Columbia Accident Investigation Board: Final Report 414
ssclift writes "After nearly 7 months the Columbia Accident Investigation Board
has released its final report into the
February 1st
loss of the Shuttle Columbia and all
7 crew members. This is more than a technical
assessment of the immediate causes of the accident.
Once again, sadly,
the world's flagship space agency
gets a thorough and grim review. Press briefings will begin at 11:00
EDT along with a webcast."
The "Culture of NASA"???? (Score:5, Insightful)
Sound familiar anyone?
Re:The "Culture of NASA"???? (Score:5, Insightful)
I suspect it's the same situation at all large organizations.
You can lead a manager to an idea, but you can't make him/her think.
Re:The "Culture of NASA"???? (Score:3, Interesting)
Re:The "Culture of NASA"???? (Score:5, Insightful)
The key is, children, it's a large organization. Being so it's relatively immune to external forces, or rather it's got internal resources to withstand any outside pressures to change. Again, this is true whether or not it's a government body or a corporate body. Local government bodies, like town councils are much, much more flexible than their equivalent in state or federal levels.
This holds true in private organizations too where small businesses, or ones with a thin layer of management are much more responsive/sensitive to outside pressures than are those from hugh behemeths like Microsoft, etc.
That same flexibility is also a weakness in that when a small organization has a good idea, government body or not, and faces a hostile environment it's not likely to succeed in implementing that idea relative to a larger organization so it's a trade off. Small and responsive, but also vulnerable and weak versus large and strong, but also insular and bullying.
Bottom line is, there's no single organizational structure that works in all circumstances for all times.
Re:The "Culture of NASA"???? (Score:3, Interesting)
I have to dis-agree with you here. It is not just a matter of office politics (a factor in all big organisations), but also national and international politics.
The problem with NASA is that the geeks and nerds are no longer in control of the big decisions. Most responsible scientific minded people are horrified by the nature of NASA today. Most people my age that could
Re:The "Culture of NASA"???? (Score:5, Interesting)
of course. now how would you or anyone build a system that was more open? even the japanese "tan" system has failed...
the suits will always be there and they will always want "yes men".
Re:The "Culture of NASA"???? (Score:3, Insightful)
See Kuhn [amazon.com], (and I am not shilling for Bezos).
The only irony in all of this is the hidden assumption that propeller-head organizations differ somehow from private sector ones. Sorry, all: peeps is peeps.
Oh so familiar... (Score:5, Interesting)
BTW, the mindset did not start within NASA. In the 60's, the mandate was to spend what was necessary to build the best solution that could be conceived; starting in the 70's, it was all about compromises.
It Would Be Nice if NASA could be given a mandate and execute on it in such a way to once again set an example on How It Should Be Done, but I think we ultimately need to fix our broader culture about the standards of how we conduct business.
Re:Oh so familiar... (Score:3, Informative)
And the 60's was also the era of the moon missions, the SR-71 Blackbird, and lots of other projects that modern engineers look back on with total amazement. Remember that 3GHz 32-bit CPUs hadn't even been dreampt of, yet--these engineers did things in their minds and with slide rules (yes, boys and girls, that is possible without Matlab and Pro/ENGINEER!).
Re:Oh so familiar... (Score:3, Insightful)
And it's not exactly like we are getting a whole lot of benefit from these "optimizations." All we end up with is a system that is either never completed, or is only a slight improvement over its predicessor.
Wait, I'm seei
Re:Oh so familiar... (Score:5, Insightful)
Given the increased complexity of modern fighter jets, 10 years for an F-22 seems about par for the course.
Re:The "Culture of NASA"???? (Score:5, Interesting)
Linux is better Re:The "Culture of NASA"???? (Score:4, Funny)
You see, with Linux we just rip off other people's work (hi SCO).
Re:The "Culture of NASA"???? (Score:5, Informative)
"Fisher did ultimately develop a pressurized pen for use by NASA astronauts (now known as the famous "Fisher Space Pen"), but both American and Soviet space missions initially used pencils, NASA did not seek out Fisher and ask them to develop a "space pen," Fisher did not charge NASA for the cost of developing the pen, and the Fisher pen was eventually used by both American and Soviet astronauts."
