Did NASA Know Mars Polar Lander Would Fail? 181
RELEASE: 00-43
NASA'S RESPONSE TO UPI'S MARCH 21 MARS POLAR LANDER STORY
James Oberg of UPI claims that NASA knew there was a problem with the Mars Polar Lander propulsion system prior to the Dec. 3 landing attempt and "withheld this conclusion from the public." NASA categorically denies this charge. Here's what NASA did and what NASA said:
* The Stephenson report, phase 1, was released to the public on November 10, 1999 during a press conference at NASA Headquarters.
* The report made 11 different references to technical issues or concerns involving the propulsion system and the Entry, Descent and Landing (EDL) sequence.
* This issue was specifically addressed in the press conference and in "MPL Observation No. 5" and other public recommendations of the Stephenson Phase 1 report. It was entitled, "Cold Firing of Thrusters," and dealt in detail with the catalyst bed issue cited by Mr. Oberg of UPI in his March 21 story, "NASA Knew Mars Polar Lander Doomed."
* Had UPI researched the public documents released on Nov. 10, which have been available online at the NASA Home Page, the reporter would have been able to conclude that NASA did indeed publicly address propulsion issues, and specifically, the propulsion system's "catalyst bed" temperature concern.
* Based on this review, NASA knew about the concerns with the propulsion system, NASA took corrective action, and NASA hid nothing from the public. We made our concerns known in early November.
* Several failure scenarios have been reported in the press over the last few weeks, including the lander legs microswitch issue. Outlets such as the Denver Post, Space Daily, and National Public Radio's "All Things Considered" have covered this angle. There is nothing new in the UPI report relating to this specific issue. The lander legs issue is among the failure modes we are studying.
* Both the Stephenson and Casani (John Casani, retired JPL flight programs head and also director of mission assurance) teams have conducted intensive reviews relating to Mars Polar Lander, and their teams have surfaced no evidence relating to thruster acceptance testing irregularities as alleged by UPI. In fact, members of the review teams are using words like "bunk," "complete nonsense," and "wacko," to describe their reactions to UPI's charge.
They did mention it before landing (Score:1)
Bureaucratic paranoia?
However, concerning the latest information about the engine temperature problem, it appears that they had developed and publicized a procedure to preheat the engine [nasa.gov] just before the landing attempt.
Feynmann's report on the Challenger (Score:1)
Re:Back off! (Score:1)
I think that price also includes a lot of R&D stuff that's applicable to other programs (like F-117, F-22, etc...); rather than have a separate R&D budget, they just dumped it all into the B2 program. And everything else gets to look cheaper. They did this with other programs in the past.
But anyway, the basic point about economy of scale still holds.
Re:Back off! (Score:1)
I'm not sure that MPL cost 5% of what a B-2 bomber would cost; that would make it... roughly 2 billion per plane, and I think it was closer to 500 million. The thing that went wrong with the B-2 was that they spent all the money developing the thing and then ran less than a dozen off of a production line. Thankfully, they're going to use the tech in planes with much better chances of getting economy of scale, and learn from their mistakes.
Why do I bring this up now? Well, NASA makes the same mistake we did when we built the B-2; they don't mass-produce space probes nearly as much as they should. They build all these onesies and twosies and they get the same false economy vibes the Air Force got when they cut back the B-2 order.
I think this sort of false economy also colors their launch vehicle development processes; take Venturestar, for instance; the first orbital vehicle would be able to carry about as much payload as the shuttle, according to the pretty viewgraphs, but shouldn't they wait until they have the tech right before trying to scale it up?
Re:I doubt it but... (Score:1)
Personally, I think space exploration and travel will, in the not too distant future, become more and more a commercial venture. As soon as corporations begin to discover extraterrestrial valuables (whatever they may be) we'll begin to see a lot of them rushing up to space to stake their claim.
-Derek
I doubt it but... (Score:1)
I doubt it, but it is possible....
-Derek
Re:It's really bad press when the story gets out. (Score:1)
Re:I worked there, and find it hard to believe (Score:1)
Re:Art Bell predicted that it would fail as well. (Score:1)
Even a blind squirrel finds a nut now and again...
Pave the Earth (Score:1)
Art Bell predicted that it would fail as well. (Score:1)
LK
Re:Back off! (Score:1)
You raise an excellent point though. With NASA's policy of cheaper, faster, better, they really ought (IMHO) to pelt the solar system with dozens, if not hundreds of probes. Guarantee misson success through redundancy. Gather data in parallel.
Obligatory
Seriously though, cutting corners is good and fine, if you don't keep all the eggs in one basket. The NASA policy makers are doing the right thing by developing cheaper probes, but they still seem caught in the 'Cowboy Mentality' of the lone-star probe. Voyager and Gallileo and Pioneer were great, but the singular, focused effort belongs in HUMAN exploration.
You just CAN'T send dozens of people to Mars, and hope one makes it. But building a bunch of Yugo-sized, disposable probes... Seems common-sense.
As for the B-2, this enthusiasts page [bangalorenet.com] cites a $2.2 billion price tag, along with some interesting specs.
Re:Back off! (Score:1)
Management and administration at NASA, and in the corporate arena, seem to share a flawed way of thinking. They estimate, budget and plan based on a 'best-case' scenario, and if things fall short, run late, or go over budget, it's the techies fault for 'not doing their job'... Do I sound bitter?
The technoids were very nervous about Challenger's last flight, but management pushed it through anyway. Cancelling the flight would have 'looked bad'. Well, seven people and a symbol of American and human ingenuity went up in smoke.
Thing is, poo-poo occurs, and you're much more likely to live up to expectations if you acknowledge that something invariably goes wrong. Risks must be mitigated and if you must err, err on the side of safety.
A common failing in software development is that corners MUST be cut to bring the project back on schedule and within budget. Doing this while the project is in progress usually means cutting down on the completion-work, like testing. This is why there's so much buggy software out there. Testing was scaled down to shorten schedules and reign in budgets.
Unfortunatelly, this tendency seems to have contaminated the ultimate think-tank in the world, NASA. You don't send a probe to a planet 6 to 18 months away, without testing your landing capability. And retesting, and retesting. Landing is sort of a crucial step, no?
Either it was an unavoidable failure, odd-ball happenstance and bad luck, OR someone didn't prioritize risks correctly, and should be working for Microsoft.
You're right, $180 mil is not cheap, not to us. But it's a drop in the bucket. Personally, I think NASA's bucket should be a lot bigger than it is, so corners like LANDING wouldn't have to get cut.
The Official Mars Polar Lander website (Score:1)
Here [nasa.gov]
Re:Only my opinion but... (Score:1)
Did endless social problems ever stand in the way of world exploration? Just think about how many things come from the technological research required for space travel. Besides, what makes more sense? Throwing more money at the unfixable social problems of Earth, or extending the grasp of the human race into the stars? One day there may be no Earth. Should that really be the end of humanity?
Re:Titanic (Score:1)
Explosion explains why the probes didn't respond (Score:1)
Funny nobody talked about the probes, eh? From the reports NASA was putting out you'd have thought that they'd forgot to attach them or something. I guess this explains it.
