'Uncrackable' Document and Product Security? 30
Curunculus writes "The Engineer reports that a unique 'fingerprint' formed by microscopic surface imperfections on almost all paper documents, plastic cards and product packaging could be used as a cheaper method to combat fraud.
One of the developers, Professor Cowburn commented: "The beauty of this system is that there is no need to modify the item being protected in any way with tags, chips or inks; it's as if documents and packaging have their own unique DNA. This makes protection covert, low-cost, simple to integrate into the manufacturing process and immune to attacks against the security feature itself."
This system is now being commercialised via Ingenia Technology, a spin off company."
But.. (Score:2, Insightful)
Shhhhhh... (Score:4, Funny)
Thank you! (Score:2)
Re:But.. (Score:2)
Flatbeds (Score:1)
Re:Flatbeds (Score:3, Informative)
Surface imperfections? (Score:2)
Re:Surface imperfections? (Score:4, Informative)
I've worked with speckle-based systems, and I'm skeptical about this, since there's a _lot_ of variance when you're dealing with laser speckle. I don't really know how their imaging system could quickly and efficiently discriminate between hundreds of little dots, average their sizes, statistics, etc.
Any OE-s around that specialize in speckle to clear this up?
Re:Surface imperfections? (Score:1)
From here [sciencedaily.com]:
The technique was tried on a variety of materials including matt-finish plastic cards, identity cards and coated paperboard packaging and resulted in clear recognition between the samples. This continued even after they were subjected to rough handling including submersion in water, scorching, scrubbing with an abrasive cleaning pad and being scribbled on with thick black marker.
Re:Surface imperfections? (Score:1)
Fraud prevention? (Score:5, Interesting)
"Well Mr. Random, while it is quite unusual to see a tax rebate check of *ahem* eleventy-billion dollars, the article passed all verification checks. We've deposited the amount into your account. Have a nice day."
Re:Fraud prevention? (Score:2)
Luke
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Re:Fraud prevention? (Score:2)
Re:Fraud prevention? (Score:2)
Step 2) Generate a hash for the paper's fingerprint + the text you wish to print.
Step 3) Cryptographically sign that hash.
Step 4) Print the text and append the signature at the end.
Any attempt to alter the text invalidates the signature. Any attempt to duplicate the document loses the fingerprint and again invalidates the signature. So yes, it can work.
Of course this is all founded upon the assumption that the paper's fingerprint cannot be replicated. That is a safe assumption
TFA indicates it is flawed (Score:4, Informative)
Well, actually I didn't read the linked FA yet, but I read about this same thing elsewhere a few days ago. They said the chances of two peices of the same kind of paper have the same signature were 1:1000. Two reams of paper and you're in (or 1,000 peices of passport plastic, or whatever). Hardly an effort considering the documents they're considering using it on. Unless they can bump that number into the billions or more, it's pointless because it's too easy to manufacture a duplicate of any given document that has an identical fingerprint just by brute force.
Re:TFA indicates it is flawed (Score:3, Interesting)
So, I wouldn't count it out just yet.
Also, I'm not so sure on your comment,
"Unless they can bump that number into the billions or more, it's pointless because it's too easy to manufacture a duplicate of any given document that has an identical fingerprint just by brute force."
In some circumstances, yes, you'll be able to see the
Re:TFA indicates it is flawed (Score:1)
So let me know how things work out for you when you hand 1000 passports to customs and wait for one of them to pass the test.
And just how cool... (Score:1)
Professor Cowburn. Say it. It just rooollls off your tongue!
What happens when I... (Score:2)
Re:What happens when I... (Score:1)
Also, what do you do when you scan a page and it's not a match?
Hmm... (Score:1)
Something similar used to protect Torah scrolls (Score:2)
denial of service attack = crumple the paper (Score:1)
How much data again? (Score:3, Interesting)
Now, on with the math. First, we figure out how many samples we're going to possibly accomodate, as an address space:
Total surface area (21.0 cm * 29.7 cm * 10 E^12) * 1 Sample / cm^2 --> 623,700,000,000,000 Samples
This results in a 50 bit address space, if we were able to just sequentially number the samples. Since we have to work with what we're given, lets just assume we can get by with 256 bits/sample.
This results in the need to store (256 bits sample) * (1 byte / 8 bits) * (21 cm * 29.7 cm / document) * (1 sample / cm^2) --> 19958.4 bytes/ document.
So, in order for this to work we need to store about 20k/page. In order to authenticate documents, your stored database would be approximately 20 Gigabytes/ million documents, and indexing isn't going to help much.
That's a lot of work, and it seems to me it would be quicker, easier, and far more efficient in general to store duplicates of the originals in a secure location.
--Mike--
Oy. (Score:2)
Remind me what this is good for again?