Re:The "Culture of NASA"???? (Score:3, Insightful)
Re:The "Culture of NASA"???? (Score:5, Insightful)
The small fry is not afraid of 200 suits, just two or three in the level or two of management above them. There are many levels of management in NASA and it is likely that someone somewhere in that chain of management (I was going to call it command, but frequently the managers high up have insufficient command/knowledge of the topic they manage) will not want to pass bad news along. They'll either decide to report nothing or spin it into something less distasteful. Generally there are two concerns: Somebody goofed or We need more time/money to do it right. The latter is not acceptable since NASA has a fixed budget and congress is already unhappy about the growing cost over-runs in some programs. It all really boils down to too much to do with too little resources. Just look at the way things worked under the moon program or the way it works under the dark side of DOD where money was/is frequently no object. Nowadays, everybody underbids to get the contract and then tries to do what they can with the money (not necessarily what was promised). Yes, checks and balances would help a little a few years down the road once the short-comings are caught and exposed, but by then any last shred of confidence in NASA by the public will have evaporated.
Bottom line here is that you get what you pay for.
Congress and the voters have to decide what they want to do given realistic costs. The costs are frequently adjusted by managers trying to get the program to boost their self esteem or pay-grade with little regard as to what will happen to the likelhood of success. The underlings are all too eager to try and make do for similar motivations. Now toss in contracting functions out to the lowest bidder and you're really asking for trouble.
Sorry if this borders on being a rant for some.
Re:The "Culture of NASA"???? (Score:3, Interesting)
The book is a series of Essays that illustrate the problems inherent in trying to use techniques for managing unskilled labor on a skilled workforce. The book is primarily structured around Software design, but it's teachings are readily adapted to most Engineering disciplines. It's chock full of un-intiuitive facts of life in engineering projects:
At least they admit it... (Score:5, Insightful)
"This was a case where we missed it. Just flat missed it," he said of the significance of the foam strike. "
At least they arent trying to cover it up. Now they can move forward, and hopefully we'll continue to explore space even more proficiently than before.
Who knows, maybe our grandkids (or their grandkids) will get to land on mars!
Re:At least they admit it... (Score:5, Funny)
I nominate DARL MCBRIDE (Score:2, Offtopic)
A rare opportunity (Score:5, Insightful)
Not having followed the eeaaarrrrllly presidential campaigning, are there any strong proponents for NASA out there?
Re:A rare opportunity (Score:5, Insightful)
I don't think it is a budget issue, though. Throwing money at this sort of problem rarely solves anything. The problem is a cultural one.
Organisations frequently have an upward focus. Too many people concentrate on what their boss wants to hear, instead of what needs to be said. Everything is about satisfying one's boss by helping them satisfy their boss, by helping them satisfy their boss, ad nauseum. It is more important that things look right the most senior administrator than that they are right.
An organisation that depends on highly skilled highly professional people at relatively low levels needs to have a downward focus. The most senior people need to focus on how they can help their direct reports do their job, and those people need to focus on helping their direct reports do their jobs, ad nauseum. In the end, this type of culture helps the engineers and technicians actually do their job.
The US military went through this kind of transition in the early 1980s. More and more command and control was moved lower and lower in the hierarchy. Tactics were left to the people on the scene. The senior personnel focused on strategy and logistics, coordinating and supplying, which enable the local personnel to do their jobs effectively. Taking out a machine gun nest is a job for a sargeant or lutenant on the scene - not a general in Washington.
Re:A rare opportunity (Score:3, Insightful)
Re:A rare opportunity (Score:3, Insightful)
Not only does this pressure exist, it has been listed as a contributory cause to both the Challenger and the Columbia accident. Chapter 5 and 6.2 of the CAIB final report goes into this in great detail.
"An Agency Trying To Do Too Much With Too Little" seems to sum up these sections. Keeping in mind that NASA's budget varies between one-half and one percent of the national budget, that's not to far af
Re:A rare opportunity (Score:5, Informative)
We don't need more funds.... (Score:3, Insightful)
Re:A rare opportunity (Score:3, Informative)
I think they should produce quarterly/yearly results of their findings/discoveries, commercial applications, patents, etc along with thier respective monetary implications. Then maybe people like my dad will stop complaining about the "hundred of millions" of dollars wasted by some people just "floating around in space" and can see some of the more tangible benefits of space explor
The future of NASA (Score:2, Interesting)
NASA Has been in trouble for a while (Score:5, Insightful)
It was a big hauler for the Military, which required so much tweakage to the engines that they require complete rebuilds between flights. It contains parts made from congressional fiefdoms scattered around the country. For example, the O-Rings were needed because the boosters are built in Minnesota and flown in chunks to Florida. The size of the shuttle and short shrift Congress paid to its budget led to useful items like atmospheric propulsion for landing to be scrapped during development.