Vik
Re:I worked there, and find it hard to believe (Score:1)
I have worked under contract to the US government (albeit not NASA), and must concur. Contractors have a different agenda than most morally-grounded individuals, let alon the scientists.
I knew during the course of my job, that neither my employer, nor the bulk of my co-workers should under any circumstaces be left unsupervised. The contractors SOLE motivation is to maximize their profit. They simply do not CARE what becomes of their work.
Contractors often land jobs with claims of huge cost savings, which invariably are created through shoddy workmanship, falsified testing, employing unqualified workers to handle tasks beyond their ability, failure to pay suppliers, failure to pay employees... It's a big list, so I'll stop there. Eventually, the worst abusers ARE identified, but at a HUGE cost.
As pointed out in the article, NASA only knew that the project would fail when it was well beyond anyone's power to do anything about it. What purpose would it have served to reveal that information and declare the project a failure? Had they done so, there would only be suspicion that a problem had occured. Playing out the mission to the failure point allows NASA to actively persue those responsible.
Re:Only my opinion but... (Score:1)
Only my opinion but... (Score:1)
Before finding out if life existed on Mars, hou about they try to save life on Earth before it becomes extinct!
Re:Only my opinion but... (Score:1)
That's a completely bullshit argument. It implies, for example, that if you hire some people to dig holes in the ground, and other people to immediately fill them up, this is "a part of the society and not a detrimental one". Advised reading: Econ 101. Ever heard of the creation of value?
Kaa
Re:I worked there, and find it hard to believe (Score:1)
I believe the point of this article is that the error wasn't detected until well after launch time. The error was detected a few days before the landing, and nothing could be done about it.
What was to be gained by keeping it a secret? I should think that the scientists went into CYA mode.
They're sitting there thinking, "What would be gained by going to the press and saying that we KNOW it won't land?"
"We've called you here today to announce that we screwed up. We've detected a fatal flaw, and Mars Polar Lander, instead of doing lots of cool stuff, will instead crash and burn, in what would be a beautiful fiery display. Unfortunately, this display will take place far out of our sight, thus robbing us of even the chance to get a sneak preview of the great Iridium Superburn."
Alternately, they could have waited until it burned up, and announce that they knew all along it would happen.
CYA. It isn't always right, and it doesn't always work, but sometimes it is all you have.
paperbacks.homepage.com [homepage.com]
Re:NASA credibility gap (Score:1)
I agree. You don't see too many geeks try to cover things up when things go wrong. Failure is best used as a learning experience. Most geeks won't take the time to make up a story, it would be distracting and hard to remember later. The truth is the easiest thing to remember.
Roger Beaujolais lives with that moment every day of his life. So do all the men and women of NASA.
Amen. I still can't watch the Challenger accident in replays. Every time I see it coming, I run out of the room if possible. I was really hoping to get into space someday, but with the Challenger accident, I don't think we'll see civilians is space anytime soon. John Glen doesn't count. Remember, he was a trained astronaut.
Chirstine Macauliff
Christine Macauliffe, IRRC.
--
Re:This was a test flight (Score:1)
Re:I worked there, and find it hard to believe (Score:1)
Re:It's really bad press when the story gets out. (Score:1)
Re:Only my opinion but... (Score:1)
It reminds me of the researcher who noticed a certain sensor frequency ("pseudocolor","IR/UV/optical detector output") was all over a part of the USA known to have gold deposits. This signature was unknown, and to find out what the satellite was detecting he simply drove to that area with a duplicate sensor. He waved the sensor around and found what rocks were being detected, then was able to get samples and identify why this was associated with gold-bearing areas. No word as to whether any other gold-bearing areas around the world were discovered by him later...
title (Score:1)
Re:Only my opinion but... (Score:1)
By the way, if one (Bob) were to hire someone (Jim) to dig holes, and someone else (Fred) to fill them up, society would benefit, since there would be two smart people with money (Fred & Jim), and one dumb one (Bob) without it 8^)
The point was not paying people for the sake of paying them, it was about the value that we do get out of that work.
> Ever heard of the creation of value?
Ever heard of considering the whole post, instead of one line?
mwahahaha (Score:1)
Re:Reason why (Score:1)
SNAFU
Re:I worked there, and find it hard to believe (Score:1)
That makes no sense. If they knew the lander was fatally flawed, why wouldn't they change its mission to salvage some research dollars? Maybe adjust its course so it goes into orbit, instead of crashing? Or adjusting its course so it crashes in full view of the Hubble Telescope's cameras?
Imagine if NASA were to call a press conference to announce that the Lander can't land and will be allowed to go into orbit in hopes that they can use it for some other purpose. Or that they'll deliberately crash it to study atmospheric effects. This would have been a much better form of CYA then just going, "Whoops! We lost the Lander, we'll waste a crapload of resources just to make sure we're not wrong, but basically, we're screwed."
It tells me... (Score:1)
--
But they didn't mention... (Score:1)
--
Re:It's really bad press when the story gets out. (Score:1)
--
Re:Back off! (Score:1)
The US government spent $44.4 billion dollars over about 15 years to get 20 aircraft. If you do a simple division you get a price of $2.2 billion per aircraft. But there are lots of costs that are included in that $44.4 billion that have nothing to do with the airframe; support equipment, facilities and up-front technology development costs.
That's why people have more than one "legitimate" price tag for this (or any other) government-developed airplane (or anything else). The $500 million price quoted by Northrop management whenever the US Congress debated buying more B-2s was most likely a "time and materials" price to get an airframe built, tested and delivered to the USAF.
So, pick your initial conditions and get the price you want, I suppose.
The "enthusiast's page" referenced by someone else on this thread is a poor source of information. I read it and was very unimpressed.
By the way, I spent 10 years on the B-2 program (1986 to 1996) and was the lead engineer for the weapon control, targeting and release software.
Re:Pave the Earth (Score:1)
and Save the Swamps...er uh..Wetlands, that's it!
Re:More Information: (Score:1)
Then, of course, landing comes closer, and we are glutted with money from NASA. But what's the point? We get 10 sysadmins one month before landing, and we have to spend hours training them up; much more preferable to have had one good one ten months before!
I hate the inconsistency of this. Far better to give NASA a fixed budget of sufficient funds to tackle all of their projects and let you folks handle how its spent. This is supposed to be about science, not political maneuvering to gain sufficient funds to complete projects - and then getting the funds too late to be of use.
For my part, the exploration of space is the most important challenge facing humanity, we should be spending whatever is necessary to make it possible. The scientific spinoffs from space exploration have had a tremendous impact on a multitude of industries worldwide, and the benefits easily outweigh the costs associated. Besides, its not like the money isn't spent here on earth :)
Re:I doubt it but... (Score:1)
Re:This much I know, (Score:1)
Re:Back off! (Score:1)
Re:I doubt it but... (Score:1)
Re:Failures Expected During Testing (Score:1)
True - and that certainly fits the pattern of all other human endeavors to date, particularly in the sciences. However I wonder a bit about that, since according to the article:
But rather than begin an expensive redesign and replacement program, an unnamed space official is said by the source to have altered the test conditions to make it look as though the engines would perform in the conditions expected.
