Commercial Quantum Cryptography System Hacked 117
KentuckyFC writes "Any proof that quantum cryptography is perfect relies on idealized assumptions that don't always hold true in the real world. One such assumption is related to the types of errors that creep into quantum messages. Alice and Bob always keep a careful eye on the level of errors in their messages because they know that Eve will introduce errors if she intercepts and reads any of the quantum bits in a message. So a high error rate is a sign that the message is being overheard. But it is impossible to get rid of errors entirely, so Alice and Bob have to tolerate a small level of error. This level is well known. Various proofs show that if the quantum bit error rate is less than 20 percent, then the message is secure. However, these proofs assume that the errors are the result of noise from the environment. Now, physicists have come up with an attack based on the realization that Alice also introduces errors when she prepares the required quantum states to send to Bob. This extra noise allows Eve to intercept some of the quantum bits, read them and then send them on, in a way that raises the error rate to only 19.7 percent. In this kind of 'intercept and resend attack,' the error rate stays below the 20 percent threshold and Alice and Bob are none the wiser, happily exchanging keys while Eve listens in unchallenged. The physicists say they have successfully used their hack on a commercial quantum cryptography system from the Geneva-based startup ID Quantique."
Wouldn't it be better... (Score:4, Funny)
...to e-mail Alice and Bob, rather than advertise that their love-letters are being snooped on?
Re:Wouldn't it be better... (Score:4, Funny)
Re: (Score:2)
Alice is a man.
Re: (Score:3, Informative)
Alice is a man.
I disagree, as per TFS:
Alice also introduces errors when she prepares the required quantum states to send to Bob
Re: (Score:3, Interesting)
"she" is a typo (extra 's').
Bob is Bob Ezrin.
Re: (Score:3, Funny)
Re: (Score:1, Offtopic)
Here is more for you then. The lyrics mentioning Alice Cooper from "What Kind Of Girl Do You Think We Are?" written by Frank Zappa. It seems on topic with this thread ;-)
http://www.lyricstime.com/frank-zappa-what-kind-of-girl-do-you-think-we-are-lyrics.html [lyricstime.com] ... . .
Mark:
Well, I'll tell ya
Well I get off bein' juked
With a baby octopus
And spewed upon with creamed corn . .
An' my girlfriend, she digs it
With a hot Yoo-hoo bottle
While somebody's screamin':
CORKS 'N SAFETIES
PIGS 'N DONKEYS
ALICE COOPER, baby . .
WAAAAH
Re: (Score:2)
And here I was thinking that it was the Alice you're supposed to ask when she's ten feet tall.
Re: (Score:2)
Smokie would just ask: Alice ? Who the fuck is Alice ?
Which (for some obscure reason - possibly the incurable lack of good taste of mankind) remains the best selling song ever with "Fuck" in the title.
Re: (Score:2)
Time to apply the Crocodile Dundee test [urbandictionary.com]!
Mal-2
Re: (Score:1)
She just so happens to be a slut AND bi.
Re: (Score:2)
...to e-mail Alice and Bob, rather than advertise that their love-letters are being snooped on?
Why not just post it on one of their Facebook pages?
Re: (Score:2)
Re: (Score:3, Funny)
They could call it the Quantum Bit Error Rate Test, or Q-BERT for short.
Re: (Score:2)
They could call it the Quantum Bit Error Rate Test, or Q-BERT for short.
Once we come up with a way to justify replacing a hyphen with an asterisk in an acronym, we'll be all set. Hmmm...
Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
Re: (Score:3, Interesting)
The ability to control external noise in real-world operating environments, at least to the degree necessary to mitigate this issue, would seem to represent a rather nasty challenge. This may be a severely constraining factor on the potential for practical usefulness of quantum cryptography, at least for the time being.
Can someone explain to me why anybody is even bothering with this technology?
Are existing cryptographic algorithms so untrustworthy that it's better to use an untested technology that a) makes the already very expensive line equipment significantly more expensive, b) may prevent the use of certain kinds of repeaters or active splices, c) is so insanely complex that nobody except a select few physicists understand the details.
Also, unlike current cryptographic techniques, quantum cryptography is strictly one
Re:the less sensational headline... (Score:5, Funny)
I seem to remember... (Score:2, Insightful)
...stopping reading the blurb on slashdot last week about the new position based system being secure because the people who previously said it wasn't secure changed their mind and said it was provably secure and then proceeded to use the words "cannot easily" to justify it being secure. Now, this week I see a commercial system that has been cracked because some how thresholds of likely hood were once again used. Anyone else see a trend?