The best thing NASA can do for itself is to just let the Shuttles sit in a hanger. They cost too much to launch and keep running. If the money that went into keeping the fleet running went into R&D they could have a replacement in a few years.
What sort of replacement? The shuttle has 3 almost mutually exclusive roles.
NASA has no shortage of heavy lift rockets. What they can't hurl into space, the Russians surely can. The ISS is in orbit 24/7, it can take over the "can ants in space sort tiny screws" experiments. So the only the part that NASA needs is the getting people to and from orbit part.
Once you strip the need to carry cargo, the shuttle suddenly shrinks. Every pound you don't have to launch is 3 pounds of propellent. You also save weight on the structure of the craft itself, it's landing gear, brakes, etc. The engines can be de-rated back to a range where they don't tear themselves apart every liftoff. Or better yet, just design them to use a cheap, quickly replaced, and disposable motor.
Since you are not riding the edge of performance, you can also utilize easier to handle hydrocarbon based fuels like aircraft Kerosene. Sure it's not as efficient, but it is readily available and simpler to store.
Even though you do have a permanent orbital platform, I do see some merit to keeping the ability to orbit for several weeks, not to mention the robot arm. EVA protocols will have to be adapted working without the cargo bay, but it could be done.
In short, by reducing the requirements of the shuttle you end up with the very simple spacecraft NASA had originally intended.
Re:NASA Has been in trouble for a while (Score:3, Informative)
The shuttle has retrieved 2 satellites (STS 51-A), and repaired 2 satellites in orbit: Canada Telecom's Syncom IV (STS 51-D) and The Hubble space telescope (STS 61, STS 82, STS 103, STS
Summary: (Score:5, Insightful)
"A terrible accident occured. It's nobody's fault, really. These things happen. We'll try to be more careful in the future. But, spaceflight is risky business, we can't make any guarantees."
Re:Summary: (Score:4, Insightful)
Re:Summary: (Score:2)
Vol. 1 (Score:2)
So, what they're saying is... (Score:5, Insightful)
Plus ca change...
Lessons learned (Score:2, Interesting)
Re:Lessons learned (Score:5, Interesting)
Also consider that that same week 90 people were roasted/squashed to death while attempting the life-altering experience of seeing "Great White" live on stage. Seems to me that space exploration is worth a bit more risk than that event.
sPh
Re:Lessons learned (Score:4, Insightful)
Yes sure. But something like this inevitably will happen again. I just hope it won't deter us from continuing with manned space exploration. (There might be other reasons to have a pause in manned space exploration, but fear of loss of life should never be one.)
Re:Lessons learned (Score:2, Insightful)
That's what we said last time. Spaceflight is a risky business and will be for a while.
Accident Report (Score:4, Funny)
Failure is not an Option? (Score:5, Interesting)
Re:Failure is not an Option? (Score:5, Insightful)
Re:Failure is not an Option? (Score:5, Insightful)
You know this how? You work at NASA? You were in mission control when Columbia went up?
About the only thing that's changed is that there's a no smoking rule. I live only a stones throw away from Gottard, and know dozens of people at various levels within NASA.
They are all extremely passionate about their work, and they all took Columbia very, very personally.
Dont make overly broad statements about a group of people you know absolutely nothing about.
Reminds me of sports fans (Score:3, Insightful)
This reminds me of sports fans, only obviously it's much more serious and real and consequential with NASA.
A guy across the cube divide from me here rants about his favorite Major League team not trying hard, having bad morale, being a bunch of overpaid, soft millionaires, and so on. He's a Red Sox fan. From back in the day, when I followed baseball, I could suggest six or seven much more curious opinions about what's ailed them over the years -- Fenway and the "Devil's Theory of Park Effects"
Re:Failure is not an Option? (Score:4, Informative)
I agree that NASA seems to be wandering rathering than striding forward. I personally think the primary cause is lack of a clear goal. I worked as a contractor at the NASA Ames Research Center for several years, and I had a look at NASA's 'mission statement' which came out in a very glossy 25 page booklet. (This was when Dan Goldin was Chief Admin.) It had a vision statement, key values, crosscutting procedures, about 10 significant questions, which all had subquestions, as well as some goals. My overall impression was "this could only have been produced by an organization that has no idea whatsoever what it's trying to do." A bit of an overstatement, but I think that the individual researchers and engineers (including myself) had plenty of drive but not enough direction.