This suggests that the flaw(s) were caught during the testing stages. If true this means a purposeful decision to deceive both scientific and general communities at large. As a matter of course how often are known critical flaws left as is in "release" products, of whatever type.. And furthermore, if these allegation are proven correct, will this lead to further disinterest in the space program and by extension reduced budget for NASA..
failure to communicate (Score:1)
Re:failure to communicate (Score:1)
I wrote the Win 2k comment as a joke. This is obviously how it was interpreted by some friendly moderator, because it was moderated as Funny. The person making the conspiracy comment was also intent upon humor. Lighten up. I know that NASA prefers Linux. The Microsoft world is a lot less painful when you can laugh a little.
I hate to pick, but... (Score:1)
Doesnt seem very nasa-esque (Score:1)
NASA really doesnt need this kind of publicity. This can only support the US governments continually stripping NASA of its funding. NASA is one of the few segments of our beaurocratic beast that I really appreciate (that and the USPS.)
Assuming this really did happen, the only explanation I can think of is funding. Perhaps it wasnt in the budget to fix the project?
D0f, this test shows that the retros wont fire.
Well we can't fix it, we spent the last nickle on the little USA flag sticker that goes on the side of the ship.
What are we going to do?
Well if it doesnt pass the test we could get fired !
So lets change the test!
good idea.
Reminds me of those dopes in lab science that used to always make up their numbers and then whine about how their results turned up faulty.
but I thought NASA weeded out those people
Perhaps the "undisclosed source" is someone that the cutting of NASA's budget would be in their best interest..
Re:Reason why (Score:1)
Re:It's really bad press when the story gets out. (Score:1)
These are never mentioned in the discussions of "What happenned to the lander". I was wondering why they were never mentioned, as they would distinguish between an incident early in the landing process (braking thrusters) from an incident late in the landing process (microswitches to detect successful landing).. A problem with the landing would not affect these early-released probes.
Nobody in the know really expected either of the penetrators to work," explains why nobody focusses on these as a diagnostic aid to analyze the main failure. This part of the quote explains a lot to me.
My note here is a reminder to people to read the "...more" after the first screenful of Tau Zero's note runs up against /.'s inline size limit.
Re:Only my opinion but... (Score:1)
-=RR=-
Paranoia (Score:1)
How unlikely is this scenario? Probably not very likely, but who knows.
Failure designed to happen? (Score:1)
Okay, this may be radical, but could NASA have intentially designed the lander to fail? Lets say that their intent was to have an inexpensive failure to point to so that they could go to Congress and say "See what happens when we don't spend enough money? Good thing it wasn't a manned craft!"
Gonzo
Re:I worked there, and find it hard to believe (Score:1)
I believe the story I read said that lander hadn't gone through sufficient tests and there was a problem with the engine cut-off system. I think they just went ahead with it because of recent failure, and figured it would work, because of, as the previous post mentioned, all the hard work that had gone into it.
Were it, "doomed from launch" it'd be utterly stupid to launch the thing. But sometimes companies try and push stuff through to get it out on time, and then not have to worry about it. Game and software companies do it all the time. (Geez, I hope nobody notices the 65,000 bugs we have...) I don't think NASA is dumb, but I also don't think NASA is above those practices.
big deal (Score:1)
Seriously, I don't really believe NASA deliberately launches projects that would not work simply because they have probably thousand of projects that would actually workk, why not spend time and money on those ones?
next time, try checking the design BEFORE launch (Score:1)
okay, it's too late to fix it, so we're covered, right?
that's some serious arrogance, folks. if the tests were falsified, as the report states, that should be "prison time" for someone. maybe some inmate will send a nice big probe to uranus.
NASA, you might want to start reviewing designs *before* the construction and launch of your probes. just an idea.
on the other hand, the MPL was supposed to be some kind of "industry validation" using low bidders and COTS technology. you sure saved the tax payers a lot of money! just think, we could have payed three times as much for a probe that worked! you still have two freebies to go using this logic!
Re:It's really bad press when the story gets out. (Score:2)
As an embedded systems designer I find this hard to believe. All mechanical switches bounce. That is a different kind of bounce, however. I imagine this "spring bounce" could be just as easily detected and ignored through reprogramming the system in-flight, just as they twiddled with the Mars Explorer firmware. A simple "if close time
Re:It's really bad press when the story gets out. (Score:2)
FIX YOUR GODDAMN PREVIEW ROB!! -- it's not like you haven't known about it for ages!
The last part of my post SHOULD have read:
A simple "if close time < 1s, ignore" statement is not hard to work into software.
Re:digested brains [OT] (Score:2)
No, the problem is that half of Slashdot's readers can't tell the difference between a humorous post and a delusional post. I've had posts mocking something get moderated down two points because people take it seriously and get in a complete huffy, even when it's obviously sarcastic. One time, I posted a reply saying it was just good humor, and then it got moderated up. The majority of people in this world can't tell sarcasm and tone of voice from plain text.
And humor's subjective. We had a good laugh at the studio today based off these comments (and some others that didn't make it).
Press? (Score:2)
This assumes, of course, that the 'leaked' information is invalid. It would seem that people always mistrust the official spokesman and instead go with the unidentified source. Figures - trust no one, literally (we'll trust the guy that doesn't exist!)...
EXTREMELY UNLIKELY!!! (Score:2)
Second: If they knew about the microswitch issue, they could have REPROGRAMMED the software to ignore the switches at all for say 10 second after their initial release.
IF NASA KNEW OF THESE SUPPOSED PROBLEM, THEY WOULD HAVE FIXED THEM IN FEW MINUTES: they did far more complex things with the first lander.
So, MAYBE some contractor knew they screwed the thing and didn't tell NASA (and I don't know why, because as I said *this* kind of problems were fixable). But it's FAR MORE likely that this is only a case of stupid and harmful journalism.
Ciao,
Rob!
NASA press release reply to allegations (Score:2)
NASA official denial. (Score:2)
Subject: NASA'S RESPONSE TO UPI'S MARCH 21 MARS POLAR LANDER STORY
Content-Type: text
Sender: owner-press-release@lists.hq.nasa.gov
To: undisclosed-recipients:;
Peggy Wilhide
Headquarters, Washington, DC March 22, 2000
(Phone: 202/ 358-1898)
Brian Welch
Headquarters, Washington, DC
(Phone: 202/ 358-1600)
Don Savage
Headquarters, Washington, DC
(Phone: 202/ 358-1547)
RELEASE: 00-43
NASA'S RESPONSE TO UPI'S MARCH 21 MARS POLAR LANDER STORY
James Oberg of UPI claims that NASA knew there was a problem
with the Mars Polar Lander propulsion system prior to the Dec. 3
landing attempt and "withheld this conclusion from the public."
NASA categorically denies this charge. Here's what NASA did and
what NASA said:
* The Stephenson report, phase 1, was released to the public on
November 10, 1999 during a press conference at NASA Headquarters.
* The report made 11 different references to technical issues or
concerns involving the propulsion system and the Entry, Descent
and Landing (EDL) sequence.
* This issue was specifically addressed in the press conference
and in "MPL Observation No. 5" and other public recommendations of
the Stephenson Phase 1 report. It was entitled, "Cold Firing of
Thrusters," and dealt in detail with the catalyst bed issue cited
by Mr. Oberg of UPI in his March 21 story, "NASA Knew Mars Polar
Lander Doomed."
