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Science

Statistics of Deadly Quarrels 314

CarlNorthcore writes "Brian Hayes published this paper in the Computing Science chapter of Jan-Feb's American Scientist. It provides a fascinating and [sadly] relevant statistical exploration of our world's deadly conflicts. Look out for the excellent "Web of Wars" diagram."
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Statistics of Deadly Quarrels

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  • nerf (Score:4, Funny)

    by Transient0 ( 175617 ) on Friday May 03, 2002 @02:51PM (#3459214) Homepage
    how appropriate that the banner ad was for Nerf weapons when I viewed this story...
  • Civil Wars (Score:4, Funny)

    by NiftyNews ( 537829 ) on Friday May 03, 2002 @02:52PM (#3459221) Homepage
    "Civil wars are omitted"

    Good. I hate to sit around and watch two windbags duke it our with big words. I like my wars like I like my movies: with lots of action and cool explosions.
  • Web of Wars (Score:3, Interesting)

    by k_d3 ( 559373 ) <kool_dudzNO@SPAMhotmail.com> on Friday May 03, 2002 @02:53PM (#3459230)
    Geez. Now that I think about it, there have been a lot more deadly conflicts than they taught us at school. It's a real eye-opener. I wish I had this when I needed it. On another tangent -- isn't this what the web is for? The "Information Superhighway"? It's nice that I'm actually learning useful history online, rather than in some stuffy classroom.
    • I wish the "Web of Wars" had been a globe and not a flat, mercator projection....

      It would be interesting to see how the lines wrapped around the world. Right now it looks like Europe was the epicenter of war, but maybe that's just because of wars that span the Pacific being routed through Europe on the map.

      Hm, actually I think it would be especially interesting to see a globe with an intensity down to about magnitude 2 or 3 or lower.

      It would be interesting to look at, and to show to guests, if nothing else. =]
  • How To Stop Wars (Score:5, Informative)

    by Mittermeyer ( 195358 ) on Friday May 03, 2002 @02:56PM (#3459240) Homepage
    Here [dunnigan.com] is a less obtuse and more practical summation of an 80s book that somehow got short shrift. How To Stop A War is more usable then that article.
    • Re:How To Stop Wars (Score:5, Interesting)

      by pmancini ( 20121 ) <.pmancini. .at. .yahoo.com.> on Friday May 03, 2002 @03:14PM (#3459358) Homepage
      That is interesting. I am a big fan of Dunnigan. He is an impossible person to deal with in real life, so I hear, but he has a brilliant mind. His other related books make good reading as well. I especially liked his book on how the digital revolution has changed warfare over the years.

      He and Keegan share a similar idea that is echoed in the article mentioned: "this respect, Richardson's data suggest that wars are like hurricanes or earthquakes: We can't know in advance when or where a specific event will strike, but we do know how many to expect in the long run. We can compute the number of victims; we just can't say who they'll be." Keegan in particular writes in "The Face of Battle" that war is very similar to natural disasters and lists the ways. A good read.

      Finally, if one is interested in this sort of thing, Dunnigan and Austin Bay wrote "The Quick and Dirty Guide to Warfare" which makes predictions. The first book in the series was quite accurate 10 years later. The last update appears to be the 1996 third edition.
  • by GutBomb ( 541585 ) on Friday May 03, 2002 @02:56PM (#3459241) Homepage
    think of the deadly conflict that is happening in this guy's server room right now. slashdotted in 1 minute.
  • by JayAndSilentBob ( 517888 ) <bass@NoSpAm.sellingmysoul.com> on Friday May 03, 2002 @03:01PM (#3459271) Homepage
    Just the image, not the surrounding page..... http://www.sellingmysoul.com/web.jpg [sellingmysoul.com] Hope someone else grabbed the rest of the site before it died....
  • A bit biased (Score:3, Insightful)

    by inepom01 ( 525367 ) <inepom01@hotmail.MOSCOWcom minus city> on Friday May 03, 2002 @03:02PM (#3459282)
    I didn't like the fact that the thing has no indication of time. What about the fact that the US has been around for little over 200 years while other countries (especially the European ones with lots of lines) have been around for much more than that. Maybe they should limit this thing by time or something.
    • it is not a comparision. it is simply a representation.
    • Re:A bit biased (Score:5, Informative)

      by jonathanjo ( 415010 ) <(gro.fsf) (ta) (onoj)> on Friday May 03, 2002 @03:54PM (#3459615) Homepage

      I didn't like the fact that the thing has no indication of time. What about the fact that the US has been around for little over 200 years while other countries (especially the European ones with lots of lines) have been around for much more than that. Maybe they should limit this thing by time or something.

      This covers the period from 1820 to 1950, as explained in the article. And the caption states, "The diagram ignores many changes in national status (such as the assembly and disassembly of Yugoslavia)." Since they used TLD country codes presumably they are ascribing conflicts to the current nation on the soil of the nation that engaged in it, for convenience. "They" *did* "limit this thing by time or something."

      RTFA.

    • It does account for time.

      Look at the last graph.

      Big decline in frequency of wars in the late 1600's and early 1700's. Which ended--oh look--during the American Revolution.

      Ever since then, the world has decided it can solve its problems profitably through violence.

      --Blair
  • 3d model (Score:2, Insightful)

    by estoll ( 443779 )
    Someone should put that diagram into that gnucleus network modelling program so you can focus on certain countries. That image is so cluttered you can barely see anything.
  • other info... (Score:2, Informative)

    by Anonymous Coward
    ...worth looking at is the Correlates of War Project:
    http://www.umich.edu/~cowproj/

    zeruch
  • I don't know about you, but I'm moving to whatever country ends in "co", "ec", "kr", "ve", or "ph". At least I know they have Internet access there.
  • by mybecq ( 131456 ) on Friday May 03, 2002 @03:11PM (#3459334)
    Although this diagram looks nice, it doesn't present a clear view of what is happening now. It consists of all conflicts between countries from Richardson's statistics (1820 - 1950), with refinements from Wilkinson.

    Consider the graph (when it eventually comes up). All the red-lines represent Category 7, which is only the two world wars (the most recent of which was 50+ years ago). Category 6 is for deaths of from 500,000 to 2,000,000.