Not to mention, NASA had its share of PHB type memos, particularly the ones Goldin used to send around about 'safety'. Worse was the requirement for each group to have a 'safety marshal' to give little talks on 'safety'. Alas, no shiny plastic badges or hats were issued with the job.
Re:Failure is not an Option? (Score:2)
Looks like it's going to take a while... (Score:4, Funny)
Not another boring space launch! (Score:5, Funny)
"Hmm, I don't know, all this equipment is for measuring TV ratings"
Feynman said exactly this 16 years ago (Score:5, Insightful)
It didn't change since then, it's not going to change now.
Re:Feynman said exactly this 16 years ago (Score:5, Interesting)
Sadly, you could be right about NASA not changing.
There are, however, some hopeful differences. Let me list a few:
This event is being viewed as NASA's Vietnam. That's a real wake up call.
Yes, things could still go wrong. There are plenty of well entrenched people who have turf to protect. But that's going to be much harder now.
And, I suspect, a lot of the good people who still manage to work in aerospace are also going to work to change things.
Time to shrink NASA (Score:5, Interesting)
Then I heard Jerry Pournelle speak a couple years ago at a convention. He said something that shook me: NASA has many good people and does many good things but needs to get out of the business of launching people and robots into space. It surprised me because here is a guy who is in favor of space exploration but against NASA.
NASA as an organization doesn't really care about cheap, reliable space launches, because that would mean that their budget would be cut! The shuttle accidents are a symptom of bureaucratic mentality. Think on this: the Russian space agency will charge you about $15M for a trip to the space station. It costs between $500M and $1 billion just to do a shuttle launch.
NASA does a great job building Mars rovers and such, let's keep them doing that. But we should turn everything else over to private industry.
Re:Time to shrink NASA (Score:2, Insightful)
Theres nothing to turn over, private industry can just go ahead and launch stuff into space, and do, as they shroud our planet in satellites.
Thats like saying the Air Force should stop researching new airplane technology. Let private industry develop the SCRAM jet.
Private industry isnt interested - they're motivated by profit. There's no money to be made studying the effects of 0 G on lima beans.
Re:Time to shrink NASA (Score:5, Insightful)
Private industry can not take up the flag for space exploration until a cheaper way is found to get there. In order for that to happen there must be central agency that focuses on this, and the agency must get government funding.
Nasa needs to keep doing what it has been doing, and it needs to be able to explore other RnD efforts.
The only company the could do priovate space launch successfully would be microsoft, and even there 40+billion wouldn't ge them far.
Actually, it doesn't have to get cheaper, but it oes have to get profitable.
once private companies do start backing manned space exporation, we had be damn sure there is a controlling body for safty, and launches. I do not want the space equivilent of baby bells.
Re:Time to shrink NASA (Score:2)
Re:Time to shrink NASA (Score:2)
Re:Time to shrink NASA (Score:2)
In those days NACA (NASA's pre-cursor) did not compete with aviation companies, like NASA does today. NACA would conduct ex
Re:Time to shrink NASA (Score:3, Insightful)
Re:Time to shrink NASA (Score:3, Interesting)
> NASA as an organization doesn't really care about cheap, reliable space launches, because that would mean that their budget would be cut!
NASA has quite a few projects under research and development. See NASA Projects [nasa.gov] -- NASA is researching cheaper ways to conduct space launches. Believe me, it behooves them to do so. Cutting costs in ANY area leaves more to apply to additional research. Congress doesn't ask NASA for bill based on the "cost of exploring space" -
Re:Time to shrink NASA (Score:2)
Crazy Vlaclav : She'll go 300 hectares on a single tank of kerosene.
Homer : What country is this car from?
Crazy Vlaclav : It no longer exists. But take her for a test drive, and you'll agree: (states their slo
*sigh* (Score:4, Informative)
I think the bottom line behind all this is most likely money. They have cut so many budgets as far as space goes and forced them to do fewer and fewer pre-flight inspections that something like this was almost guaranteed.