So, quantum cryptography is fundamentally flawed? (Score:2, Insightful)
If this article is correct, all an eavesdropper has to know is the proper error threshold to stay under to remain undetected.
Doesn't seem so secure to me.
Re: (Score:2)
It's hardly fundamentally flawed. Even if the eavesdropper knows the error threshold and can intercept a few bits without detection thanks to errors in the system, the information gain is very minimal. You might be able to get a few percent of the transmitted bits in a key. Three out of every hundred bits in a one-time pad isn't going to break the encryption. The parties can always XOR some bits until the information that an eavesdropper could extract is negligible.
Re:So, quantum cryptography is fundamentally flawe (Score:5, Insightful)
If they all made it safely without interception. You've got your secure channel. 1TB/128kbps = 2 years. 1TB/256kbps = 1 year.
You could send more than one set of drives. When they all arrive, you tell the "B" let's start with drive set #5.
Re: (Score:2)
Re: (Score:2)
1) You would need all three disks to reconstruct the original OTP that will be used.
2) If I send more sets of three and only use some sets, that makes it even harder.
3) I could even send 9 disks over time and over different couriers/channels and then randomly choose different combinations of them to construct the actual OTP.
Quantum Bullshit (Score:2, Interesting)
The core idea of using quantum communication security (or, in general, quantum communication) is that you'll be able to tell when the message has been altered.
All a man in the middle attack has to do is read the message, recreate it, and send out a spoofed message instead of the original message.
Reading the message is trivial.
Recreating the message, while introducing tolerable levels of noise is trivial once you have the key. Alice does it all the time.
Blocking the original message is not trivial, but it i
Re: (Score:2, Informative)
Re: (Score:1)
Uh, read my entire post please?
And someone has to successfully eavesdrop for that protection to kick in. You can't control when they'll eavesdrop, so information can still get out, so it's far from a "secure" communication channel.
And with a noise tolerance of X, eavesdropping without being detected is not only possible, but likely very easy. Remember that Alice has to generate noise-free signals in the first place. Alice isn't made of magic. Eve can do anything Alice can.
And if you have a perfect netwo
Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
Basically, if you have a fiber run that you want to make sure nobody is tapping, you can either station trustworthy guys with guns every few yards along its length or you can put a quantum crypto box at each end. Given that the guys-with-guns approach is largely impractical(especially for buried or undersea lines) the potential to
Re: (Score:2)
Re: (Score:2)
Obviously, for the vast majority of applications it is total overkill. Quick quiz: Do you own/seriously lease the actual fiber over which you are transmitting? If not, you are definitely not a candidate. If so, you are probably not a candidate.
There are, though, probably some applications where the risk of future disclosure is simply unacceptable.
Re: (Score:1)
The only difference is that with classical crypto you can guess infinitely, while with quantum crypto you can guess only once.
Re: (Score:1)
The only difference is that with classical crypto you can guess infinitely, while with quantum crypto you can guess only once.
You can copy a signal - any signal.
You can copy a quantum signal and test against it forever.
Reading said signal is probably detectable on the other end, so they SHOULD stop communicating.
You get one small piece of the message when you get the key (brute force or otherwise) and you have performed a successful denial of service attack.
If the two hosts then try to reestablish communication, they need to generate new keys. You can DOS them indefinitely since they're using a dedicated line that you have physic
Re: (Score:1)
You can copy a quantum signal and test against it forever.
No, you can't due to the no-cloning theorem, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No-cloning_theorem [wikipedia.org]
Please do yourself a favor and learn some basics about quantum mechanics. The no-cloning theorem is a vital ingredient in quantum cryptography. The eavesdropping detection is a nice bye-effect, but QC offers much more than that. You simply cannot decrypt a 'quantum message' unless you know the key, period. If you try a wrong key the message is lost, hence the eavesdropping detection.
Let me illustrate this
Re: (Score:1)
Quantum communication occurs how, by magic?
No, you measure the signal. Analyze it, modulate it, decode it, and present it to the user.
Write down the measurements once, test against them forever.
You can't measure the signal without disrupting the legitimate people trying to communicate, but you have still measured the signal.
Alice and Bob measure the signals all the fucking time in order to communicate.