* Had UPI researched the public documents released on Nov. 10,
which have been available online at the NASA Home Page, the
reporter would have been able to conclude that NASA did indeed
publicly address propulsion issues, and specifically, the
propulsion system's "catalyst bed" temperature concern.
* Based on this review, NASA knew about the concerns with the
propulsion system, NASA took corrective action, and NASA hid
nothing from the public. We made our concerns known in early
November.
* Several failure scenarios have been reported in the press over
the last few weeks, including the lander legs microswitch issue.
Outlets such as the Denver Post, Space Daily, and National Public
Radio's "All Things Considered" have covered this angle. There is
nothing new in the UPI report relating to this specific issue.
The lander legs issue is among the failure modes we are studying.
* Both the Stephenson and Casani (John Casani, retired JPL
flight programs head and also director of mission assurance) teams
have conducted intensive reviews relating to Mars Polar Lander,
and their teams have surfaced no evidence relating to thruster
acceptance testing irregularities as alleged by UPI. In fact,
members of the review teams are using words like "bunk," "complete
nonsense," and "wacko," to describe their reactions to UPI's
charge.
- end -
* * *
NASA press releases and other information are available automatically
by sending an Internet electronic mail message to domo@hq.nasa.gov.
In the body of the message (not the subject line) users should type
the words "subscribe press-release" (no quotes). The system will
reply with a confirmation via E-mail of each subscription. A second
automatic message will include additional information on the service.
NASA releases also are available via CompuServe using the command
GO NASA. To unsubscribe from this mailing list, address an E-mail
message to domo@hq.nasa.gov, leave the subject blank, and type only
"unsubscribe press-release" (no quotes) in the body of the message.
Re:NASA credibility gap (Score:2)
I take genuine offense at an admitted anonymous coward taking potshots at my patriotism because I point out that a weapons system the Air Force didn't even want costs more per unit than an entire space exploration mission.
I approve of the "anonymous coward" posting system because it allows people to express outright dangerous opinions, but when it is used to slander someone, then it truly lives up to the "coward" part of its name. You should be ashamed of yourself, sir or madam.
Sorry, bad day...
Re:ITS A CONSPIRACY!!! Geeez (Score:2)
The claim is that somebody (probably a contractor?) fudged the conditions of a test because he knew that his hardware would fail the "correct" test. NASA officials discovered the problem something like three days before landing -- kinda late to do the fixing.
This all looks eminently probable to me.
Kaa
Re:I worked there, and find it hard to believe (Score:2)
Great analysis, completely agree. Interactions between elements in NASA are more complex than average too; matrix management promotes a lot of dizzy focus and inability to spot who the hell is clearly responsible for what.
Re:I worked there, and find it hard to believe (Score:2)
The only minor upside was that we didnt actually have to work on 31/12/99, as we would have had to if the probe had landed
Your father was Rich Cook btw?
Re:I worked there, and find it hard to believe (Score:2)
Could Boeing do a better job? Hope so
Anyway, we all know who screwed up the Climate Orbiter units conversion, and it wasn't JPL *coughlockheedcough*
Re:I worked there, and find it hard to believe (Score:2)
Simply because we were all working offsite at UCLA, at the new building constructed especially for the task (sharing with a tokomak too, which was cool), and this was where ops was being run from.
We got pretty much as far away from the JPL atmosphere as possible; almost everyone that worked at UCLA commented on what an excellent location it was for a mission; right in the middle of LA, with food, hotels, etc nearby; much more fun for people than being stuck in Pasadena in the middle of the mountains. Good for team morale anyway.
Re:More Information: (Score:2)
Welcome to Earth
It would seem to always be the case when there's no "clear" profit to be made
I still hold to my view that commercial space travel is the only way forward for serious space exploration. Slap a couple more Pizza Hut logos out there, and you'll have a lot more focus as serious commercial money hits the fan, and a lot more accountability takes place.
Of course, it wouldnt work for science missions, but it would be a nice complement to "solidify" what the science missions have already achieved.
Failures Expected During Testing (Score:2)
They're not at that point yet, which is why we're seeing bouncing-airbag on one mission and parachute/rocket on the next (and no-parachute penetration probes).
Re:Only my opinion but... (Score:2)
The money going into NASA and other programs is more useful than a lot of people realize. Technical advancements need to be pushed somehow. War is great for this, and exploration / outer space travel pushes this along also. Mnay good technologies come out of these things, which end up making much of our lives more convenient and, believe or not, cheaper on a day-to-day basis. Plus a great portion of this money goes to the workers (high costs are due to large amounts of person-years). These are people with familys. They need jobs. They support their local economies with their food/housing/etc dollars. Their children go to schools. It's a part of the society, and not a detrimental one. Many things have gained from the work that goes into these projects. Even the garbage trucks that pick up your trash have benefited from the space program. If all you are considering is 'millions of dollars to try to look at some microbes in rocks', then you are taking a very short-sighted view of things.
"NASA"? (Score:2)
workers) and contractors.
The report doesn't make it clear who these "NASA
engineers" are. I suspect the civil servants monitor the work while the contractors perform the actual tests and evaluation.
It's kind of like ABC News when they report about "NASA technicians" working on the space shuttle at the Kennedy Space Center. Those persons are really the contractors.
It doesn't really excuse this. If the report is true this is criminal behavior IMO. But I'd like to clarify who the people were.
Re:I worked there, and find it hard to believe (Score:2)
There are plenty of "dedicated and hard-working" contractors that work "above and beyond" in all phases of a mission. Some of these jobs can result in serious injury or death if not done properly every single time. This is something mission scientists and managers usually watch from a far away video monitor.
I do agree that scientists involved with construction is a good idea, but sometimes it is so the contractor can read the scientist the Riot Act as well. A space mission is group cooperation on a grand scale.
It seems that the only way for the space program to get positive attention these days is have an extremely risky mission that works. Well thought out, pragmatic and "Occam's Rasor" type missions that work are usually too "boring", and risky missions that fail lead to the public questioning all types of space exploration (not to mention lots of Monday-morning quarterbacking).
Talk about a difficult order to fill!
It's really bad press when the story gets out. (Score:2)
NASA knew Mars Polar Lander doomed
United Press International - March 21, 2000 15:01
By James Oberg, UPI Space Writer
HOUSTON, March 21 (UPI) -- The disappearance of NASA's Mars Polar Lander last December was no surprise to space officials, UPI has learned.
Prior to its arrival at Mars, a review board had already identified a fatal design flaw with the braking thrusters that doomed the mission, but NASA withheld this conclusion from the public.
The probe was lost while attempting to land near the martian south pole on December 3. Two small microprobes which had deployed separately also were never heard from again. It was the second expensive setback for American interplanetary exploration in less than three months. On September 23, a companion probe had been destroyed when a navigation error sent it skimming too deeply into the atmosphere of Mars.
Following these failures, NASA commissioned several expert panels to review the accidents and recommend improvements in NASA procedures. A source close to the panel probing the second accident has told UPI that its conclusions are "devastating" to NASA's reputation. Unlike the previous accident, where management errors merely prevented the recognition of other human errors, in this case it was a management misjudgment which caused the fatal flaw in the first place.