    It would be nice to have information regarding something in more recent history, such as the last 10 - 20 years.
  • by JeanBaptiste ( 537955 ) on Friday May 03, 2002 @03:14PM (#3459362)
    completely one sided wars, like Iraq v US (round 1)
    wouldn't that be a high magnitude for Iraq and a low magnitude for the US?

    and yes I do know that this study did not include that war... were there any completely one sided wars involved in the time frame studied?
    • I don't know if he counted them, but yes, there were many one-sided wars through the 19th and 20th centuries. All it requires is a vast technological difference between one side and the other. Good old-fashioned imperialist subjugation of Africa, Asia, and the Americas largely consisted of one-sided slaughters, usually those with guns and horses versus those without.
    • In most one-sided wars of acquisition (instead of punishment or destruction), you would expect the losing side to capitulate rather quickly and probably suffer not that many casualties. Belgium, for instance, probably did not suffer huge casualties against the German invasion in absolute terms (which the study uses); it did not, AFAIK, have a massive army with which to have massive losses, nor did the Germans try particularly hard to obliterate the Belgian citizenry.

      (Compare to the German-Russian conflict, where massive losses were pretty much inevitable because both military machines were of such enormity, and neither's government had any intention of backing down quickly...)

      Iraq was an odd case because it had a quite large, as measured in persons, but their training, morale and equipment were quite deficient.
    • I think he's going on war being a lose/lose proposition. Why have two different magnitudes for the sides when all the dead people are... well, all dead? Total effect on humankind, or something of that sort.

      Regardless, on a hunch I would say that tremendously one-sided wars are probably lower magnitude than when the sides are evenly matched. Nothing causes casualties like a slugfest where neither side is backing down. Armies that break quickly and surrender take fewer casualties than those that stand and fight it out (excepting ethnic or religious conflicts).
      • IIRC we killed about a 100,000 people in iraq. I don't know how many we killed in afghanistan (only we had free press in this country we migh have had some numbers) but I'd venture to say it's impossible to bomb continuously for a month not kill at least 30 thousand people.
        • Sure; not trying to say no one died, just hypothesizing that it would have been more had it been a more even match. I think you're way off on your numbers as far as equating months of bombardment with certain amounts of casualties. It has a lot more to do with targets, tonnage, and rules of engagement. If they're hitting cities (like in Iraq) I would expect it would be higher, mostly rocks (like Afghanistan) a lot lower. And the reason we don't know, of course, has much more to do with lack of a free press there than here. If you're expecting some guy speculating from the anchor desk of ABC to give you good numbers on something happening half a world away that he can't see, of course you're not going to get accuracy--which is not to say he can't make up any numbers he'd like, high or low, which sounds pretty free to me. :)
          • Why would the United States spend billions of dollars and bomb rocks? What a silly thing to say. Bombing was targetted at the (so called) soldiers.

            BTW nobody in afghanistan was impeding the movement of the press except the US military. Just like nobody is impeding the movement of the press in palestine except the israeli army. The reason we don't have numbers is because the US military controlled what you are allowed to see and hear. They kept a tight lid on the press in afghanistan and gave the public the rummy show stand up act to keep them occupied.
            • I didn't say they were targetting rocks, just hitting them, and I said it because A: it was a colorful metaphor and B: because (and I'm surprised this has escaped your notice, given your obvious bias) they make mistakes. And there is a difference between dispersed targets (a lot of guys in caves) and clustered targets (a lot of guys in urban areas). And I won't even go into the different types of bombs and bombing that might be used and how that affects casualty rates, since you don't seem very interested in hearing anything that doesn't reinforce your own view of the situation.

              Your assertion about Afghanistan and the press is misplaced; specifically, it should be placed in Kuwait/Iraq and moved back about ten years. There haven't been any significant restrictions on press movement in Afghanistan since this thing started, and if you leaf back through the various articles covering the last several months you would see that--all those reporters getting killed by bandits, wearing burqas to blend in to the populace, and generally spending more time filing articles about their personal safety and not about the battles--they are not there under control of anyone's military. Some of them were there before there was any real military presence. Their lack of freedom has more to do with cultural issues than any sort of control problem. I would suggest that you're so caught up in your agenda that you're taking the conditions of Kosovo and the Gulf War and imposing them here to stoke your somewhat weak arguments. However, I'm not interested in discussing the conspiracy theory of the week--I think this study, the numbers, and the implications, are intriguing, and are so without dragging any tired old over-simplified, anti-American diatribes into it. I have no interest in defending the American military's mistakes, but they just don't have anything to do with what this conversation was originally about. If you can't even be bothered to address the basic thesis (even matches=more casualties) then this is just a waste of bandwidth. Thanks for your time anyway.
    • didn't see anything about completely one sided wars, like Iraq v US (round 1)

      And there was me thinking that it was a coalition of countries vs Iraq. Only 12 years on and already it's being revised.

      You remind me of a guy who I talked to on IRC a couple of months back who swore blind that the US was actively involved in World War II before Pearl Harbor forced its hand. Any documentary evidence I produced about the US policy of isolationism, etc was just dismissed as "commie propoganda".

      The guy even went as far as saying that only US troops were involved in D-Day (all those British and Canadian troops must have crossed the Channel on a collective day trip) and that they marched into Berlin and ended the war in Europe too (neatly omitting the Russian contribution as well).

      Oh, and if you think that a war that saw half a million US troops deployed half the way around the world is "low magnitude" then you've got a really strange idea of scale. Other than WWII, Korea and Vietnam, the Gulf War is easily the biggest conflict in which the US has played an significant part.

      Bottom line: get the facts straight please.
  • by rebill ( 87977 ) on Friday May 03, 2002 @03:15PM (#3459371) Journal

    One comment at the end of the article caught my attention:

    We now have it in our power to have a magnitude-8 or -9 war. In the aftermath of such an event, no one would say that war is demographically irrelevant. After a war of magnitude 9.8, no one would say anything at all.