5000 years for classical crypto to be brute forced? Massively parallel FPGAs (or GPUs if you're cheap) sa
Re: (Score:1)
Quantum communication occurs how, by magic?
Yes, quantum mechanics has some implications that indeed appear magical with our classical understanding of the world.
Write down the measurements once, test against them forever.
You did not read the article about the non-cloning theorem, did you? If you are familiar with the Heisenberg principle and are willing to accept it as a fact, the informal proof is quite easy to understand.
You can't measure the signal without disrupting the legitimate people trying to communicate, but you have still measured the signal.
The point that you don't seem to understand is the fact, that in quantum cryptography, the measurement of the signal corresponds to a key guess in classical crypto. If in quantum crypto yo
Re: (Score:1)
Re: (Score:1)
Each packet on it's own is not useless.
And for two-way communication you just need both keys.
And an attacker pretending to be Alice saying "Bob, you're a fag." would be pretty successful.
So would "Obama" telling Putin "Duck and cover, here it comes!" and then severing the communication line.
Re: (Score:1)
If you have have physical access to the communication line, and you want to inhibit the communication between Alice and Bob, you can just as well cut the cable.
Re: (Score:1)
The intertrons is a switching network, not a mass of dedicated circuits.
If you want to take someone down, you probably want to make sure that they can't re-route around your cut, and you probably want to do it without taking yourself down.
Are you proposing that quantum communication gets adopted and we actually have dedicated circuits for every host pair?
Re: (Score:1, Insightful)
I think his point is that traditional MITM will always succeed. Say Alice wants to talk to Bob, using QC. Evil Mallory sits in the middle, posing as Bob for Alice and Alice for Bob. When Alice sends the quanta to what she thinks is Bob, she's actually negotiating a connection with Mallory; and so is Bob. Thus, Alice encrypts, sends to "Bob" (Mallory), Mallory decrypts, re-encrypts, and sends to Bob.
No system, quantum or classical, can protect against this unless Alice and Bob have a shared secret. If they d
Re: (Score:3, Informative)
All a man in the middle attack has to do is read the message, recreate it, and send out a spoofed message instead of the original message.
Reading the message is trivial.
You don’t understand quantum physics AT ALL, do you? Or you’re just a troll.
Read up on entanglement.
There is no way to recreate the message. Because you can’t entangle the photons again. It’s literally physically impossible.
Re: (Score:1)
Literally physically impossible assuming you have a dedicated circuit for each host pair.
Otherwise you have to trust the nodes and routers.
It is infeasible to have a dedicated circuit for each node pair on the internet.
It is only feasible for small local networks, or one off pairs.
For a copper network using a dedicated circuit, you get the same boost in security. Quantum bullshit adds nothing.
And if you do have a quantum dedicated circuit, any failed MITM attack is a successful DOS attack. Any successful
Re:Quantum Bullshit (Score:4, Informative)
Sending out the spoofed message is trivial.
No it isn't. It's impossible to do it with better than 50% accuracy, which will make the man-in-the-middle very, very detectable. None of the useful information is ever sent using quantum bits, it's only one-time-pad style key. If a man-in-the-middle is detected, the key is not used and no secure information is breached. I mentioned it in an above post, but the best that a "hacker" could ever do is get a few random bits of information out of every hundred, even with this attack. That isn't enough information about the key to extract any information about the message.
Alice and Bob compare measurement results before send the message. There is theoretically no way to intercept and resend bits or eavesdrop without introducing errors.
Re: (Score:2)
50% accuracy? Isn't that just transmitting random data?
Re: (Score:2)
Ah, 75% accuracy I suppose. 50% of the data is would be retransmitted correctly, 50% would be random so 75% of the bits would end up appearing correct.
Re: (Score:2)
Alice and Bob compare measurement results before send the message. There is theoretically no way to intercept and resend bits or eavesdrop without introducing errors.
There's something here that one of us isn't understanding. Either you're missing the OP's point, or I'm missing yours.
The OP's point seems to me to be that the exchange between Alice and Bob necessarily goes like this:
1) Get individual quanta from an entangled source such that they have a shared secret that cannot have been interfered with.
2) Use that shared secret to encrypt in a conventional way and communicate.