"I'm as certain as I can be that the thing blew up," the source concluded.
As explained privately to UPI, the Mars Polar Lander vehicle's braking thrusters had failed acceptance testing during its construction. But rather than begin an expensive and time-consuming redesign, an unnamed space official simply altered the conditions of the testing until the engine passed.
"That happened in middle management," the source told UPI. "It was done unilaterally with no approval up or down the chain of command."
The Mars Polar Lander employed a bank of rocket engines which use hydrazine fuel. The fuel is passed through metal grates which cause it to decompose violently, creating the thrust used by the engines. These metal grates are called "catalyst beds," or "cat beds." Their purpose is to initiate the explosive chemical reaction in the hydrazine.
"They tested the cat bed ignition process at a temperature much higher than it would be in flight," UPI's source said. This was done because when the cat beds were first tested at the low temperatures predicted after the long cruise from Earth to Mars, the ignition failed or was too unstable to be controlled.
So the test conditions were changed in order to certify the engine performance. But the conditions then no longer represented those most likely to occur on the real space flight.
Following the September loss of the first spacecraft due to management errors, NASA had initiated a crash review of the Mars Polar Lander to identify any similar oversights. According to UPI's source, the flaws in the cat bed testing were uncovered only a few days before the landing was to occur on December 3.
By then it was too late to do anything about it.
Garbled rumors of some temperature-related design flaw circulated in the days before the landing attempt. However, as in the September case when space officials possessed terrifying indications of imminent failure even before the arrival at Mars, NASA made no public disclosure of these expectations.
The Mars Polar Lander investigation team has also reportedly identified a second fatal design flaw that would have doomed the probe even if the engines had functioned properly.
The three landing legs of the probe contain small microswitches which are triggered when the legs touch the surface. This signal commands the engines to cease firing.
Post-accident tests have shown that when the legs are initially unfolded during the final descent, springs push them so hard that they "bounce" and trigger the microswitches by accident. As a result, the computer receives what it believes are indications of a successful touchdown, and it shuts off the engines.
Since this false signal actually occurs high in the air, the engine shutdown automatically leads to a free fall and destructive high-speed impact.
Ground testing prior to launch apparently never detected this because each of the tests was performed in isolation from other tests. One team verified that the legs unfolded properly.
Another team verified that the microswitches functioned on landing.
No integrated end-to-end test was performed due to budget and time constraints. But UPI has been privately told that "this has been reproduceable on a regular basis" in post-flight tests.
Perhaps by coincidence, in a safety memo to NASA employees distributed on March 20, NASA administrator Dan Goldin stressed "the importance of adequate testing." Reliability, he said, "requires well-thought-out verification and test activities."
Goldin explicitly described the adverse impact of "our difficulties with recent failures in late stages of development -- such as system integration and testing -- and during mission operations." The memo did not specifically attribute these problems to the Mars failures.
The Mars Polar Lander also deployed two small "penetrator" probes, both called Deep Space 2. They were designed to fall freely through the thin atmosphere, hit the ground at about 200 meters per second (400 miles per hour), and come to rest deep in the soil.
All attempts to pick up radio signals from these probes, relayed via another spacecraft already orbiting Mars, also failed. Reportedly, the review board believes that the probe radio equipment could not have survived the impact.
Alternately, the probes may simply have hit ground too rocky for survival. Engineers also suspected that their batteries, which had been charged before launch almost a year earlier and not checked since then, might not have retained sufficient power.
"Nobody in the know really expected either of the penetrators to work," UPI's primary source said.
Dr. Carl Pilcher, head of NASA's planetary program, talked with space scientists at last week's Lunar and Planetary Science Conference in Houston. While expressing disappointment at the setbacks and skepticism of ambitious flight schedules -- "Our ambition exceeded our grasp," he told the scientists -- he would not discuss the results of the accident investigation.
The conclusions, he did admit, "make sober reading." The investigation was led by Tom Young, a former manager at NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory which runs most of NASA's deep space probes.
"Goldin recently told his managers that the Young report will be the Rogers Commission of space science," Andrew Lawler wrote in the March 10 issue of Science magazine, "referring to the devastating critique delivered by a panel that examined the 1986 Challenger disaster."
And in a March 9 internal memo from JPL director Ed Stone, which UPI has obtained, space workers are warned that "the days ahead may at times be difficult."
According to Lori Garver, NASA's associate administrator for plans, the report on NSA's failures will be reviewed internally and then will be sent to the White House before being released to the public.
--
Another POV, from someone with experience. (Score:2)
From my reading of the reports, and assuming they are reasonably credible, this is one of those things that keeps coming up in Government R&D and procurement and we keep trying to fight - the "success is mandatory" syndrome. People here and there - and not rarely, unfortunately - are convinced that it is better to find a way to deem something conforming than to find out what is wrong and fix it.
We (the US Govt as a whole) are gradually doing better at fixing that syndrome in general when it comes to our own management practices (i.e. the conviction that our practices must be good and that we shouldn't find flaws in them) but still doing badly at this one extremely important practice. Why?
- Everyone is afraid Congress, the press and the public will think we're doing bad jobs. We are supposedly (and sometimes in fact) working closely with the contractors to improve the chance of conforming goods being delivered, so if they fail, it's our fault. That's a simplistic but very likely reaction in the current environment of Government procurement.
- Whenever something fails and it seems to be the fault of an agency, the logical response would be to find out why it failed and dedicate resources to fixing the problem. But the much more probable result is to cut funds to the agency as a penalty, and thus guarantee that it will never be fixed. This is a pervasive and IMO important issue.
- It is sometimes hard to identify a contractor as not complying with requirements without accusing them of fraud, if (for instance) they say the item passed tests and your review indicates that it couldn't possibly have, so they either are lying to you about it passing or about even doing the tests. These days, by and large no one wants to call a contractor a crook unless it is absolutely clear and provable and also politically acceptable. Again, the thought is that we are supposed to be working closely with the contractors, so such problems should never arise without our advance knowledge. This is absurd, of course, but it is in fact likely that senior officials or congress members will react this way. This is a very bad environment for buying extremely expensive items or ones that involve human safety.
- There is rarely really good understanding of technical problems by the people who have to make decisions about them. This is partly the fault of badly conceived organizations, and partly bad communications on the part of the managers and the technical experts. It is too easy for managers to believe that something is "good enough" and that the technical people who disagree are just too narrowly focused on perfecting their own pet projects. (Because of bad organizations, it is also sometimes the case that the managers never even hear from the technical expert who was willing and able to explain the concerns.)
I see this last one all the time. I have been involved in numerous contract disputes where NO ONE who was actually making decisions on behalf of the government had looked closely at the specification or drawings to see if they made sense, could be followed, and required the contractor to do what the technical "experts" said was required of the item. That is, there is someone telling the procurement person "this item must do such-and-such"; the procurement person tells the contractor "it must do such-and-such"; the contractor says "the specifications don't require that"; the procurement person, who has no training in reading engineering drawing and probably doesn't even understand what the item is for, asks his "expert" to confirm that the item really is required to do such-and-such; and he never realizes that the technical expert doesn't even know for sure what drawings were really provided to the contractor, and is only talking about what such a device is supposed to do in theory.And it's not going to get better without pain. Most big buying agencies (such as DoD and I believe NASA) have been reduced consistently for years; DoD has been reduced in personnel every year for the past 14. What does this mean?