    This points out a comparison problem within the original research - it does not take into account the population increases over time. For example, somewhere in the mid-1600s, London had a population of 600,000 people, while it currently has a population near 7,000,000. That is the difference between a magnitude-5.7 and a magnitude-6.8 event, using the given scale.

    Would factoring in the population growth curve enhance or reduce the apparent randomness of the data?

  • Battle Estimate (Score:2, Informative)

    by Mittermeyer ( 195358 )
    This [dupuyinstitute.org] is THE battle analysis tool. Trevor Dupuy was the master of prediction. Note the $93,000 price tag.

    Remember, this is a tool for the operational level. The article is discussing macrosocietal conflict.
  • by 3ryon ( 415000 ) on Friday May 03, 2002 @03:20PM (#3459397)
    Computing Science
    January-February, 2002

    Statistics of Deadly Quarrels

    Brian Hayes

    Note: This document is available in other formats.

    Look upon the phenomenon of war with dispassion and detachment, as if observing the follies of another species on a distant planet: From such an elevated view, war seems a puny enough pastime. Demographically, it hardly matters. War deaths amount to something like 1 percent of all deaths; in many places, more die by suicide, and still more in accidents. If saving human lives is the great desideratum, then there is more to be gained by prevention of drowning and auto wrecks than by the abolition of war.

    But no one on this planet sees war from such a height of austere equanimity. Even the gods on Olympus could not keep from meddling in earthly conflicts. Something about the clash of arms has a special power to rouse the stronger emotions--pity and love as well as fear and hatred--and so our response to battlefield killing and dying is out of all proportion to its rank in tables of vital statistics. When war comes, it muscles aside the calmer aspects of life; no one is unmoved. Most of us choose one side or the other, but even among those who merely want to stop the fighting, feelings run high. ("Antiwar militant" is no oxymoron.)

    The same inflamed passions that give war its urgent human interest also stand in the way of scholarly or scientific understanding. Reaching impartial judgment about rights and wrongs seems all but impossible. Stepping outside the bounds of one's own culture and ideology is also a challenge--not to mention the bounds of one's time and place. We tend to see all wars through the lens of the current conflict, and we mine history for lessons convenient to the present purpose.

    One defense against such distortions is the statistical method of gathering data about many wars from many sources, in the hope that at least some of the biases will balance out and true patterns will emerge. It's a dumb, brute-force approach and not foolproof, but nothing else looks more promising. A pioneer of this quantitative study of war was Lewis Fry Richardson, the British meteorologist whose ambitious but premature foray into numerical weather forecasting I described in this space a year ago. Now seems a good time to consider the other half of Richardson's lifework, on the mathematics of armed conflict.

    Wars and Peaces

    Richardson was born in 1881 to a prosperous Quaker family in the north of England. He studied physics with J. J. Thomson at Cambridge, where he developed expertise in the numerical solution of differential equations. Such approximate methods are a major mathematical industry today, but at that time they were not a popular subject or a shrewd career choice. After a series of short-term appointments--well off the tenure track--Richardson found a professional home in weather research, making notable contributions to the theory of atmospheric turbulence. Then, in 1916, he resigned his post to serve in France as a driver with the Friends' Ambulance Unit. Between tours of duty at the front, he did most of the calculations for his trial weather forecast. (The forecast was not a success, but the basic idea was sound, and all modern weather prediction relies on similar methods.)

    After the war, Richardson gradually shifted his attention from meteorology to questions of war and international relations. He found some of the same mathematical tools still useful. In particular, he modeled arms races with differential equations. The death spiral of escalation--where one country's arsenal provokes another to increase its own armament, whereupon the first nation responds by adding still more weapons--has a ready representation in a pair of linked differential equations. Richardson showed that an arms race can be stabilized only if the "fatigue and expense" of preparing for war are greater than the perceived threats from enemies. This result is hardly profound or surprising, and yet Richardson's analysis nonetheless attracted much comment (mainly skeptical), because the equations offered the prospect of a quantitative measure of war risks. If Richardson's equations could be trusted, then observers would merely need to track expenditures on armaments to produce a war forecast analogous to a weather forecast.

    Mathematical models of arms races have been further refined since Richardson's era, and they had a place in policy deliberations during the "mutually assured destruction" phase of the Cold War. But Richardson's own investigations turned in a somewhat different direction. A focus on armaments presupposes that the accumulation of weaponry is a major cause of war, or at least has a strong correlation with it. Other theories of the origin of war would emphasize different factors--the economic status of nations, say, or differences of culture and language, or the effectiveness of diplomacy and mediation. There is no shortage of such theories; the problem is choosing among them. Richardson argued that theories of war could and should be evaluated on a scientific basis, by testing them against data on actual wars. So he set out to collect such data.

    Richardson was not the first to follow this path. Several lists of wars were drawn up in the early years of the 20th century, and two more war catalogues were compiled in the 1930s and 40s by the Russian-born sociologist Pitirim A. Sorokin and by Quincy Wright of the University of Chicago. Richardson began his own collection in about 1940 and continued work on it until his death in 1953. His was not the largest data set, but it was the best suited to statistical analysis.

    Figure 1

    Richardson published some of his writings on war in journal articles and pamphlets, but his ideas became widely known only after two posthumous volumes appeared in 1960. The work on arms races is collected in Arms and Insecurity; the statistical studies are in Statistics of Deadly Quarrels. In addition, a two-volume Collected Papers was published in 1993. Most of what follows in this article comes from Statistics of Deadly Quarrels. I have also leaned heavily on a 1980 study by David Wilkinson of the University of California, Los Angeles, which presents Richardson's data in a rationalized and more readable format.

    "Thinginess Fails"

    The catalogue of conflicts in Statistics of Deadly Quarrels covers the period from about 1820 until 1950. Richardson's aim was to count all deaths during this interval caused by a deliberate act of another person. Thus he includes individual murders and other lesser episodes of violence in addition to warfare, but he excludes accidents and negligence and natural disasters. He also decided not to count deaths from famine and disease associated with war, on the grounds that multiple causes are too hard to disentangle. (Did World War I "cause" the influenza epidemic of 1918-1919?)