"Confidential interviews with shuttle workers at NASA and its contractors, 'from line technicians all the way through management', found no one who believed that preflight safety inspections were adequate, a member of the independent board investigating the loss of the Columbia has said." Linkage (and more of the same): http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/05/29/1054177
It's sad that it had to come to something like this for a wakeup call to be heard, but i guess all they can get out of it is to be more careful and not let it happen again. what else can ya get i guess...
change of mindset (Score:4, Interesting)
It's Huge! (Score:5, Informative)
So, for handy reference, here are the chapter titles.
PART ONE THE ACCIDENT
Chapter 1 The Evolution of the Space Shuttle Program
Chapter 2 Columbia?s Final Flight
Chapter 3 Accident Analysis
Chapter 4 Other Factors Considered
PART TWO WHY THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED
Chapter 5 From Challenger to Columbia
Chapter 6 Decision Making at NASA
Chapter 7 The Accident?s Organizational Causes
Chapter 8 History as Cause: Columbia and Challenger
PART THREE A LOOK AHEAD
Chapter 9 Implications for the Future of Human Space Flight
Chapter 10 Other Significant Observations
Chapter 11 Recommendations
PART FOUR APPENDICES
Appendix A The Investigation
Appendix B Board Member Biographies
Appendix C Board Staff
Even larger is the "Medium Resolution" version (Score:2)
At http://www.nasa.gov/columbia/home/index.html [slashdot.org] they also have the 28 Meg "Medium Resolution" version, which you'll want if you actually want to read any of the fine print on the graphics...
Managed by accountants rather than engineers (Score:5, Insightful)
Regrettably, many organisations insist that you be "Part of the solution" not "Part of the problem" (I think this was an AC buzz-phrase). This meant that unless you could deliver a problem with a solution, you were associated with failure. At the bottom engineers may gripe but unless the PHBs supervsing them help the problems be escalated, nothing will happen.
In the end if we want public money spent responsibly, then projects have to be managed and accountants must count the beans. However, engineering must have a voice that is equal to that of the manager and the accountant. It is right that an experimental program takes risks, but they must be informed.
Lastly, the space program has provided some very good examples of the managed delivery of quality projects. With Columbia and Challenger we have two major counter-examples. It is both useful and a good memorial to those who died if everyone, both inside and outside NASA learned from this.
Reminds me a lot of Apollo 1 disaster (Score:3, Interesting)
It appears that NASA frequently ignored safety warnings about the fragility of the shuttle tiles, and it appears that in a way that the switch to a more environment-friendly external tank foam material in 1997 may have contributed to the accident due to the fact the new foam had a tendency to shed material at an alarming rate. It reminds me a lot about the issues that caused the Apollo 1 fire in the way NASA engineers tacitly ignored the serious fire dangers of exposed wiring, flammable materials and 100% oxygen atmosphere on the ground.
Re:Reminds me a lot of Apollo 1 disaster (Score:2)
One of the reasons that Columbia wasn't in the same orbit as the ISS was that Columbia was using one of the older, heavier tanks, and as I understand it, those use the older type of foam.
Re:Reminds me a lot of Apollo 1 disaster (Score:2, Insightful)
If you ever have participated in a bigger industry project you will have noticed that every specialist involved has a _lot_ of objections to how things currently are done. Yet, the optimum solution is often not feasible due to cost constraints. As a result, project managers constantly get a lot of emails in their inbox with people bitching around that this-or-tha
NASA is no longer a flagship (Score:5, Insightful)
But because we've lost only 3 crews, and spend over a billion on every launch trying to bring it to zero (and therefore don't get a lot of launches), people are able to delude themselves into thinking that space travel should be safe. So when we do have a problem, everyone looks for someone to blame, NASA writes a few more books of safety procedures, launches get more expensive and less frequent.
You know why we lost the Columbia? Because NASA regulations didn't allow anyone to go out and look at the damned wing in orbit without specific orders. If the astronauts weren't treated as remote voice-controlled drones by the ground crews, and the shuttle commander had the responsibility and authority that goes with that title in any other field, somebody would have put on a suit and taken a look. But an EVA requires the input of hundreds of desk jockeys, and an "emergency" EVA requires authorization from the agency director. What kind of bullshit way to run a railroad is that?