- the bright young people with up-to-date skills are forced out by seniority rules;
- the ones who have lots of experience, know what matters and have the seniority and respect that they aren't afraid to identify problems retire; and at the same time,
- many of the best of the middle group jump ship early because they are afraid of later reductions and can afford to take the risk because they can get good salaries elsewhere.
So we are left with a few really dedicated people who don't want to give up, but also with a lot of people who will never quit because they couldn't compete on the commercial market.Solutions, anyone?
--
James Oberg Rebuts (Score:2)
Wed, 22 Mar 2000 09:40:11
sci.space.policy Thread 15 of 22
Lines 8
Re: MPL lies
RespNo 4 of 4
JamesOberg at AOL http://www.aol.com
Newsgroups: sci.space.policy
The nov 10 press conference said that cold starts could result in 'delayed ignition'. Igniting a cold engine is a formula for thermal shock. My information is that the "fix" of turning on heaters in the fuel tanks was not really going to heat the cat beds to any significant degree. Engineers gave the probe a zero chance of success -- maybe they knew the managers just didn't want to know that.
News Contest: Cydonia Mapping vs Polar Lander Leak (Score:2)
It should be quite entertaining to check out the audio archive of this the March 22 broadcast of the Art Bell show [artbell.com]! ;-)
James Oberg is generally reliable so it is rather strange he would blow off so much of his bread-and-butter credibility as a major wire service's science reporter.
Your Tax Dollars At Work (Score:2)
It's a risky business (Score:2)
We'll know more in a couple of weeks (Score:2)
But, he does seem to take perverse pleasure in the failures that occur. Like me, he may simply wish that the shoddiness which occasionally creeps in would go away. But the fact that I rarely see a word of credit for the things NASA has done well makes it seem that he has an animus.
My questions: What does Oberg accomplish by releasing this news/rumor, given that the failure reports will be out in a couple of weeks? Did he have a choice, or would the anonymous source have blabbed to a brainless twit like Miles O'Brien to ensure the story got out? What does the anonymous source get out of this?
"Rogers Commission of Space Science" (Score:2)
My impression of the Rogers Commission (gleaned from Richard Feynman's autobiographical stories) was that it was a whitewash that failed and ultimately was a truthful and accurate assessment of management problems of some, but not all, parts of the SST program. Is this what Dan Goldin means?
As far as NASA's credibility goes, I just don't know. While I believe that they may have known the ways that the craft was likely to fail, that does not constitute knowledge that it would fail. Furthermore, if this was known only three days before the final landing, it really was too late to do anything about it.
Anomalous: inconsistent with or deviating from what is usual, normal, or expected
ITS A CONSPIRACY!!! Geeez (Score:2)
Sure they know there was a risk, I'm sure... but that's like goin out yelling TOYOTA KNEW THIS ACCIDENT WOULD HAPPEN!&#@$#! when there's a car accident.
Pretty much pointless.
Re:Only my opinion but... (Score:2)
We should also keep the costs involved in perspective. The Mars Polar Lander cost (these figures are from memory and may be off) about $165 million. F-22 fighter jets cost about $200 million each and the Pentagon recently ordered 300 of them. Each Space Shuttle mission costs ~$800 million.
Some other budget outlays for 1996 (from the New York Times Almanac):
National Defence: $265,748,000,000 (yep, 265 Billion)
Interest on Debt: $241,090,000,000
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (Welfare): 20,295,000,000
Space Research and Technology (1994): 13,533,000,000
Total budget (1996): 1,560,330,000,000
The United States is incredibly wealthy. I agree that the quality of life of its citizens should have a priority in the budget, but NASA isn't where I'd take the money from.
NASA Coverup? Maybe not but... (Score:2)
Quoting from his article "And in a March 9 internal memo from JPL director Ed Stone, which UPI has obtained, space workers are warned that "the days ahead may at times be difficult."
As first reported on NASA Watch [nasawatch.com] On November 8th NASA did indeed know that there could be a problem with the thrusters. Here is an excerpt [spaceref.com] of the press release; "The NASA investigation board, chaired by Art Stephenson, director of NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Ala., found that cold temperatures could affect the performance Mars Polar Lander's descent engine, which begins firing at about 2 kilometers (about 10 miles) altitude during the descent to Mars surface. As a result of the finding, a team of engineers at NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Pasadena, Calif., has developed procedures to warm up the engine system prior to firing. In addition, the team has analyzed descent engine performance at a range of temperatures to assess its predicted performance upon arrival."
The report on the Mars Polar Lander to be relased shortly will no doubt tarnish NASA's reputation in the short term. The repercussions of the last two failed Mars missions could set back the exploration of the solar system 5-10 years. While perhaps it is time for some serious reorganization at NASA we must not let these setbacks stop us. NASA's budget is small and has been shrinking for some time. If the U.S. is to lead the world in space exploration then a stronger committment is required by government.
Marc Boucher
Re:NASA Coverup? Maybe not but... (Score:2)
The full story can be read here [spaceref.com].
Can we infer that the whole truth is now slowly coming out? Did the original article serve as a catalyst to get to the truth? More to follow.
That's It! (Score:3)
Everyone knows that human beings came from aliens, yet NASA repeatedly covers up alien contact it has had with the Zoltar species from quadrant Delta that has given us such great 'NASA' technological advances as the TV dinner, freeze-dried chili, and velcro. No self-thinking human being could ever have come up with these astounding inventions, and NASA should just give up the "We don't know any aliens, honest!" argument.
We didn't land on the friggin' moon! Hello? Have you seen the so called 'pictures' of the moon? They have black crosses all over them. I don't know about you, but when I look up at the moon, I don't see any black crosses. I see green cheese, and hell, the so-called 'moon rocks' they brought back had absolutely no cheese in them whatsoever. It doesn't surprise me that geologists analyzing the rocks concluded that they were 'just like earth rocks.' What else are earth rocks going to be like?
I believe the quote heard around NASA headquarters was, "Oops, how'd we let that one slip through?" Of course, there's a face on Mars. The Zoltar species put it there as a way of reminding NASA, "Hey, we're watching you." They did an awful job trying to cover it up with the MGS pictures (I could do that in Photoshop, I mean, come on!), but luckily, Hollywood called them on it in the non-fiction Oscar-caliber classic, Mission to Mars. As always, though, NASA has to send out their Slashdot goons to bad-mouth the movie and talk about what trash it is.
Why are we landing on some pitiful asteroid in the middle of a million billion pitiful asteroids? We're setting up a super-secret base from which we can defend ourselves from the Zoltar species, duh! Would you look for humans on that pitiful rock? I wouldn't, and neither will the ZOltar. NASA, obviously ungrateful for velcro has decided to strike back against the oppressors. They're not telling you or I, though, because we probably won't make it.