    The decision to lump together murder and war was meant to be provocative. To those who hold that "murder is an abominable selfish crime, but war is a heroic and patriotic adventure," Richardson replies: "One can find cases of homicide which one large group of people condemned as murder, while another large group condoned or praised them as legitimate war. Such things went on in Ireland in 1921 and are going on now in Palestine." (It's depressing that his examples, 50 years later, remain so apt.) But if Richardson dismissed moral distinctions between various kinds of killing, he acknowledged methodological difficulties. Wars are the province of historians, whereas murders belong to criminologists; statistics from the two groups are hard to reconcile. And the range of deadly quarrels lying between murder and war is even more problematic. Riots, raids and insurrections have been too small and too frequent to attract the notice of historians, but they are too political for criminologists.

    For larger wars, Richardson compiled his list by reading histories, starting with the Encyclopaedia Britannica and going on to more diverse and specialized sources. Murder data came from national crime reports. To fill in the gap between wars and murders he tried interpolating and extrapolating and other means of estimating, but he acknowledged that his results in this area were weak and incomplete. He mixed together civil and international wars in a single list, arguing that the distinction is often unclear.

    An interesting lesson of Richardson's exercise is just how difficult it can be to extract consistent and reliable quantitative information from the historical record. It seems easier to count inaccessible galaxies or invisible neutrinos than to count wars that swept through whole nations just a century ago. Of course some aspects of military history are always contentious; you can't expect all historians to agree on who started a war, or who won it. But it turns out that even more basic facts--Who were the combatants? When did the fighting begin and end? How many died?--can be remarkably hard to pin down. Lots of wars merge and split, or have no clear beginning or end. As Richardson remarks, "Thinginess fails."

    In organizing his data, Richardson borrowed a crucial idea from astronomy: He classified wars and other quarrels according to their magnitude, the base-10 logarithm of the total number of deaths. Thus a terror campaign that kills 100 has a magnitude of 2, and a war with a million casualties is a magnitude-6 conflict. A murder with a single victim is magnitude 0 (since 100=1). The logarithmic scale was chosen in large part to cope with shortcomings of available data; although casualty totals are seldom known precisely, it is usually possible to estimate the logarithm within ±0.5. (A war of magnitude 6±0.5 could have anywhere from 316,228 to 3,162,278 deaths.) But the use of logarithmic magnitudes has a psychological benefit as well: One can survey the entire spectrum of human violence on a single scale.

    Random Violence

    Richardson's war list (as refined by Wilkinson) includes 315 conflicts of magnitude 2.5 or greater (or in other words with at least about 300 deaths). It's no surprise that the two World Wars of the 20th century are at the top of this list; they are the only magnitude-7 conflicts in human history. What is surprising is the extent to which the World Wars dominate the overall death toll. Together they account for some 36 million deaths, which is about 60 percent of all the quarrel deaths in the 130-year period. The next largest category is at the other end of the spectrum: The magnitude-0 events (quarrels in which one to three people died) were responsible for 9.7 million deaths. Thus the remainder of the 315 recorded wars, along with all the thousands of quarrels of intermediate size, produced less than a fourth of all the deaths.

    Figure 2 Figure 3

    The list of magnitude-6 wars also yields surprises, although of a different kind. Richardson identified seven of these conflicts, the smallest causing half a million deaths and the largest about 2 million. Clearly these are major upheavals in world history; you might think that every educated person could name most of them. Try it before you read on. The seven megadeath conflicts listed by Richardson are, in chronological order, and using the names he adopted: the Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864), the North American Civil War (1861-1865), the Great War in La Plata (1865-1870), the sequel to the Bolshevik Revolution (1918-1920), the first Chinese-Communist War (1927-1936), the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) and the communal riots in the Indian Peninsula (1946-1948).

    Looking at the list of 315 wars as a time series, Richardson asked what patterns or regularities could be discerned. Is war becoming more frequent, or less? Is the typical magnitude increasing? Are there any periodicities in the record, or other tendencies for the events to form clusters?

    A null hypothesis useful in addressing these questions suggests that wars are independent, random events, and on any given day there is always the same probability that war will break out. This hypothesis implies that the average number of new wars per year ought to obey a Poisson distribution, which describes how events tend to arrange themselves when each occurrence of an event is unlikely but there are many opportunities for an event to occur. The Poisson distribution is the law suitable for tabulating radioactive decays, cancer clusters, tornado touchdowns, Web-server hits and, in a famous early example, deaths of cavalrymen by horse kicks. As applied to the statistics of deadly quarrels, the Poisson law says that if p is the probability of a war starting in the course of a year, then the probability of seeing n wars begin in any one year is e-ppn/n!. Plugging some numbers into the formula shows that when p is small, years with no onsets of war are the most likely, followed by years in which a single war begins; as n grows, the likelihood of seeing a year with n wars declines steeply.

    Figure 3 compares the Poisson distribution with Richardson's data for a group of magnitude- 4 wars. The match is very close. Richardson performed a similar analysis of the dates on which wars ended--the "outbreaks of peace"--with the same result. He checked the wars on Quincy Wright's list in the same way and again found good agreement. Thus the data offer no reason to believe that wars are anything other than randomly distributed accidents.

    Richardson also examined his data set for evidence of long-term trends in the incidence of war. Although certain patterns catch the eye when the data are plotted chronologically, Richardson concluded that the trends are not clear enough to rule out random fluctuations. "The collection as a whole does not indicate any trend towards more, nor towards fewer, fatal quarrels." He did find some slight hint of "contagion": The presence of an ongoing war may to some extent increase the probability of a new war starting.

    Figure 4

    Love Thy Neighbor

    If the temporal dimension fails to explain much about war, what about spatial relations? Are neighboring countries less likely than average to wind up fighting one another, or more likely? Either hypothesis seems defensible. Close neighbors often have interests in common and so might be expected to become allies rather than enemies. On the other hand, neighbors could also be rivals contending for a share of the same resources--or maybe the people next door are just plain annoying. The existence of civil wars argues that living together is no guarantee of amity. (And at the low end of the magnitude scale, people often murder their own kin.)