Disband NASA, turn over civilian spaceflight regulation to the FAA (after first burning every regulation NASA ever wrote), turn the shuttle over to the Air Force and unmanned launches over to the civilian companies that really run them already. Otherwise, get used to the idea that the good old USA is no longer a space-faring nation, and other countries with the stomach for it are going to take the lead.
--Dave
Re:NASA is no longer a flagship (Score:2, Informative)
There was no way to do so even if they had an idea there might be something wrong. It's impossible to be crawling around the underside of the craft in orbit.
It had nothing to do with regulations. It was simply not possible.
give the engineers/commanders some autonomy (Score:3, Insightful)
Columbia was lost no matter what (Score:4, Insightful)
Same outcome, one way or another. Either they try to de-orbit regardless and crash, or they don't de-orbit, run out of power and oxygen and then lose the Orbiter when it comes down due to air drag. There was no place to park it and no way to rescue the crew on orbit. Screwed.
All the orbiters should have been in museums by now. The whole Shuttle system should have been replaced long since. Our failure to do so is testament to the triumph of inertia and pork over concrete goals.
Re:Columbia was lost no matter what (Score:3, Interesting)
BS. Once the breach had been identified, any number of out-of-the-box solutions could have been worked out to go and rescue the astrounats... E.g.
- resuply with a Progress ship
- rescue with a Long March
- send space-age duct tape with an Atlas
- send more fuel to the escape pod in the SS, then use the scape pod to ferry astrounats from the shuttle to the SS
- dust off an Apollo re-entry capsule from the Smithsonian and send it on an Ariadne 5 to be used as re-entry pod
and on and on... With so many options av
Re:Columbia was lost no matter what (Score:3, Interesting)
Rescue with long march... ummmm they havn't even sent a person up yet that I know of in a long march. Also questions about orbital inclnation possibilities.
SPace age duct tape.. right let me go down to wally world and pick some up. It dosn't exist. Tile is custom fitted and fixing t
Re:NASA is no longer a flagship (Score:3, Insightful)
Fine, there was no MMU. Why? Wrong question, there was no MMU because after studying it
The report has some nice pictures. (Score:3, Insightful)
Privatized space exploration (Score:5, Funny)
Mr. Feynman... (Score:2)
Using a BETA product for Production (Score:4, Interesting)
The shuttle is and was an experiment. It's effectively a very functional prototype, but the completion - or at least the ongoing refinement - of the shuttle program has been in stasis for too long. We're not driving Model-T's anymore for a reason.
The report itself is a great read. (Score:2)
Marcos
Comment removed (Score:5, Insightful)
Re:Starved for money and lacking direction (Score:2, Offtopic)
The wrong solutions to the wrong problems (Score:3, Interesting)
2. NASA's separation from the military is nothing more than a relic of Cold-War propaganda. If you check much of the pre-60's litera
Re: (Score:3, Interesting)
Key excerpts from Executive Summary (Score:5, Informative)
Executive Summary: Paragraphs 2,3 and 4
The Board recognized early on that the accident was probably not an anomalous, random event, but rather likely rooted to some degree in NASAs history and the human space flight programs culture. Accordingly, the Board broadened its mandate at the outset to include an investigation of a wide range of historical and organizational issues, including political and budgeary considerations, compromises, and changing priorities over the life of the Space Shuttle Program. The Boards conviction regarding the importance of these factors strengthened as the investigation progressed, with the result that this report, in its findings, conclusions, and recommendations, places as much weight on these causal factors as on the more easily understood and corrected physical cause of the accident.
The physical cause of the loss of Columbia and its crew was a breach in the Thermal Protection System on the leading edge of the left wing, caused by a piece of insulating foam which separated from the left bipod ramp section of the External Tank at 81.7 seconds after launch, and struck the wing in the vicinity of the lower half of Reinforced Carbon-Carbon panel number 8. During re-entry this breach in the Thermal Protection System allowed superheated air to penetrate through the leading edge insulation and progressively melt the aluminum structure of the left wing, resulting in a weakening of the structure until increasing aerodynamic forces caused loss of control, failure of the wing, and breakup of the Orbiter. This breakup occurred in a flight regime in which, given the current design of the Orbiter, there was no possibility for the crew to survive.
