overrun by morns who know little but act big, but now we have to put up with text-ese ?
His UID is lower than yours so shouldn't it be "I can deal with that slashdot was overrun by morns who knew little when I signed up. (eol)"
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This is a newer ID. I have been on slashdot since '99
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This is a newer ID. I have been on slashdot since '99
... yeah ...
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Still a young'n. Heh, n00b!
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I love you too... but it's a secret remember?
Re:Timeless saying applies here... (Score:4, Interesting)
That falls under the generalization of (3).
(1) Threat/intimidation/violence
(2) Exploit a careless mistake
(3) Bribery/persuasion
I suppose (1) and (3) even could blur together into "influence" (negative and positive).
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I don't think XOR is the appropriate logic operator. cash is not mutually exclusive from hookers and dope as a bribe.
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I don't think XOR is the appropriate logic operator. cash is not mutually exclusive from hookers and dope as a bribe.
True but when you mix the two something odd happens and all of the money gets overwritten with blow somewhere in the FIFO buffer...
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Cash is actually the superposition of hookers and blow.
I purpose we petition for a grant to study this theorem in extreme detail as it just might lead to a grand unifying theory with black jack.
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and hookers. Okay, forget the Black Jack!
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It's worth noting that social engineering is quite often the cheapest method. I was at a conference back in 1999, where a Navy guy pointed out that in 'red team' testing, they'd found that the typical Systems Administrator would roll over for an average of $7000. No, I don't know how the details of how they conducted the test.
One could argue (or hope) that _most_ SysAdmins these days are more cognizant of the risks, so probably not as casual as they used to be.
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A fair point, but I would say that the number is at least one, maybe two orders of magnitude too low. $7000 is pocket change, probably less than the red team paid to fly there (wherever 'there' was). It says that a sysadmin would sell out what must be viewed as a multimillion dollar asset (not to mention their self-respect) for pennies on the dollar. To me it means that the sysadmins had no respect for their jobs, their profession, their responsibilities. If you're going to be a sleazebag crook, at leas
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Back in the day (1980) where I worked we were trying to get some computer graphics terminals 'TEMPEST' [wikipedia.org] certified. For those not familiar, this was a standard for minimal leakage of EMI, such that folks outside the building could pick up the noise and figure out what you were typing on your keyboard, or what direction and speed the plotter pen was moving, or even (I suppose) the memory addresses put on the bus - and certainly the large EMI coming off the high voltage guns for the display tubes, which could
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I think he's saying that this article does not qualify for reverse-engineering ;)
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How does that apply to this article, in any way?
I don't think you'd be surprised by how many upmods you could get by replying with old saying to just about any topic.
You can even pick one at random [neonwinter.com], post it in the next news item without even readin it and you'll have big chances of at least a +1 (insightful) among all the offtopics.
Re:Timeless saying applies here... (Score:5, Insightful)
If it can be engineered, it can be reverse-engineered.
That only works for "security through obscurity" type of problems. A good encryption should not be "solvable" - it must be brute forced. The question is how expensive the brute force method is in processing power and time.
Let's just back up a moment. (Score:3, Interesting)
How do you brute force (or solve) a one-time pad, where the pad was created from random atmospheric noise or any other truly random source?
[...]
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One-time passwords are a variation off the pre-shared key methods, where the sender and receiver have agreed on a set of keys on some presumed secure channel. Used as a method of identification, this method is exactly as secure as the pad (and its copies) are. However, the system does not have the advantages of asymetric encryption, in that whoever has the other copy of the preshared key (the bank, e.g.) can impersonate you, while with asymetric keys nobody can impersonate you (provided the channel where th
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Impersonation is an entirely different problem, and it may or may not be an advantage: for instance, when the endpoints are (or must be) trusted, it's irrelevant. And I should point out that if the endpoints aren't trusted, you shouldn't be talking to them at all.
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I missed the part about reusing pads, even after rereading. "You encrypt them with the last/reserved OTP the other end has." is mistaken in the idea that you can use a bitstring longer than the pad itself. It's not really a suggestion to reuse a pad that's already been used, though. It's a suggestion that the new pad be encrypted with the last pad bits not used from the old pad source.
One could chain-block a partial pad out to cover a larger cleartext, but then you're not really utilizing a full one-time pa
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I didn't mean to suggest that. I can see how it could be read that way, "cyclic" was poor wording on my part (I meant new random against old random, not reusing a short pad against a long message), I'm entirely on board with the updated OTP having to be the same (or lesser) length than the reserved OTP. Otherwise the repeated presence of the short OTP provides an analytical hook.
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Yes, exactly. So... in what sense is this not an updated OTP? Are you saying that because it is limited to the length of the reserved original OTP (which I absolutely agree with, btw) that it's not new? It'll be different, will it not? And it is every bit as secure as the original reserve, is it not? And it serves as yet another completely incomprehensible stream of X to burn useless cycles on decrypt attem
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I think you failed to comprehend what the original poster said, actually. I wasn't attacking him, I was just pointing out that a good encryption - in this case OTP encryptions - don't respond to brute force. At all. There's no amount of force that is sufficient or appropriate. Nor are they solvable. They are not only "good encryptions", they are *awesome* encryptions.
But thanks for playing: HDCUTWSVZPXYAZZC.
Let me know when you brute force that. :)
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yes, take the seeds in it and plant them.
Easy,
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Re:Good but not great (Score:5, Informative)
Feel secure again. Only a variant was broken. [iacr.org]
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Feel secure again. Only a variant was broken. [iacr.org]
The date of your document July 2008 precedes the successful decryption in October 2008.
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Which might be why it says:
This attack has been implemented and is now in progress.
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1) I think (hope) you mean WPA2, not WEP2...
2) The proof for the perfect security of OTPs only applies if the pad is random. Not pseudo-random. You seem to be describing what amounts to a very primitive psuedo-random number generator, using pages of books as seeds. If you are not using random information, it is incorrect to call it a one time pad.
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Regardless of whether or not his method is "good enough" (it probably is), it's not a OTP unless it uses actually random pads. By definition. If it's using a PRNG instead of a RNG, it is called a stream cipher.
'One time pad' is a term of art. In technical discussions about cryptography is should only be used where technically correct.
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Randomly generated one-time pads are definitely unbreakable. But the problems are generating the key and getting the key to the target as the key is as big as the text. So if you're using this to encrypt a connection, you need to split a 1Gig key, physically hand it to the target, and then you have 1Gig of communication before you need to hand him another stack of pads. It's good for sending code-words and like, emergency e-mails or something, but not c
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And a secure system for transmitting this pad from the sender to the receiver.
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There was an app named iGnore, which was rumoured to hide Apple stories from the Slashdot website.
Unfortunately, anyone who used it only saw a blank screen and assumed it was broken.