    Richardson's approach to these questions had a topological flavor. Instead of measuring the distance between countries, he merely asked whether or not they share a boundary. Then, in later studies, he refined this notion by trying to measure the length of the common boundary--which led to a fascinating digression. Working with maps at various scales, Richardson paced off the lengths of boundaries and coastlines with dividers, and realized that the result depends on the setting of the dividers, or in other words on the unit of measurement. A coastline that measures 100 steps of 10 millimeters each will not necessarily measure 1,000 steps of 1 millimeter each; it is likely to be more, because the smaller units more closely follow the zigzag path of the coast. This result appeared in a somewhat out-of-the-way publication; when Benoit Mandelbrot came across it by chance, Richardson's observation became one of the ideas that inspired Mandelbrot's theory of fractals.

    During the period covered by Richardson's study there were about 60 stable nations and empires (the empires being counted for this purpose as single entities). The mean number of neighbors for these states was about six (and Richardson offered an elegant geometric argument, based on Euler's relation among the vertices, edges and faces of a polyhedron, that the number must be approximately six, for any plausible arrangement of nations). Hence if warring nations were to choose their foes entirely at random, there would be about a 10 percent chance that any pair of belligerents would turn out to be neighbors. The actual proportion of warring neighbors is far higher. Of 94 international wars with just two participants, Richardson found only 12 cases in which the two combatants had no shared boundary, suggesting that war is mostly a neighborhood affair.

    But extending this conclusion to larger and wider wars proved difficult, mainly because the "great powers" are effectively everyone's neighbor. Richardson was best able to fit the data with a rather complex model assigning different probabilities to conflicts between two great powers, between a great power and a smaller state, and between two lesser nations. But rigging up a model with three parameters for such a small data set is not very satisfying. Furthermore, Richardson concluded that "chaos" was still the predominant factor in explaining the world's larger wars: The same element of randomness seen in the time-series analysis is at work here, though "restricted by geography and modified by infectiousness."

    What about other causative factors--social, economic, cultural? While compiling his war list, Richardson noted the various items that historians mentioned as possible irritants or pacifying influences, and then he looked for correlations between these factors and belligerence. The results were almost uniformly disappointing. Richardson's own suppositions about the importance of arms races were not confirmed; he found evidence of a preparatory arms race in only 13 out of 315 cases. Richardson was also a proponent of Esperanto, but his hope that a common language would reduce the chance of conflict failed to find support in the data. Economic indicators were equally unhelpful: The statistics ratify neither the idea that war is mainly a struggle between the rich and the poor nor the view that commerce between nations creates bonds that prevent war.

    Figure 5

    The one social factor that does have some detectable correlation with war is religion. In the Richardson data set, nations that differ in religion are more likely to fight than those that share the same religion. Moreover, some sects seem generally to be more bellicose (Christian nations participated in a disproportionate number of conflicts). But these effects are not large.

    Mere Anarchy Loosed upon the World

    The residuum of all these noncauses of war is mere randomness--the notion that warring nations bang against one another with no more plan or principle than molecules in an overheated gas. In this respect, Richardson's data suggest that wars are like hurricanes or earthquakes: We can't know in advance when or where a specific event will strike, but we do know how many to expect in the long run. We can compute the number of victims; we just can't say who they'll be.

    This view of wars as random catastrophes is not a comforting thought. It seems to leave us no control over our own destiny, nor any room for individual virtue or villainy. If wars just happen, who's to blame? But this is a misreading of Richardson's findings. Statistical "laws" are not rules that govern the behavior either of nations or of individuals; they merely describe that behavior in the aggregate. A murderer might offer the defense that the crime rate is a known quantity, and so someone has to keep it up, but that plea is not likely to earn the sympathy of a jury. Conscience and personal responsibility are in no way diminished by taking a statistical view of war.

    What is depressing is that the data suggest no clear plan of action for those who want to reduce the prevalence of violence. Richardson himself was disappointed that his studies pointed to no obvious remedy. Perhaps he was expecting too much. A retired physicist reading the Encyclopaedia Britannica can do just so much toward securing world peace. But with larger and more detailed data sets, and more powerful statistical machinery, some useful lessons might emerge.

    There is now a whole community of people working to gather war data, many of whom trace their intellectual heritage back to Richardson and Quincy Wright. The largest such undertaking is the Correlates of War project, begun in the 1960s by J. David Singer of the University of Michigan. The COW catalogues, like Richardson's, begin in the post-Napoleonic period, but they have been brought up close to the present day and now list thousands of militarized disputes. Offshoots and continuations of the project are being maintained by Russell J. Leng of Middlebury College and by Stuart A. Bremer of Pennsylvania State University.

    Peter Brecke of the Georgia Institute of Technology has begun another data collection. His catalogue extends down to magnitude 1.5 (about 30 deaths) and covers a much longer span of time, back as far as A.D. 1400. The catalogue is approaching completion for 5 of 12 global regions and includes more than 3,000 conflicts. The most intriguing finding so far is a dramatic, century-long lull in the 1700s.

    Figure 6

    Even if Richardson's limited data were all we had to go on, one clear policy imperative emerges: At all costs avoid the clash of the titans. However painful a series of brushfire wars may seem to the participants, it is the great global conflagrations that threaten us most. As noted above, the two magnitude-7 wars of the 20th century were responsible for three-fifths of all the deaths that Richardson recorded. We now have it in our power to have a magnitude-8 or -9 war. In the aftermath of such an event, no one would say that war is demographically irrelevant. After a war of magnitude 9.8, no one would say anything at all.

    Bibliography

    Ashford, Oliver M. 1985. Prophet--or Professor?: The Life and Work of Lewis Fry Richardson. Bristol, Boston: Adam Hilger.

    Brecke, Peter. 1999. Violent conflicts 1400 A.D. to
    the present in different regions of the world. http://www.inta.gatech.edu/peter/PSS99_paper.html

    Cioffi-Revilla, Claudio A. 1990. The Scientific Measurement of International Conflict: Handbook of Datasets on Crises and Wars 1945-1988. Boulder and London: Lynne Reinner Publishers.

    Richardson, Lewis F. 1960. Statistics of Deadly Quarrels. Edited by Quincy Wright and C. C. Lienau. Pittsburgh: Boxwood Press.