The OP is pointing out that the MTM attack is just as practical against step 1 as step 2 by ha
Re: (Score:3, Informative)
I was basing my description on the BB84 cryptographic protocol. That protocol does not use an entangling source, rather it sends single q-bits along a quantum channel to be detected by Bob. I interpreted a man-in-the-middle attack to be an intercept-resend attack in that channel. So:
Ideal: Alice --------> Bob
MITM: Alice ------> detect - read - resend ------> Bob
If the channel is noise-free, the detectors are ideal and the states are prepared perfectly, this is theoretically secure against if error
Re: (Score:1)
But the channel is NOT noise free.
And for it to have any measure of security provided by the quantum nature, it needs to be a dedicated circuit between all host pairs.
When you have a dedicated circuit, you need physical access to perform any attacks. Quantum or regular, it doesn't matter.
Given a dedicated circuit and an attacker with physical access, any unsuccessful MITM attack becomes a successful DOS attack.
Any successful MITM attack will require the private keys of one of the parties. You need both if
Re: (Score:2)
The problem is MUCH more fundamental. The commercial systems want you to believe that it's a magic bullet because it's quantum. In fact, it DOES prevent simple eavesdropping but it does NOT stop an attack where Eve controls both channels of communication.
Re: (Score:2)
Thanks! That's one of the most informative and useful replies I've ever had on /.
Re: (Score:1)
The core idea of quantum communication security is that it is impossible to decipher a quantum message unless you destroy the quantum state nature of the communication media (photons, electron,
Unlike with classical communication you just have *one* try to decrypt the message. If the wrong key is used, the message is lost, forever. That even Bob (with the correct key) wont be able to decrypt/read the message afterward (and hence will notice the eavesdropping) is just a side effect.
Re: (Score:1)
Read my post.
The entire point of it being quantum means nothing.
If someone has the key, you won't know.
If someone doesn't have the key, you often won't know because they can fudge around in that tolerance level, and you'll just resend your message anyway because the network is not reliable, etc.
The only practical application which would give you any benefit from the quantum nature would be a dedicated circuit for each host pair. That is simply not feasible.
All.
Digital.
Security.
Ever.
Boils.
Down.
To.
A.
Key.
Shar
Re: (Score:2)
Sure, sure, paint me as the bad one again (Score:5, Funny)
Really, is a little fidelity in this relationship too much to ask for? I've caught Bob kissing that skank Alice so many fucking times and he always says he's sorry and he'll stop seeing her, but still I can tell they're exchanging information through hidden channels.
But what I really hate is when people act like I'm so unreasonable by trying to find out what is going on and who my allegedly significant other is seeing behind my back. What the fuck.
-
Cryptographically Signed,
Eve.
(Inspired by xkcd [xkcd.com], of course.)
I don't think "prove" means what you think... (Score:5, Interesting)
Then they do not "prove" anything.
When you start from a false premise, you produce "garbage", not "proofs" (Actually, you can produce some really useful counterfactuals that way, but you wouldn't present it in the context of a proof of the original concept). Particularly when talking about security, what moron would assume any sources of error come from the environment rather than the attacker???
Re: (Score:2)
Various proofs show that if the quantum bit error rate is less than 20 percent, then the message is secure. However, these proofs assume that the errors are the result of noise from the environment.
Then they do not "prove" anything.
When you start from a false premise, you produce "garbage", not "proofs" (Actually,
you can produce some really useful counterfactuals that way, but you wouldn't present it in the context of a proof of the
original concept). Particularly when talking about security, what moron would assume any sources of error come from
the environment rather than the attacker???
Wow, it's obvious you have no idea what you are talking about. The premise may have been non-physical but that doesn't affect the proof. The proof is fine. It just happens not to be true. There's only a problem here, if you assume proof means true or more specifically physically true.
Errors are inevitable. It's a little something called the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. Have you heard of it? No?
Re:I don't think "prove" means what you think... (Score:5, Funny)
Errors are inevitable. It's a little something called the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. Have you heard of it? No?
I guess the correct answer is maybe. But only possibly so.
Re: (Score:2)
Errors are inevitable. It's a little something called the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. Have you heard of it? No?
I guess the correct answer is maybe. But only possibly so.
:-)
Re: (Score:1)
If you RTFA you will see they openly discuss that this attack works only for this real world device, and that it is easy to stop:
Moreover, in our attack, Eve only sends two states to Bob. Alice and Bob can detect this attack by estimating the statistics of the four BB84 states. Note that, once a security loophole has been found, it is often easy to develop countermeasures. However, the unanticipated attacks are the most fatal ones.
