Name withheld by request writes "Writing in the IEEE Spectrum, James Oberg analyzes whether there was, in fact a significant risk to humans from the satellite which the US military shot down on 21 February, purportedly "to head off the possibility of its splashing a half ton of toxic hydrazine fuel somewhere on Earth." Previous experts had "scoffed" at the rationale put forth, pointing out that there was trivial possibiity that any significant amount of toxic fuel would make it to the ground intact.
Unfortunately, the analysis is full of flaws and lack of rigor — indeed, lacking any sort of numerical reasoning. It seems to be too much repeating official "spin," and could have used a hefty dose of skepticism — and could also use a little bit of actual analysis using numbers, rather than handwaving.
Here's the first number that Oberg should have quoted: 32 Megajoules per kilogram. That's orbital energy, which is how much energy has to be removed by ablation or otherwise dissipated for the hydrazine tank to enter the atmosphere and hit the ground undamaged. For reference, TNT holds about 4.6 MJ/kg.
Oberg quotes ""Hydrazine requires a tremendous amount of energy to go from solid to liquid." This energy is known as the heat of fusion, and for hydrazine it is just a little under 400 kJ/kg. That's about 1% of the energy released by entry heating. Hardly a "tremendous" amount of energy, compared to the entry energy that's nearly a hundred times greater.
Oberg goes on to quote "There is a widespread notion that meteorites falling to Earth arrive red hot." He is in correct here. In fact, meteorites falling through the atmosphere typically explode, shattering into dozens or hundreds of pieces; something that occurs at the point when the dynamic pressure on the leading face exceeds the yield stress of the material. This occurs for meteroids of all compositions, including nickle-iron meteorites that are far more robust than hydrazine tanks. If the atmospheric entry of meteorites is relevant, it hardly bolsters the case that a tank will enter intact (and if it's not relevent, why did Oberg bring it up?)
Furthermore, if you look at a typical nickle iron meteorite, you'll see a surface pitted and mottled with holes ranging from the size of golfballs up to pits the size of baseballs. These are known as regmaglypts; they are the areas ablated away by the entry plasma. Even a single such ablation pit would, of course, destroy a hydrazine tank.
The second number Oberg should have quoted is a number called ballistic coefficient, the mass divided by the area of the tank. Basically, the smaller the ballistic coefficient, the less stressful the entry will be. Unfortunately, a full hydrazine tank has a very high ballistic coefficient. It is an empty tank, not a full one, that is likely to enter intact. Talking about empty film cannisters, or even empty fuel tanks, making it intact through atmospheric entry is really about as relevant as talking about dropping a piece of paper on the floor.
The article contains a quote from Andrew Higgins, with a link to (purportedly) the research done that contains the quote. Unfortuntely the link does not actually contain the quote used in the article; in fact, it seems to be mostly a discussion of a side issue. Let me emphasize this: Higgins did not say what he is quoted as saying in the place he was reported as saying it. This may merely be sloppy journalism — maybe he said it somewhere else — but I am left with again with the question, if I can't even trust the simplest things he says that can be easily checked, why should I trust anything else?
In short, Oberg's article is poorly thought out, avoids even simple back of the envelope calculations, and accepts uncritically information that should have been agressively questions. He concludes that a well-defined and thoroughly researched technological hazard assessment — of a kind that someday, for better or worse, will be needed again — has wound up buried in obscurity and obfuscation. This may be true, but no well defined nor thoroughly researched technological hazard assessment was anywhere in evidence. The analysis he gives in the article is buried in obscurity and obfuscation.
Pre-Existing Case Study (Score:2)