    Richardson, Lewis F. 1960. Arms and Insecurity: A Mathematical Study of the Causes and Origins of War. Edited by Nicolas Rashevsky and Ernesto Trucco. Pittsburgh: Boxwood Press.

    Richardson, Lewis F. 1961. The problem of contiguity: An appendix to Statistics of Deadly Quarrels. Yearbook of the Society for General Systems Research, Ann Arbor, Mich., Vol. VI, pp. 140-187.

    Richardson, Lewis Fry. 1993. Collected Papers of Lewis Fry Richardson. Edited by Oliver M. Ashford, et al. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Richardson, Stephen A. 1957. Lewis Fry Richardson (1881-1953): A personal biography. Journal of Conflict Resolution 1:300-304.

    Singer, J. David, and Melvin Small. 1972. The Wages of War, 1816-1965: A Statistical Handbook. New York: John Wiley.

    Sorokin, Pitirim A. 1937. Social and Cultural Dynamics Vol. 3: Fluctuations of Social Relationships, War, and Revolution. New York: American Book Company.

    Wilkinson, David. 1980. Deadly Quarrels: Lewis F. Richardson and the Statistical Study of War. Berkeley: University of California Press.

    Wright, Quincy. 1965. A Study of War, with a Commentary on War Since 1942. Second edition. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press.

    Copyright 2001 Brian Hayes
    • "Thus the data offer no reason to believe that wars are anything other than randomly distributed accidents.

      ...

      war is mostly a neighborhood affair.

      ...

      The one social factor that does have some detectable correlation with war is religion.

      ...

      At all costs avoid the clash of the titans."
      • On the "war is mostly a neighborhood affair" bit, I thought I'd add that I think this is changing in today's high tech world.

        Of course most wars of antiquity were fought close together. Who's gonna send tens of thousands of troops on a leaky boat across the world? The supply line nightmares alone would destroy you. These days we can cross the globe in hours, develop space based weapons platforms, lob cruise missiles, and employ fanatical human vectors carrying bio weapons, suitcase nukes, or M$ Flight Sim: WTC Detail pack.
        • "On the "war is mostly a neighborhood affair" bit, I thought I'd add that I think this is changing in today's high tech world."

          Let's go by continents.

          Africa: Northern part of the continent is predominantly Muslim and really don't like their neighbor Israel (especially Egypt). Sub-Saharan Africa seems to have at least a dozen conflicts (international or civil) at any given moment.

          Europe: All sorts of localized conflicts, from Ireland to Yugoslavia.

          Asia: India and Pakistan are obvious examples, but not the only ones. About the only neighbors China hasn't tried invading are either already puppet states or are quite capable of mauling China (such as Russia and India).

          Australia: Came pretty damned close to a shooting war with neighbor Indonesia recently. See East Timor.

          South America: Colombia is still trying to get rid of FARC. International relations still aren't all that peachy-keen down there.

          North America: Things may seem fine in the US, but once you get south of Mexico...

          "Of course most wars of antiquity were fought close together. Who's gonna send tens of thousands of troops on a leaky boat across the world?"

          Alexander the Great went from Greece to India. Hannibal got from Lybia to Italy by land. The Roman empire stretched from Scottland to Turkey. Genghis Khan had Mongols in Hungary. China has been that big for a very, very long time. Conquistadores conquered peoples on both American continents as well as various Pacific islanders (the ocean used to be referred to as a "Spanish lake"). England and France had the first globe-spanning war before the invention of the marine chronometer, let alone the telegraph.

          "The supply line nightmares alone would destroy you."

          Knowing where you are once you lose sight of land isn't a pre-requisite for sending an invasion force to another hemisphere. Look what Cortez did, and all he could do was follow a line of latitude.

          "These days we can cross the globe in hours, develop space based weapons platforms, lob cruise missiles,"

          Um... just because the US has a four ocean navy and manned spaceflight capabilities doesn't mean everybody does. Most navies are lucky to be able to project any kind of power outside of their territorial waters, let alone into an ocean they don't border. We're given the designation "superpower" for a reason.

          But even then it should be noted that the article pointed out that the "titans" were essentially everybody's neighbor.

          One has only to look at sub-Saharan Africa to realize that the vast majority of wars are still very much regional.

          "and employ fanatical human vectors carrying bio weapons, suitcase nukes, or M$ Flight Sim: WTC Detail pack."

          It's easy to get such human weapons into the US because we're the largest economy in the world and a great deal of the world's traffic is either coming to or leaving from the United States. See the "everybody's neighbor" comment above.
  • War and violence is unfortunately a part of human life. Over the centuries various groups of people have tried to create peaceful utopian societies and they have failed. The problem is human nature. Our motivations are very self-centered, without regard or consideration for the other person or country. We want our fair share and a little bit more. That is the way we humans are.

    • Evolution. Human Nature was meant to EVOLVE.

      I'm sick of every cave man, murderer, theif, and other bad person getting the term "Oh its just human nature"

      No, its caveman nature. This is 2002, Humans should evolve to my level, or else why should I consider them human? I can consider them animals.
      • Let us know when you make peace with bacteria and viruses trying to infect you. There are many abuses that do not involve war, but can only reliably be stopped by it, like genocide and tyranny...


        • Humans arent bacteria.

          You have ways of dealing with bacteria in the human body.

          First you kill the bacteria.(war) Eventually that may cease to work, at this point your body develops immunity to the bacteria (it defends against it) the evolution occurs when the body finds ways to make that bacteria "GOOD" and useful to the human body. (this is the route we should take)

          The Human Body even knows not to have war with something forever. It stresses the body (hurts the enviornment), it consumes resouces (money, time, effort), it kills many many cells (lives are lost)

          The body has an evolution process, you are saying we shouldnt? we should be in perpetual war even when we have nano technology and biotechnology? The technologies which allow us to control nature?

          I'm sorry but the rules HAVE changed. When technology reaches a certain point just like when the body is sick for a certain amount of time, it evolves, this is how we create vaccines!