Re:I don't think "prove" means what you think... (Score:4, Insightful)
Those "morons" have doctorates in math and physics. What do you have?
The idea is that if you can account for all known systemic noise sources then anything left will be from the attacker. The proofs set bounds for what error thresholds rule out the possibility of an attacker under given, known sources of noise in the system. The proofs are not wrong, they were simply done using particular sets of assumptions. If those assumptions are not applicable to a particular system, then obviously those calculations wouldn't be used.
It astounds me that people think they know better than an entire discipline and even more so that they get modded up for doing it. But then again...it is the internet.
Re: (Score:3, Interesting)
Funny thing about the internet... Believe it or not, some of us do actually count as experts in the domain of knowledge in question, fully capable of calling BS even on all those magically-always-right PhDs out there.
In this case, I can't claim myself an expert (merely have a minor in math, concentrating on, of all things, proof theory).
Re:I don't think "prove" means what you think... (Score:5, Informative)
I happen to have have read a number of such papers because it is related to the field that I work in and I have some idea of what is involved in determining bounds on error rates. They are absolutely proofs in the very strictest sense of the word. They state up-front what the assumptions are and derive rigorous proofs within the conditions that were laid out.
The mathematical premises are completely sound. The only question is what physical system the assumptions used to arrive at those premises apply to. The idealized system is clearly laid out in the paper and can be assessed for how applicable it is to a given physical system. To say that the premises are unsound because the simplifying assumptions may not apply to real systems is to reject any mathematical analysis of the physical world.
You are confusing the ideas of a premise in mathematics and an assumption in physics. What has been done is the different between a correct analysis of an idealized system. What you claim is that an incorrect analysis of a realistic model has occurred, which is incorrect.
Re: (Score:2)
What you claim is that an incorrect analysis of a realistic model has occurred, which is incorrect.
And yet for reasons that escape me these correct analyses of unrealistic models have been used in the marketing of quantum cryptography as a realistic solution to the problem of secure communication.
Can you provide any insight into how that situation has come about?
Re: (Score:2)
And that's the whole problem! Proving that given a set of conditions A is true is just fine mathematically. But as soon as you try to use it in engineering, you face the potentially much more difficult problem of proving that the real world matches those conditions. If the conditions are things like approximately 1 earth gravity and ambient temperatures don't exceed 300C you're on fairly solid ground, when you start having to worry about exact levels of quantum noise, you can easily get into trouble.
Re: (Score:2)
You know what's sad... I actually agree with your conclusion but your entire argument consists of a call-to-authority. A fallacy.
Don't you think it's a bit of an insult to the discipline that your best defense for it is a false argument ?
Especially since history (even RECENT history) is filled with examples of untrained outsiders spotting a fatal flaw in the work of a discipline, which then needs to be corrected leading to a paradigm shift. Scientists consider the call-to-authority one of the worst fallacie
Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
It's not the questioning of conclusions that I disagree with. Scientists love informed debate, but don't appreciate being called "morons." Anyone with the insight about the discipline to make a shrewd observation about the correctness of the work would recognize that the people involved are not morons.
It's important to keep an open mind, but the vast, vast majority of "OMG, how can you sheeple be so stupid?" posts about quantum physics can be safely ignored without any loss to the body of knowledge.
Re: (Score:2)
The whole field of practical quantum encryption (as opposed to fun games) is riddled with real world problems. So much so that I'd say most of the applications are snake oil. Currently it's usefulness is confined to cases where the endpoints are close enough to use an unamplified fiber and there exists a second communications channel that cannot be subjected to a MITM attack even by someone determined enough to dig up and splice into that fiber in the first place. If the information isn't valuable enough fo
Isn't this obvious? (Score:5, Funny)
Eve is a fucking spy, arrest her.
I'm not too sure about Alice and Bob either, seems they're always around when these things happen.
Re: (Score:3, Funny)
Eve is clearly spying on fucking, but it's not clear that she herself is fucking to do so.
Re: (Score:2)
It's not that easy.
She wears a mask.
Re:Isn't this obvious? (Score:5, Funny)
It's not that easy.
She's only called Eve online.
Re: (Score:1, Troll)
But she’s also insanely hot. I can haz hawt bittsecks wif her??
