The Dozen Space Weapon Myths 191
Thanks to Disowned Sky for finding a good debunking piece on space based weapon systems. Slightly disheartening, because I really want to have solar energy satellites that are also lasers. The article does a good job of looking further afield at nations besides the United States efforts in this area.
Hey look, just for Slashdot! (Score:5, Informative)
Well, here's The Space Review's take on it:
On another topic, the author makes a very good point about the 1967 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. i.e. The same treaty that is credited with preventing the development of the Orion nuclear pulse propulsion vehicle. As item 9 points out, the Soviets had continued nuclear space development in violation of a treaty that had been signed specifically to prevent them from doing that. The Polyus ASAT Platform [astronautix.com] that was launched on the back of the first Energia in 1987 (and thankfully failed to make orbit) was intended to have nuclear weapon capabilities. The translations of the Polyus diagrams show that it would have carried "Nuclear Space Mines" to target and destroy missiles and satellites.
So much for that treaty.
Who cares how new a technology is if it works? (Score:4, Informative)
But since the 1985 air-launch satellite intercept, a project cancelled by Congress (see "Blunt arrows: the limited utility of ASATs", The Space Review, June 6, 2005), there is no evidence that a new satellite-killer technology has been developed
So what? Who cares if no new ASAT technology has been developed if the old ones work just fine? The Soviet orbital ASAT program predated the US's F-15 ASAT program by over a decade, and it worked.
Noy sure about this one... (Score:5, Informative)
Yes, it exists and has existed for decades, however, it was explicitely allowed under the ABM-Treaty [wikipedia.org]. The US was allowed to build such a system for North Dakota but I'm not sure if we ever followed through with that. However, a national system was what the treaty intended to prevent, which it did until we decided to withdraw from the treaty in 2002.
Item 5 IS a correct statement. (Score:5, Informative)
Re:Terminating other sattelites (Score:3, Informative)
Re:My personal favorite (Score:3, Informative)
China's military budget for FY2007 is about $44.94 billion. The US military budget for FY2007 is $532.8 billion. (source [yahoo.com]) Eventually, China may outspend the US, but they need about a 1250% increase to do so.
Um... That was the whole point of MAD. If one side did it, both had to do it to ensure no one used it. It may not be moral, but it is logical to create any type of weapons in response to the fact the other side has done so.
Good point, but false on two counts:
1) The whole MAD excuse for Iran to have nuclear weapons doesn't fly when the US has had them for over 50 years and hasn't nuked Iran yet.
2) The argument for MAD assumes that both sides care about assured destruction. While the US doesn't want to be destroyed, I can't say the same for Iran (or at least it's Muslim based leadership). Many people believe that the rulers of Iran WANT Armageddon as signals the Muslim equivalent of "The Second Coming". From NPR [npr.org]: A better article can be found HERE [washingtonpost.com], but I didn't think you'd give it credit considering the source.
So the threat of MAD does not apply to a country that has no fear destruction.
Re:Hey look, just for Slashdot! (Score:5, Informative)
1. To a foe, our ability, which he admits, to blind or jam satellites, might as well be the ability to destroy them. Literally destroying them is certainly worse from an environmental perspective, but tactically, blinding them is just the same in the middle of a war, and one certainly ought to expect other countries (including those with less military resources who feel threatened by the US) to attempt to gain the same tactical ability to deny satellite access.
2. "But the actual policy document makes no such claim and displays no such intent to ?deny? access." One of many blatantly false claims in this article. I did "actually read" the policy, and it states:
The United States considers space capabilities -- including the ground and space segments and supporting links -- vital to its national interests. Consistent with this policy, the United States will: preserve its rights, capabilities, and freedom of action in space; dissuade or deter others from either impeding those rights or developing capabilities intended to do so; take those actions necessary to protect its space capabilities; respond to interference; and deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests
3. Space-based weapons *do* have a major advantage over ground-based ones: there is no boost phase. They have the potential to give *much* less warning and reaction time. Consequently, they're more destabilizing. It's the same reason why short range (tactical) ballistic missiles were banned: they reached their targets too quickly. Also, is he really so daft as to believe that the Bush adminstration *hasn't* been trying to create "usable" nuclear weapons? There's a new statement from an "anonymous administration official" (and sometimes named ones) every month or so about things like nuclear bunker busters and the like.
4. "Most discussions leave the impression the Russian system simply doesn?t exist." Undoubtedly, the author is talking about the S-400/A-135 network. It's certainly a threat to even our best warplanes (think a patriot missile battery on steroids, with a much longer testing history), but with the 100 km upper range for the biggest missile configurations (if memory serves), it's not going to be shooting down satellites, even low ones, any time soon.
5. "Equating a boost-phase anti-missile weapon (based at sea, on an aircraft, or even in space) to an anti-satellite weapon overlooks a fundamental design difference, their guidance mode." -- Apparently this person has never heard of THAAD. Not all of our systems are boost phase.
6. Yes, and the Istrebitel Sputnik was a response to the US's SAINT program ('60-'62). Was the SAINT program a response to anything? Not really. We discontinued it, but it was too late by then. We started it. Now, it was long enough ago that arguments about who started it are pretty moot, but still, if you want to pick hairs, like this person does...
8. "The enormous advantage of an orbital system (even if launched only hours or days before making its attack) is that simply by selecting a larger booster, the weapon can be sent into nearly any orbit of potential interest, at any altitude" -- No, that's the advantage of a ground-based system. Having to enter orbit is an extra delay and takes extra energy. The lowest-energy, fastest way to intercept a satellite at 400km? Be below it and launch 400km straight up. Being in orbit allows for incremental homing of the killer satellite, providing a simpler, more reliable, but slower kill. And who knows what he's thinking about when he writes about changing the orbit with "the moon's gravity". If he's talking about a lunar transfer orbit, he must be ignorant of the huge amount of time and delta-V needed for such a maneuver; it'd be foolish. If he's talking about the lunar perturbations of satellites already orbitting at GEO, that takes years. I have no idea what he's thinking. Anyone have any clue?
9. Very low o
Re:Overly Ideal is Bad in Any Case (Score:2, Informative)
Orion would not have ultimately launched from Earth. SF (or Sci-Fi) writers in the 50's and 60's had nukular (sorry, just had to) rockets launching from Earth. Orion missions would have launched, conventionally from Earth to orbit (ferry), crew would have tansferred to the Orion vehicle and then nuke launch from space.
Re:Hey look, just for Slashdot! (Score:3, Informative)
Re:Hey look, just for Slashdot! (Score:3, Informative)
My point is that even if you couldn't develop nuclear weapons using a civilian power program as cover, Iran would likely still want the program. It's a source of prestige, too. Iranians resent being seen as a third world nation. Even when they hate their government, they tend to be proud of what their scientists are able to accomplish. And for those who think that refining uranium is a small feat after the Manhattan project, think again. You have to strip out U-235, which makes up 0.7% of natural uranium, and has almost identical chemical properties to U-238 -- and you need to produce it in commercial quantities. This is generally done in the form of "hex" (uranium hexafluoride), a nasty chemical that generally requires teflon-lined, tightly sealed equipment. Yet, for gas centrifuges (the most common way to refine these days), you need very high speed rotors inside your chambers: you're combining "high corrosion environment", "highly stressed parts made of high-strength alloys", and "high speed movement". And you need these centrifuges produced in the tens of thousands, so add in "mass production" to the list.
Re:Hey look, just for Slashdot! (Score:4, Informative)