          Vaccines are the cure, you can have a Vaccine for aids, or you can keep taking AZT drug cocktails and wait until its time for you to die from aids.

          • ... Having immunity/vaccination and killing germs are the same thing.

            When you are immune your body knows so well how to kill that germ that you just don't get sick from it because it is eradicated whenever it enters your body. For example when you get chicken pox, your body fights it and eventually kills it off, and then the immune system "remembers" how to kill chicken pox quickly and easily. Vaccines give the immune system this "memory" without making you sick, by various means such as dead germs which can't make you sick, but the body will still attack.

            Sorta ruins your whole analogy thing, sorry.

            Tim
      • ... Humans should evolve to my level, or else why should I consider them human? I can consider them animals.

        (1) Arrogance such as yours, assuming that you are human and others are not or that you are more highly evolved than others, contributes to war and violent behavior. Such arrogance and conceit contradict you claim of superiority. You share much with the murderers and thieves.

        (2) Extreme pacifism is not necessarily biologically superior, it may or may not be a failed mutation. An ability to engage in violence may or may not be biologically superior. What is known is that mathematical models suggests cooperating with others until they betray you is a very successful strategy.


        • A. Its not arrogance to see that by harming no one, you are better for the world than those who harm everyone.

          B. Pacifism leads to utopia, its the only way to get there, and the goal of every society is to reach this. Betraying is a moral issue, because I dont betray people, exploit people or harm anyone, if everyone else were like me also, we'd have world peace.

          • A. Its not arrogance to see that by harming no one, you are better for the world than those who harm everyone

            Your original quote: "Humans should evolve to my level, or else why should I consider them human? I can consider them animals"

            Believing yourself to be superior or more evolved is arrogant and that particular belief of yours is shared with many who have killed and committed genocide. It is one rationalization they use to commit such acts. Dehumanizing the enemy is a standard technique used to prepare soldiers for war. You are delusional to think that you are evolved beyond such people.

            B. Pacifism leads to utopia, its the only way to get there, and the goal of every society is to reach this.

            Pacifism leads to extinction, pacifists can only survive if non-pacifists protect them. Violence in the name of self defense, not personal gain, leads to a better society.

            • Protect them from what?

              If theres only pacifists theres nothing to protect us from!!

              Its the non pacifists who create war, crime, hate and everything bad in the world.

              Tell me, if you are a pacifist, and theres no hate in the world, whats going to kill you? The only thing you'd have to worry about are the natural elements, and the animals, and we've had that in check for thousands of years now and that has nothing to do with human nature, thats survival.

              Violence in the name of self defensive = pacifism.
              I dont attack anyone, but if someone attacks me i'll defend myself. I think 99 percent of the population would defend themselves as well if in the same situation.

              The diffrence is, a Pacifist is never the one ATTACKING.
      • Are we more "civilized" today than 5000 years ago? I am not certain we are evolving morally. I would say we are not, or if we are evolving morally the rapid technological advances has given us power to destroy ourselves before we are ready. People today seem to think we are evolving in some biological moral way to something better. This is a philosophical (religious) belief that many today hold. I believe it is wishful thinking.
        • The problem is,

          If you do evolve morally, and ever share it, people kill you. Every single person who is a moral genius, they seem to get killed, and its because just like in the times when jesus was killed, the bad still outnumber the good. The morally ignorant still outnumber the moral geniuses and until the balance shifts, and the pacifists or whatever the hell you want to call them outnumber the war loving hate loving idiots, well, the worlds headed for self destruction.

          When you have a war filled with people who love to hate and who love war, these people will hate anything and that includes themselves, they will have war with themselves until they destroy themselves.
        • ... all humans were illiterate, because writing had not been invented yet.

          5000 years is NOTHING on an evolutionary time scale.

          We're all still primates. We display primate behavior all the time. Our weapons have evolved far faster than we have.

          DG
          • Thats the exact point i was trying to make.

            We need to evolve, not just through technology but all around.

            The problem with thhe current system is, we give technology to people who arent evolved enough to handle it, the creators of the technology are evolved usually, you dont see geeks lining up to go to war.

            The problem is, geek dont run the government, geeks dont make up the majority, so what you have is like 5 percent of the population creating all the technology thats fine for this perfect of the enlightened population, but the rest of the population just arent ready for it.

            People like george bush the president, hes not ready for cloning or nano technology.

      • Be careful! (Score:3, Insightful)

        by PineHall ( 206441 )
        This is 2002, Humans should evolve to my level, or else why should I consider them human? I can consider them animals.

        Be careful! A lot of people have used similar reasoning to justify violence and killing.



        • Its not about reasoning, its about enlightenment, any enlightened or evolved person knows its bad to harm yourself, to be on that level you have to know we are all one, we arent seperate, what you do to your neighbor you are also doing to yourself.

          When you realize this you understand why terrorists like bin laden exsist, we created them through the process of wars with russia and iraq.

          When people get into wars, it creates hate which creates more wars.

          Its a cycle which only increases, in programming terms think of a loop with +1
          • This is 2002, Humans should evolve to my level, or else why should I consider them human? I can consider them animals.

            Is only an enlightened/evolved person truely human? Can you treat an unenlightened person as part of the "one"? Are they equal in value to an enlightened person? Are you going to love them too as you love yourself?


            • We can define it by how much of an animal you are.

              Or we can define it by how enlightened you are.

              Most people would choose to define being human, by an enlightened picture of buddha, jesus christ, or any of these men, most people do not want to assosiate being human with hitler, bin laden, and those men.

              Pick a side.
      • Humans should evolve to my level, or else why should I consider them human?

        I don't think "evolution" is the correct word here. It's a common myth that evolution has a goal--that "higher" life forms are always the most fit. Actually it all depends on the environment. Some successful creatures are simpler than their ancestors.

        Of course our medical technology means that people who wouldn't have survived a couple of thousand years ago will lead long, healthy, reproductive lives. This isn't a bad thing, but perhaps it will prevent humans from evolving through survival of the fittest.

        I can consider them animals

        Humans are animals.
        • Survival of the fittest isnt the way evolution works on the greater scale.

          We arent the fittest creature on earth, the roach is.

