Saul Kripke, Philosopher Who Found Truths In Semantics, Dies At 81 (nytimes.com) 31
Saul Kripke, a math prodigy and pioneering logician whose revolutionary theories on language qualified him as one of the 20th century's greatest philosophers, died on Sept. 15 in Plainsboro, N.J. He was 81. The New York Times reports: His death, at Penn Medicine Princeton Medical Center, was caused by pancreatic cancer, according to Romina Padro, director of the Saul Kripke Center at the City University of New York, where Professor Kripke had been a distinguished professor of philosophy and computer science since 2003 and had capped a career exploring how people communicate. Professor Kripke's classic work, "Naming and Necessity," first published in 1972 and drawn from three lectures he delivered at Princeton University in 1970 before he was 30, was considered one of the century's most evocative philosophical books.
"Kripke challenged the notion that anyone who uses terms, especially proper names, must be able to correctly identify what the terms refer to," said Michael Devitt, a distinguished professor of philosophy who recruited Professor Kripke to the City University Graduate Center in Manhattan. "Rather, people can use terms like 'Einstein,' 'springbok,' perhaps even 'computer,' despite being too ignorant or wrong to provide identifying descriptions of their referents," Professor Devitt said. "We can use terms successfully not because we know much about the referent but because we're linked to the referent by a great social chain of communication."
The Pulitzer Prize-winning historian Taylor Branch, writing in The New York Times Magazine in 1977, said Professor Kripke had "introduced ways to distinguish kinds of true statements -- between statements that are 'possibly' true and those that are 'necessarily' true." "In Professor Kripke's analysis," he continued, "a statement is possibly true if and only if it is true in some possible world -- for example, 'The sky is blue' is a possible truth, because there is some world in which the sky could be red. A statement is necessarily true if it is true in all possible worlds, as in 'The bachelor is an unmarried man.'"
"Kripke challenged the notion that anyone who uses terms, especially proper names, must be able to correctly identify what the terms refer to," said Michael Devitt, a distinguished professor of philosophy who recruited Professor Kripke to the City University Graduate Center in Manhattan. "Rather, people can use terms like 'Einstein,' 'springbok,' perhaps even 'computer,' despite being too ignorant or wrong to provide identifying descriptions of their referents," Professor Devitt said. "We can use terms successfully not because we know much about the referent but because we're linked to the referent by a great social chain of communication."
The Pulitzer Prize-winning historian Taylor Branch, writing in The New York Times Magazine in 1977, said Professor Kripke had "introduced ways to distinguish kinds of true statements -- between statements that are 'possibly' true and those that are 'necessarily' true." "In Professor Kripke's analysis," he continued, "a statement is possibly true if and only if it is true in some possible world -- for example, 'The sky is blue' is a possible truth, because there is some world in which the sky could be red. A statement is necessarily true if it is true in all possible worlds, as in 'The bachelor is an unmarried man.'"
So useful (Score:3)
"Kripke challenged the notion that anyone who uses terms, especially proper names, must be able to correctly identify what the terms refer to,"
This is exactly what Queen Elizabeth would say. No, not that Queen Elizabeth.
Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
Just look at how demagogues, like Trump and Putin and Xi, use language.
Imagine if their followers actually understand how language works, and how it is manipulated, then they'd see through their bullshit.
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It is true, the number of times I see people even here on Slashdot fall for logical fallacies, is enough to shift an election.
Reddit is even worse of course with the voting system that means "I agree" rather than "well reasoned." Every lie we tell incurs a debt to the truth that sooner or later must be paid.
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Have you ever read A Clockwork Orange? I only read the first 20 pages or so, but right away I was faced with made-up words whose meaning I didn't know. So I guessed at what these words meant based on context. Then some of the words would come up again a little later, and I would be able to see if my original guess still made sense or needed to be changed based on the new context.
I would say that this is
Kwipke (Score:2)
This makes me twuly sad
Lecture without notes. (Score:4, Interesting)
When I was an undergraduate at Western Washington University in 1978 or 1979, the philosophy faculty invited me to accompany then to Kripke's *Naming and Necessity* lectures at one of Vancouver universities. They were the first set of "big time" lectures I attended. I was astounded. Not just by the content but by the fact that the lectures were so clear, and given without notes. (An aside: my wife did the index for *Naming and Necessity* while a grad. student. :) )
Best wishes,
Bob
Postscript -- corrections to story summary. (Score:3)
*Naming and Necessity* was published in 1980 or 1981. However, it was based on the 1970 lectures, and a Xeroxed manuscript was floating around.