The organizational causes of this accident are rooted in the Space Shuttle Programs history and culture, including the original compromises that were required to gain approval for the Shuttle, subsequent years of resource constraints, fluctuating priorities, schedule pressures, mischaracterization of the Shuttle as operational rather than developmental, and lack of an agreed national vision for human space flight. Cultural traits and organizational practices detrimental to safety were allowed to develop, including: reliance on past success as a substitute for sound engineering practices (such as testing to understand why systems were not performing in accordance with requirements); organizational barriers that prevented effective communication of critical safety information and stifled professional differences of opinion; lack of integrated management across program elements; and the evolution of an informal chain of command and decision-making processes that operated outside the organizations rules.
Reduced Engineering Staff at NASA and Contractors (Score:5, Insightful)
Time to get out the broom and clean the house.
Communication (Score:2)
Both space shuttle disasters have a common thread: The inability of an engineer to communicate. In the first disaster, NASA was faxed a "don't launch" from some rocket engineers with pages and pages off scribbled supporting data in random order. NASA couldn't make sense of the scribblings, and twisted a few arms and got a "go ahead and launch but don't blame us" from the rocket engineers. We all know what happened.
The second disaster, engineers noticed the debris and said that this needed immediate investi
Meanwhile, in Parkes, Australia (Score:2)
(With apologies to The Dish [imdb.com].)
Chapter 10 is a must read for R&D engineers (Score:4, Informative)
p.219: "While ISO 9000/9001 expressed strong principles, they are more applicable to manufacturing and repetitive-procedure industries, such as running a major airline, than to a research-and-development, non-operational flight test environment like that of the Space Shuttle"
And it goes on with interesting points regarding maintenance documentation, procedures, design flaws, and managerial training.
Once again... (Score:3, Informative)
Secondly, Look at the missing tiles, et alia? They're applied manually, one-by-one. Do we need sensors (e.g., a filament) on every one of them so we know which ones are still there (or not)? The same goes for all of the other sections of the shuttle. Sensor mesh ingrained to various parts of the body, inside & out, learning to know "what's normal" and "what's not"? We take a lot of chances simply because we've gotten away with it. (It's good if it works - not unlike the software industry) If we had to make another landing on the moon, could we do it (and return safely) without a lot of flights to start over, just as we did in the 60s (for those reading this who were alive in the 60s) to get us "ready" for such a trip? How long will it be before we have a real-life "Capricorn One" (including OJ Simpson in the cast) and this is the twenty-fifth anniversary of that movie: Capricorn One [allmovie.com] There really wasn't any science in this movie - it's the suspense from finding out what happens with a doomed flight to Mars and the fact the public can't be told it fails. (Let's hope no schlockmeister gets the opportunity to remake it just as they did with other classic such as RollerBall.) Seriously, Capricorn One is worth the rental or late-night viewing.
No news (Score:5, Insightful)
My family has had several of its members working for NASA for the past 30 years. We have seen NASA locked in the same vicious cycle for the past 7 presidents, it goes something like this:
1. Congress tells NASA to cut budget.
2. Congress says no Centers, no matter how useless can be closed.
3. Directors of centers give actual job of cutting budget to middle managers(Who haven't done any engineering in decades)
4. Middle managers vote to fire everybody but themselves(What a surprise!) that is fire all the engineers under them and farm out the actual engineering to contractors.
5. Make wild claims of success
6. Repeat after next election cycle.
This has been repeated now so many times that NASA doesnt do any actual engineering any more. Furthermore many of these MMs farm out even the writing of the specs!
It is the opposite of what private industry does which is to fire the MMs and keep the engineers(Flatten the organizational chart, keep the Indians fire the chiefs, etc.)
There are so many reasons why this is bad that I wont list them all here (the average Slashdot reader knows them anyway) but the most devastating effect is zero accumulation of organizational knowledge. Constructing space vehicles is very technique oriented; the devil is all in the details. That is the difference between success and failure may be knowing that the lubricating grease on the control moment gyro needs to be of a specific viscosity and quality. (Speaking hypothetically, no slur to ISS, really). Going outside of these parameters means that the CMG fails which means that the spacecraft cant change attitude which means that you have a 100 M dollar piece of junk.
This has been has been documented at NASA ad nauseum but the basic organizational structure prevents accumulation of knowledge. Which means that we pay to reengineer every time will build something.
Now add in ?Low bid always wins? and see what happens. An experienced contractor who has built spacecraft now knows that they have NASA over a barrel because they are the only ones who know how to build what they want. So they jack up the price. The bid then is won by the inexperienced contractor who now has to learn everything all over again. Repeat.