Re: (Score:2)
Remember buddy, eve is the spy...she knows all about your life size furry porn dolls and hello kitty sex toy collection.
Re: (Score:1)
What the heck is alice doing out of wonderland anyway?
shouldn't it be Alice & Bunny?
Re: (Score:2)
That should be good enough to get a search warrant rubber stamped. So tell me Alice and Bob, just how good is your precious security NOW! We'll just rip out the sheet rock to be sure!
any lock made by a man (Score:5, Insightful)
can be broken by a man
depending upon your current situation in life, this is either a wonderfully hopeful or horribly depressing realization
Re: (Score:2)
I was thinking the same. But my train of thought was more along the lines of "no matter how secure a system, some doofus will stick a post-it with his key next to the monitor".
The weakest link in almost all security systems is still the human.
Re: (Score:1, Funny)
It's obvious then we need to get rid of the weakest link.
Hardware Arms Race (Score:1, Interesting)
The third paragraph from the end of TFA is the key. Alice/Bob will be in an arms race with Eve. Alice/Bob will need better single-photon detectors and generators to stay ahead of Eve. As Alice/Bob improve the quality of their hardware and increase the probability of being to emit and then detect a single photon increase, Eve has to keep pace with the quality of her hardware. Over time as Alice/Bob increase the quality of their hardware, the attack surface available to Eve shrinks, and it will take her l
Quantum waste-of-money (Score:1, Troll)
*The quantum part has nothing to do with encryption, it's just an over the top high tech attempt at preventing wire taps.
Re: (Score:2)
More than 2^512 state changes are required ON AVERAGE to break 512 bit encryption USING BRUTE FORCE.
Are we at the end of cryptographic history? What are the odds that in your notional billion years of computation, some weakness or new technique will be discovered that makes our current methods trivially breakable?
For that matter, are we at the end of physics? Are "current estimates" guaranteed not to later turn out to be wildly incorrect, as they have done many times before? Are these estimates making the a
Re: (Score:1)
I'd say that all the assumptions I have made are far more likely to hold than the assumptions you need to make for quantum key sharing to be safe. That is not to say that I find the quantum key sharing technique highly likely to be broken, but many new discoveries in the field of quantum mechanics are yet to be made.
Why is it impossible to build a computational device that relies on non-observed phenomena, which (as I understand it) are not subject to such limits?
We simply can't tell what limits apply to non-observed phenomena, that doesn't mean there ain't limits, but since we can't observe non-observed phenomena it is quite hard to know their exact nat
NIST achieved 99% detection efficiency last month (Score:5, Interesting)
Re: (Score:2)
But at what dark-count rate? There are always trade-offs.
Re: (Score:3, Informative)
The dark count is essentially zero. That's what makes this breakthrough so impressive.
FTA I linked:
"When these detectors indicate they've spotted a photon, they're trustworthy. They don't give false positives," says Nam, a physicist with NIST's Optoelectronics division. "Other types of detectors have really high gain so they can measure a single photon, but their noise levels are such that occasionally a noise glitch is mistakenly identified as
Re: (Score:2)
Oh wow, I'll have to grab a hold of the publication. That is impressive.
Re: (Score:2)
No photon detector "measures anything like spin". The polarization is determined by a filter prior to detection. Which direction the filter should be oriented is part of the quantum cryptography protocol, and the filter is followed by a detector that needs only to determine the presence or absence of a photon passing through the filter.
Re: (Score:2)
A flaw....but fixable.... (Score:2, Informative)
Moreover, in our attack, Eve only sends two states to Bob. Alice and Bob can detect this attack by estimating the statistics of the four BB84 states. Note that, once a security loophole has been found, it is often easy to develop countermeasures. However, the unanticipated attacks are the most fatal ones.
Beat Bob with a shovel (Score:2)
until he tells you what was in the message.
Of course you can't beat Alice because she's a girl. If Alice had sent the message to Eve then you'd be out of luck.
Dump Alice (Score:2, Funny)
I say Bob should dump Alice and go with Eve. Bad girls are hot.
Though dumped good girls can be trouble as well, so the original problem remains.
Sadly, as long as Eve (or Alice) are sufficiently determined to intercept Bob's communications, he's got problems. The only answer may be to become a celibate monk in a monastery committedly observing a vow of silence.
Who the f#ck is Alice? (Score:2)
Does she live next door to Bob?
Had to be asked.. ;)
I have said this before (Score:1)