          Its survival of the strongest, not the fittest!
          The fittest are often people like jesus christ, peace making types who if they ran the world, we'd have no wars and would survive alot longer, than if stronger but more self destructive types who love war survive.

          You see, people who dare to think out of the box, who may be evolved on the emotional level, they are considered weak because cavemen are more violent.

          Survival of the strongest not the fittest.
      • It's agraculturist nature.

        The caveman was perfectly willing to live off the spoils of the land. What good is more land, after all? It's only when you need more land to grow more crops to feed your increasing population that the "elimination of everything in your way" becomes important.

        How many different tribes of Native Americans are (were) there? Why wasn't there only one? Because they lived off the spoils of the land, and had no reason to eliminate their neighbors. Pick any tribal culture that lives off the land. You'll find the same cultural diversity living in relative peace.

        Sure they had skirmishes. If you don't keep your neighbors off balance, they might think you are weak.

        It's not caveman nature. They were far less violent than us. It was only with the agricultural revolution that humans decided there is "one right way to live".

        Daniel Quinn [ishmael.com] has some pretty interesting books on where (he belives) we came from, and where we are headed. One of my personal favorite articles (actually the transcript of a speech) is here [ishmael.com].
  • by HanzoSan ( 251665 ) on Friday May 03, 2002 @03:24PM (#3459429) Homepage Journal

    The amount of wars we have, and considering we are entering the nano age and still cant get along. Expect us to destroy ourselves for good in the next world war.
  • by jcsehak ( 559709 ) on Friday May 03, 2002 @03:39PM (#3459515) Homepage
    There's a cool map [edwardtufte.com] of Nappy's march into Russia, which shows, visually, the losses suffered by the thickness of the line, among other things. Really beautifully rendered. Edward Tutfe (master of information design) is a big fan of it, understandably so.

    • > There's a cool map [edwardtufte.com] of Nappy's march into Russia, which shows, visually, the losses suffered by the thickness of the line, among other things.

      Wish I had computer for every time I've seen that in a magazine ad. (I'd build an awesome beowulf cluster.)

      It is interesting, though. For instance, you always hear about how horrible the march back west was, but if you look at the chart you can see that the army was already reduced to about 1/4 its original size by the time it reached Moscow. I looks like the march east was thrice as bad as the part you always hear horror stories about.

      Such is the value of good data presentation, I suppose.

      • During the march east the numbers were mostly reduced by battles (if I recall correctly), whilst during the march back west, it was the actual "march" doing people in. I think that would explain the bias in the descriptions.
  • by cosmo7 ( 325616 ) on Friday May 03, 2002 @03:45PM (#3459551) Homepage
    doesn't any country realise that the best way to win is to conquer australia first? you get five extra units and you only have to defend two territories.
    • Exactly! I always love to start with a power base in China. Drop in to secure Australia and then smack the rest of the world.
    • I like to snag Austrailia too, but let's be honest, it's in the middle of nowhere. Once you have Austrailia where do you go from there? Asia and Europe are the hardest continents to win and hold.

      The best strategy is to go for the Americas. You only have to defend two territories in South America and it gives you an excellent staging ground to move into North America which only has three territories to defend. But perhaps best of all, if you take North America you only have to worry about attacks from South America, Europe, and Kamchatka. In all likelihood, your enemies along these fronts will have much larger fronts to defend elsewhere so they won't be able to commit as many troops to attacking your 3 key territories. If you own north America, any South American player will either be dying or fighting for Africa while trying to hold you back. A European player has far too many possible points to defend to be launching an assault into Greenland. Similarly, an Asian player will be fighting to secure the most difficult continent in the game. Provided you don't piss him off by taking Kamchatka every other turn it is in both of your best interests to leave each other alone.
      • Once you have Austrailia where do you go from there? Asia and Europe are the hardest continents to win and hold.

        You answer your own question. The key to holding Asia is to hold Australia first. It gives you a secure base from which to launch into China. Anyone already in Asia will be fighting for their life on several fronts, so you should be able to chip away at them from the south. By the time you have to defend a wide front you now own Australia and Asia, so you can kick anyone's ass.

  • The most intriguing finding so far is a dramatic, century-long lull in the 1700s.

    This is actually a very interesting detail, the 1700s amongst other things had "the small ice-age" [nasa.gov] where temperatures in europe were significantly lower than normal.

    Considered together with the traditional wisdom of "hot tempers" in southern climates, (the middle east being the poster boy), this points to the obvious solution to world peace: Move everybody to Mars where the temperature is lower than on this war-ridden planet.

  • Brian Hayes' writing is excellent and very clear. How come a mathematician is responsible for one of the best-written articles /. has linked to in a long while!
  • This would have been much more interesting if the headline was actually as I first read it: Statistics of Deadly Squirels.
  • I'm not sure the order of magnitude of the effect, but it would seem that the overall stratiegic and tactical theories that are in vogue at the time of the war directly relates to the casualties it produces. A lot of the death toll of the Great War can be laid at Clauswitz's (sp?) feet, while the teachings of Sun-Tzu seem to be SOP of today (special ops are used a heck of a lot more now than they were 100 years ago, and to greater effect).
  • If you are the only person in the room - there is no chance for conflict with anyone else in that room. If there is another person in the room - there is a chance for conflict. Like chemical reactions; conflict goes as the square of the density of the reactants.

    What is remarkable is not that there are wars - but that there is not a continuous war with everybody fighting all the time.

    Given the possibility for conflict - people actually get along really well the vast majority of the time - if they didn't we couldn't exist.

    If war were a common occurrence it wouldn't be newsworthy; the news is reserved for extraordinary events.

    The problem with improved communication is that in effect - you expand the size of your 'room' which increases the number of people who are inside of it - thus greatly raising the chance of conflict.

    If I don't write anything here there is zero chance of my ideas creating conflict with other poster's ideas. In a very real sense isolationism is the only way to prevent conflict - of course there is an enormous price to be paid for isolationism.

    Show me any species of creatures which exist on this planet without conflict - there isn't one - there can't be one; life itself is in conflict with death.

6.023 x 10 to the 23rd power alligator pears = Avocado's number

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