The solution? Do the same thing private industry does: Keep the Indians, fire the chiefs. Prevent the loss of organizational knowledge at all cost. Begin the slow process of knowledge accumulation so that eventually the price of space vehicle construction will come down.
Naaah, makes too much sense.
EWR
Re:No news (Score:3, Insightful)
I don't know what dreamworld you're living in, but most of the time in private industry it's the engineers who are fired when there's a budget cut, not the managers. I've been working for NASA for two years and my impression is that it's no worse at NASA - and potentially better: JPL just created a new fund specifically to pay the salari
Is shuttle fligh safe? (Score:4, Interesting)
Transportation fatalities (Score:3, Insightful)
Here's the relevant figures for various dangerous modes of transportation. Based on this I would say its not about how dangerous it is to life and limb, its about the money, period.
Fatalities per 1 million passenger miles
Auto: 110
Urban transit: 83
School bus: 14
Shuttle: 0.006
Shuttle data so you can check my math
Total fatalities: 7 on Challenger, 7 on Columbia
Total passengers: over 600
Total time on orbit: 19179 hours
Avg orbital period: 90 minutes
Total miles: 329 million
Avg crew: 7
Total passenger miles: 2304 million
From the Executive Summary (Score:3, Interesting)
Emphasis mine.
What's *right* with NASA. (Score:5, Interesting)
I'm not sure to start on what's wrong with NASA. Many other posters have covered that in detail, and I think many of them are spot on.
But there is one thing very, very right--the people. From janitors and groundskeepers, all the way to the directors of the various centers, NASA employees are passionately devoted to the job they do. Losing Columbia hurt like losing members of their families, hurt their professional pride, hurt that part of their souls where they keep their their dedication and hope. They will continue because there is still work to be done, because the journey is still unfinished, because that's what their fallen comrades wanted. This spark is fundamental to NASA--the institutional culture cannot extinguish it, but I fear that it may become impotent.
Space travel is costly and risky. It will be centuries before we can consider it routine. The people of NASA have the expertise and the will to carry on, but will they be permitted to do so? I say, Stand aside and let your scientists and engineers work. Let your astronauts fly. They may greatly fail, but it will be because they have greatly dared.
We've forgotten courage, I think.
-Carolyn
Read chapter 6 (Score:4, Informative)
The basic problem, of course, is that the Shuttle's foam insulation flakes off and the thermal protection tiles are too fragile. Both of those problems have been known for decades, but not fixed. The only reason this didn't happen earlier is that a big piece of foam hadn't happened to hit a weak tile in a vulnerable spot. Big pieces of foam have fallen off before, they've hit tiles before, and they've caused damage before. Twenty years ago, foam caused serious tile damage. The damaged tile just happened to be covering an antenna mounting plate, so there was extra metal there to protect the structure. So that shuttle survived.
Buran, the USSR space shuttle, had a better tile design. (Buy surplus Buran tiles here.) [9f.com] The designers of Buran had the advantage of doing it after the US, and Buran has some advantages over the US shuttle. It's sad that Buran was retired so early.
Re:NASA seems to mean... (Score:2, Insightful)
They wont do anything that doesnt generate a profit. And safety in industry is directed by the legal department, a la "will this 'we are not responsible for blah blah..' disclaimer hold up in court?" This will be true so long as lawyers are cheaper than R&D.
I'd rather go to the moon with NASA than Amtrak or Delta, thanks.
Pr
Re:I am NOT a rocket scientist (Score:3, Insightful)
Just like the last disaster this one was caused by ignoring a problem and then assuming the problem was normal operating procedure.
To explain... The o-ring issue (of burn through due to cold temps) had been observed serval times before (including when the boosters were tested.) But a full burn through never happend so it was assumed the o-rings were safe, then tragedy number one happened.
It has been observed numerous times that foam insulation would come off and hit the shuttle (this was adm
Re:Physics question about foam impact (Score:3, Interesting)
Slipstream is fast, foam is light (Score:3, Informative)
Because the slipstream in the neighborhood of the bipod ramp was transsonic or even supersonic, and the foam had a huge amount of surface area for its mass. The combination of high velocity air and high area made the force quite high, while the low mass increased the acceleration (a = F/m, by Newton). If I understand correctly, the size of the foam piece and its speed were measured mo