His contribution to discussion of modality, i.e., possibility and necessity, wasn't in distinguishing them, or even in developing the logic of modality, but rather in giving the semantics of modal claims. Think of it as giving an interpretation or model of modal logic. So, for example, (nearly) everyone accepted that if something is necessarily true is possibly t
Re: (Score:3, Interesting)
That example is only the pop-press's account of what happens. If you need a more realistic account, something even you can understand, consider a finite state machine. A necessary proposition is true at state x if at every state y accessible from x, the proposition is true at y.
Too trivial? It provides the basis for Floyd-Hoare semantics: Let P be a precondition, C a blob of computation, and Q be a post condition, written
{ P } C { Q }
where the braces do not indicat
I should print this on a shirt (Score:2)
In case I encounter someone who tries to deconstruct all comon knowledge with "Oh yeah? Then please define XXX!" arguments.
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In case I encounter someone who tries to deconstruct all comon knowledge with "Oh yeah? Then please define XXX!" arguments.
When I was a grad. student, I had a tee shirt printed with "Free the bound variables!". :)
Best wishes,
Bob
In case you were wondering (Score:3)
From Wikipedia: "He is the second cousin once removed of television writer, director, and producer Eric Kripke"
The guy who did "Supernatural" and "The Boys".
Reminds me of the old joke... (Score:3, Funny)
Professor of Engineering goes to the Chancellor to ask for money for some expensive equipment.
"You engineers cost this place a fortune", the Chancellor complained. " Why can't you be like the Theoretical Physicists ? All they need is some paper, a few pens, and a wastebasket. Or better yet, be like the Philosophers. They don't even need the basket!".
Caught in the middle (Score:3)
Philosophy is in a difficult position - its caught in an unsatisfactory middle between science and mathematics. Mathematics considered in a very general sense where it includes logic.
Its practitioners always find themselves caught between saying things that are obvious and things that are obviously false.
For instance, we have in this piece "Kripke challenged the notion that anyone who uses terms, especially proper names, must be able to correctly identify what the terms refer to".
He was challenging something that is obviously false, given a moment's thought, and something that probably no-one has ever seriously believed.
If you want another classic example, look at Quine's doctrine of the indeterminacy of translation. In a trivial sense translation is indeterminate, in this sense its obvious and uninteresting. In a strong sense, where its potentially an interesting claim or has the appearance of being interesting, it would make understanding of it and debate about it impossible - along with making most conversation impossible. Which of course we know it is not.
The problem with philosophy is that where it says interesting things it needs to say them in a way that empirical evidence bears. At which point it becomes science. Political philosophy, where it is interesting, becomes political science, that is, the study of how political choices and decisions work out in society. Metaphysics, to be saying anything understandable, turns into physics. Ethics turns into casuistry - the study of cases.
The philosopher who came closest to seeing this in recent times was Moore in his demolitions of Idealism. But if you read Principia Ethica with the above in mind, you see it deteriorating into same old. There is an interesting argument to be had with Moore on ethics, but its not about the theory. Its about whether he was right to think that the things he identifies as the supreme goods really are that.
Re: Caught in the middle (Score:1)
What i take fron this is that using a term weather you know the accepted definition or not is the act of learning a definition. But, Pop media abuses this natural learning process by flooding the user with whatever definition they the media corporations want to push. Sooo... E cigs, virtual reality, whatever theses crazys are smoking now, for example.....at some point are never unhealthy because it's not part of their pop definitions.
Re:Caught in the middle (Score:4, Interesting)
Modern philosophy is not something between mathematics and science. It is unrelated to either. Philosophy is mainly engaged in finding questions which cannot be answered. It's just an exploration of introspection ad absurdum.
A better analogy would be that philosophy is in a realm between 19th century psychology and religion.
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As an engineer I have found my limited exposure to philosophy to be mostly frustrating. It seems like they spend 99% of their time arguing about angels on the heads of pins. Then the 1% comes along and it's like, "Oh, that's not only useful but ground-breaking". It's just that you have to sort through so much dreck in philosophy. It literally means "love of thinking", so they just think, think, think, and it's always the wheels turning and making a lot of noise, only grinding the occasional kernel of wh
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It literally means "love of thinking"
No, it literally means "love of wisdom".
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In my 40+ years doing philosophy (undergraduate to now -- retiring at the end of this month) I've never had the fortune of engaging in a discussion of angels and pins. However, I have thought about, and discussed the possibility of there being things with location, but no dimensions, which may not be a million miles away, as it were. Points (as in geometry) come to mind. Some also think that if Descartes would have modelled the mind as a point type object, that would have solved some problems with his v
In other words (Score:2)
In other words, it's ok to use the term "woman" without being able to say what "woman" means. Kripke I'm sure explained this because idiots have free speech, too. It's also why politicians are always explaining how we are going to see a quantum leap.
Was that difficult? (Score:2)