Is anyone listening to me? Anyone? Hello? Did I mention they knew about Mars Polar Lander's imminent failure before it was even launched, yet covered it up by throwing hundreds of millions dollars and man hours at it? It's obvious. NASA has a history of being sneaky with the public and it has to stop. I'm going to start a petition on a site and I encourage every Slashdot person to sign the petition and then maybe NASA will stop.
NOTE: This post not for the humor (or humour) impaired
NOTE 2: Are we landing on Eros or some other asteroid? If it's not Eros, then it's a further NASA cover-up because they're brainwashing people one-by-one into thinking that it's Eros we're landing on, probably to fool the Zoltar when they capture us and digest our brains.
Back off! (Score:3)
Next time, for maybe a slightly higher cost (seven percent of a B-2), we will land on Mars. I'm sure I'm not the only one who considers this feat a more worthwhile goal than radar absorbing paint.
I mean, for God's sake, it would cost less money to put people on Mars than Titanic made in the theaters. Doesn't this bother anyone else? NASA needs a public support fund.
Re:More Information: (Score:3)
The biggest problem is of course the budget for NASA, which has been steadily decreasing over the last few years. I think it is ludicrous of us to expect NASA to launch missions like these without a proper budget for development, manufacturing, and testing of the equipment. In this case, apparently the money was simply not there to afford a complete test of the whole landing proceedure - which would have made it obvious that the engines were not going to work and that the censors for shutting them off would not work either
Too right. It was really really stupid on the Mars Polar Lander mission
Then, of course, landing comes closer, and we are glutted with money from NASA. But what's the point? We get 10 sysadmins one month before landing, and we have to spend hours training them up; much more preferable to have had one good one ten months before!
Compare this to the old days of Viking
Still, I have faith in Faster Better Cheaper; we cant afford mistakes like the Mars Orbiter again, where a simple case of bad luck (exploding fuel line) lost the entire mission. Painful as it was to lose the MPL/MCO/DS2 probes, they were cheap and cheerful, and we can throw more of them out to Mars.
As a contractor, I have to... agree. (Score:3)
This is almost invariably catastrophic - contractors have different agendas from scientists, and once the contract is secured, they often don't want to do more than the absolute minimum necessary to fulfil it.
If you replace "scientists" with "government customers" in general, then I'd have to say that this is true, again, in the general case. I myself am a contractor, and while I put in a lot of long hours and have occasionally been whacked by my supervisors for giving the customer "too much," I have known contractors who look forward to delivering a buggy-as-hell product.
They know that the government will turn around and say, "Well, gosh, that sucked, but we know you can do better if we give you more money and let you try again." (In this respect, they're no different from any big computer vendor (Microsoft, Sun, RedHat) and their customers -- the vendor can ship crap and the customers will keep paying for it.)
Having said that, no, I don't believe that NASA knew about it in advance either. They have too much to lose by doing so, and not enough to gain. I have no problem believing that some of their contractors tried, however.
This wasn't a TEST, this was a FLIGHT (Score:3)
--
NASA's response to the UPI item (Score:3)
From: NASANews@hq.nasa.gov
To: undisclosed-recipients:
Subject: NASA'S RESPONSE TO UPI'S MARCH 21 MARS POLAR LANDER STORY
Peggy Wilhide
Headquarters, Washington, DC March 22, 2000
(Phone: 202/ 358-1898)
Brian Welch
Headquarters, Washington, DC
(Phone: 202/ 358-1600)
Don Savage
Headquarters, Washington, DC
(Phone: 202/ 358-1547)
RELEASE: 00-43
NASA'S RESPONSE TO UPI'S MARCH 21 MARS POLAR LANDER STORY
James Oberg of UPI claims that NASA knew there was a problem with the Mars Polar Lander propulsion system prior to the Dec. 3 landing attempt and "withheld this conclusion from the public." NASA categorically denies this charge. Here's what NASA did and what NASA said:
* The Stephenson report, phase 1, was released to the public on November 10, 1999 during a press conference at NASA Headquarters.
* The report made 11 different references to technical issues or concerns involving the propulsion system and the Entry, Descent and Landing (EDL) sequence.
* This issue was specifically addressed in the press conference and in "MPL Observation No. 5" and other public recommendations of the Stephenson Phase 1 report. It was entitled, "Cold Firing of Thrusters," and dealt in detail with the catalyst bed issue cited by Mr. Oberg of UPI in his March 21 story, "NASA Knew Mars Polar Lander Doomed."
* Had UPI researched the public documents released on Nov. 10, which have been available online at the NASA Home Page, the reporter would have been able to conclude that NASA did indeed publicly address propulsion issues, and specifically, the propulsion system's "catalyst bed" temperature concern.
* Based on this review, NASA knew about the concerns with the propulsion system, NASA took corrective action, and NASA hid nothing from the public. We made our concerns known in early November.
* Several failure scenarios have been reported in the press over the last few weeks, including the lander legs microswitch issue. Outlets such as the Denver Post, Space Daily, and National Public Radio's "All Things Considered" have covered this angle. There is nothing new in the UPI report relating to this specific issue. The lander legs issue is among the failure modes we are studying.
* Both the Stephenson and Casani (John Casani, retired JPL flight programs head and also director of mission assurance) teams have conducted intensive reviews relating to Mars Polar Lander, and their teams have surfaced no evidence relating to thruster acceptance testing irregularities as alleged by UPI. In fact, members of the review teams are using words like "bunk," "complete nonsense," and "wacko," to describe their reactions to UPI's charge.
- end -
--
More Information: (Score:3)
As always with anything to do with Space, if you want the latest information on this issue, be sure to check Spaceref.com [spaceref.com] and NASA Watch [nasawatch.com]. In this matter, I believe NASA Watch was reporting a possible engine problem back in November - although there was no corroborating evidence at the time. The fact that they knew about the problems with the MPL was reported yesterday.
Certainly, some heads are going to roll in NASA, and hopefully the blame gets placed where it should be - on the shoulders of whoever decided to cover this up. Also, blame should apparently be placed on the folks at Lockheed Martin (the company that I believe built the engines on the MPL) who must have known there was a problem with their engines.
The biggest problem is of course the budget for NASA, which has been steadily decreasing over the last few years. I think it is ludicrous of us to expect NASA to launch missions like these without a proper budget for development, manufacturing, and testing of the equipment. In this case, apparently the money was simply not there to afford a complete test of the whole landing proceedure - which would have made it obvious that the engines were not going to work and that the censors for shutting them off would not work either.
OTOH, it is also criminal for a project of this magnitude and expense to go ahead with a known flaw that will prevent its success, and those responsible should be called to the mat for their explanations.
Sadly, this will probably put space exploration back several years, and the blame will probably end up on the shoulders of good people who didn't deserve it.
Re:I worked there, and find it hard to believe (Score:3)
There is plenty of precedent for this kind of thing. The original Hubble mirror was fucked up by Perkin Elmer, which then proceeded to shade the results of the optical tests - a fact that was not discovered until after Hubble was launched, leading to the NASA-spun "triumph" of the first repair mission.
There was a projact management failure in that case: the contractor was not properly supervised by the project scientists. It sounds like this is also what happened with MPL.
This is almost invariably catastrophic - contractors have different agendas from scientists, and once the contract is secured, they often don't want to do more than the absolute minimum necessary to fulfil it. Successful projects send scientists out to live at the contractor plant, and to read them the Riot Act on a bi-weekly basis.
Good Site (Score:3)
Mars Exploration Program. [nasa.gov]
Jainith Slashdot [slashdot.org] 4 Life
Re:I worked there, and find it hard to believe (Score:3)
My feelings exactly. My father was Project Manager for the MPL mission. He poured heart and soul into it, commuted from LA to Denver to keep the engineering on track, and then from LA to Florida to keep the launch on track. He did an incredible job with the money and mass that was allocated, and was never content to slack off and let things take care of themselves.
From what I saw of his colleagues at the launch, the entire project operated this way. This was an incredible group of engineers and scientists who would never fiddle with the test conditions to make things "pass their tests."
Re:I worked there, and find it hard to believe (Score:4)
I can easily believe it. If you work in a success driven culture that is also under financial pressure - which describes NASA pretty well - then as a manager you'd tend to view things optimistically, because if things fail then you are seen to fail too. The chain of thought of whoever is alleged to be responsible is frighteningly plausible.
First you test the rocket motor - it fails. This is bad. You have two choices: redesign the rocket motor or redesign the test. The second is quicker and cheaper. So, you have a close look at the test, and pick holes in it. You are now the devils's advocate, and it is terribly easy to find "flaws" in a test that render it "not representative" - destructive criticism is easy. So you redesign the test because you've found all these flaws in it.
Repeat until the rocket passes.
Now you have a rocket that passes the test. You believe that it will do it's job. It is here that I would disagree with the article - I cannot believe that anyone would, in effect, knowingly allow a defective rocket on the Mars PE., which is certainly what is seems to imply. I can see how culture and bureaucracy could conspire to allow it to happen unwittingly.
NASA credibility gap (Score:5)
I think NASA has a serious credibility problem that stems in no small part from the mid-1980's Challenger accident. We have seen NASA attempt to pass off bad decision making (the Challenger launch was opposed by every Thiokol engineer on the SRB team) as a technical judgement call too complex to hold them accoutable for. Dr. Feynman's now famous ice water experiment at the hearings took the air out of that effort.
Any of us who were around for that (pointless aside: one of the most baffling things about getting older is how shocking we find it that anyone could be too young to remember things we remember -- nothing is more surprising than aging) can remember the image of NASA management as a bunch of toadying bureaucrats posing as engineers to avoid responsibility for a colossal tragedy.
I think this is why a story like this one, which is little more than rumormongering, gets disproportionate attention.
I, for one, supported the hardworking scientists and engineers involved in the Space Program even as NASA leadership struggled to hide bad decisions made for political expedience as complex technical problems boldly handled by courageous decision-makers who had to let the chips fall in the face of their petty and waffling engineers (can you tell NASA infuriated me during the Challenger hearings?). JPL has done magnificent work, and I think even the worst NASA managers were just trying to avoid the destruction of their careers, an understandable if self-serving goal. I'm sure each of them is haunted each day by the image of those trails of smouldering debris trailing out of the sky.
The business of exploration and discovery is fraught with risk. Sometimes things fail. Whether that failure is human or mechanical the aftermath should be the struggle to understand the nature of the failure, not to find someone on whom to hang the blame.
As much as I think NASA needed to be raked over the Challenger accident, it was becuase it was an avoidable tragedy. NASA needed to be changed such that if the same circumstances arose, the right decision will be made next time.
I remember seeing an interview with Roger Beaujolais, a senior engineer at Morton-Thiokol at the time of the Challenger accident. In that interview he talked about watching the launch after he and all the other engineers had advised against the launch. He said, after the shuttle cleared the tower, "We just dodged a bullet." A moment later the spacecraft disintegrated in a collosal fireball and seven people lost thier lives, including Chirstine Macauliff (sp?), the much touted "Teacher in Space." Roger Beaujolais lives with that moment every day of his life. So do all the men and women of NASA.
I do not believe this story about the lander in no small part because in my heart and soul I pray that human memory is not that short. That no one in the NASA that remained after the Challenger accident would ever, could ever hide a failure, even one that involved no loss of life.
And for those who think $150 million is some sort of monumental waste, how much does one B1 bomber cost? A lot more than the entire Mars Polar Lander project...
I worked there, and find it hard to believe (Score:5)
That report is bull as far as I am concerned. We worked our ARSES off as launch came closer. I have never worked with a brighter, more intelligent, and more optimistic crew than the Mars Polar Lander team that was assembled at MVACS before that fateful landing.
After the Mars Climate Orbiter was lost, we had a huge influx of support from JPL; system admins, scientists, programmers, all drafted in at short notice simply to come in and fill in the budget shortage that we'd been suffering from before.
I somehow don't believe JPL would have thrown everything they had at us, to help us out, if they somehow knew this "secret" that the lander was doomed to fail.
It is possible that such a report could have kept secret by uppermost echelons of NASA, and kept from the team and the JPL management. I find that difficult to believe; I would count any such action as bordering criminal, after the incredible amount of hard work sunk by the staff of the mission before landing.
Really, the feeling of utter disbelief we had when it crashed said it all. Noone really expected it to happen, after all the effort, and it took a long time for some of the crew to come to terms with it.
Also, the Mars missions are underwent a fundamental and deep review of their future after this mission failed; it simply wasn't in NASA's interests to cover this up, since it really would have been a "worstcase" end to their Mars Surveyor 98 missions, with only ONE success (the global surveyor). If they did know about this, it would have made sense for them to come out and say it, and attempt a fix, rather than keep it secret, and throw (useless) resources at the team!
As with all other management, NASA executives can be dumb, but I don't believe they could be that dumb.
NASA responses to UPI -- both official and un- (Score:5)
I worked at NASA/GSFC for four years. Admittedly, it's about as far (geographically) as you can get from JPL and still be in the U.S. -- but I can't imagine a full coverup by NASA of any sort of major secret. The climate of the organization is just too open for that. Of course, there *are* plenty of PHB's (as in any other large organization) and it's at least possible that some engineer, somewhere, believed that the thrusters wouldn't work. But as for a coverup at high levels? Naah.
On the other hand, LOTS of outsiders seem to think that NASA coverups are a good explanation for everything from dropped telemetry in solar images to the mysterious sounds they hear (in Wisconsin) at four in the morning. Comes with being a high profile organization, I guess.
FWIW, here's the NASA response -- it's a press release that came out this morning.
(Gee, it'd sure be nice if we could use <pre> in our HTML -- these things come out in ASCII...)
NASA'S RESPONSE TO UPI'S MARCH 21 MARS POLAR LANDER STORY
James Oberg of UPI claims that NASA knew there was a problem with the Mars Polar Lander propulsion system prior to the Dec. 3 landing attempt and "withheld this conclusion from the public." NASA categorically denies this charge. Here's what NASA did and what NASA said:
- end -
The Truth! (Score:5)
We are at war with Mars, the mars polar lander was not a probe it was a nuclear bomb. We have been at war with the martians since the 70's.
Hello? Cant you guys/girls see the obvious?