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The Internet Science Technology

Building the Energy Internet 197

Ant writes "This article talks about transforming today's dumb electricity grid into a smart, responsive and self-healing digital network--in short, an 'energy internet'."
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Building the Energy Internet

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  • by Anonymous Coward on Wednesday March 24, 2004 @08:50AM (#8654773)
    Building the energy internet

    Mar 11th 2004 From The Economist print edition

    Energy: More and bigger blackouts lie ahead, unless today's dumb electricity grid can be transformed into a smart, responsive and self-healing digital network--in short, an "energy internet"

    "TREES or terrorists, the power grid will go down again!" That chilling forecast comes not from some ill-informed gloom-monger or armchair pundit, but from Robert Schainker, a leading expert on the matter. He and his colleagues at the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), the official research arm of America's power utilities, are convinced that the big grid failures of 2003--such as the one that plunged some 50m Americans and Canadians into darkness in August, and another a few weeks later that blacked out all of Italy--were not flukes. Rather, they and other experts argue, they are harbingers of worse to come.

    The chief reason for concern is not what the industry calls "poor vegetation management", even though both of last year's big power cuts were precipitated by mischievous trees. It will never be possible to prevent natural forces from affecting power lines. The real test of any network's resilience is how quickly and intelligently it can handle such disruptions. Think, for example, of the internet's ability to re-route packets of data swiftly and efficiently when a network link fails.

    The analogy is not lost on the energy industry. Of course, the power grid will never quite become the internet--it is impossible to packet-switch power. Even so, transforming today's centralised, dumb power grid into something closer to a smart, distributed network will be necessary to provide a reliable power supply--and to make possible innovative new energy services. Energy visionaries imagine a "self-healing" grid with real-time sensors and "plug and play" software that can allow scattered generators or energy-storage devices to attach to it. In other words, an energy internet.

    Flying blind

    It sounds great. But in reality, most power grids are based on 1950s technology, with sketchy communications and antiquated control systems. The investigation into last year's North American blackout revealed that during the precious minutes following the first outages in Ohio, when action might have been taken to prevent the blackout spreading, the local utility's managers had to ask the regional system operator by phone what was happening on their own wires. Meanwhile, the failure cascaded to neighbouring regions. "They simply can't see the grid!" laments Clark Gelling of the EPRI.

    Even if operators had smart sensors throughout the system, they could do little to halt problems from spreading, because they lack suitable control systems. Instead, essential bits of energy infrastructure are built to shut down at the first sign of trouble, spreading blackouts and increasing their economic impact. The North American blackout, for example, cost power users around $7 billion. Engineers have to spend hours or even days restarting power plants.

    The good news is that technologies are now being developed in four areas that point the way towards the smart grid of the future. First, utilities are experimenting with ways to measure the behaviour of the grid in real time. Second, they are looking for ways to use that information to control the flow of power fast enough to avoid blackouts. Third, they are upgrading their networks in order to pump more juice through the grid safely. Finally, they are looking for ways to produce and store power close to consumers, to reduce the need to send so much power down those ageing transmission lines in the first place.

    First, to the eyes and ears. With the exception of some simple sensors located at a minority of substations, there is little "intelligence" embedded in today's grid. But in America's Pacific north-west, the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), a regional utility run by the federal government, has been ex
  • by Syntroxis ( 564739 ) on Wednesday March 24, 2004 @09:01AM (#8654828)
    The ARRL (Amateur Radio Relay League) is very concerned about the disruption of various portions of the RF spectrum, particularly HF that police, er, fema, etc. use.

    An article regarding their concern is here [arrl.org].

  • by millahtime ( 710421 ) on Wednesday March 24, 2004 @09:04AM (#8654848) Homepage Journal
    The technology they are reffering to in reality is PHM (Prognostics Health Management) or sometimes called Prognostics and Diagnostics.

    This is a form of fault detection that detects something much earlier where you can either go perform maintenance on the problem before it breaks or reroute power from the problem area and go fix it. Either way it keeps the power up and is transparent to the user

    Fault detection has come a lot way since the days of the 1950s. Hell it has come a log way from 10 years ago

    Say you can detect a problem in the power grid hours or even days before it causes something to break in the grid. You can have a repair guy go out and fix it or if you can't get someone to fix it in time you can reroute power around the problem until you can get it fixed.

    From a technical side it can be done and it is a networked approach but nothing says they will use the internet or it will have the same kind of problems from users accessing it.
  • by Hee Hee Hee ( 310695 ) on Wednesday March 24, 2004 @09:09AM (#8654868)
    Carson Taylor, BPA's chief transmission expert, explains that the impetus for this experiment was a big blackout in 1996. Sensors installed throughout the network send data about local grid conditions to a central computer, 30 times a second. Dr Taylor credits this system with preventing another big blackout in his region, and says his counterparts in America's north-east could have avoided last year's blackout if they had had such a system.

    Geez. Come on, Dr. Taylor. Just about everyone has some sort of SCADA network (the network of sensors) running on their grid. The blackout started in Ohio because some operators couldn't see some alarms, and the problems cascaded from there. (There are suggestions that some buggy software caused this, but the jury is still out.) The reports that have been released leave many questions unanswered, which tells how complicated and extensive our power grid is.

    It will take many BILLIONS of $$ and many years to upgrade things enough to make it what we call dependable. It's complicated enough just keeping local grids running, let alone transferring power from one to another; balancing sources and loads, switching connections at the right time, etc.

  • Re:England? (Score:3, Informative)

    by pklong ( 323451 ) on Wednesday March 24, 2004 @09:32AM (#8655067) Journal

    The blackout in London, not long ago should be proof enough that the british grid is not perfect.

    Concerns about long term blackouts in the future due to our overreliance on gas [bbc.co.uk] for power generation have also been raised.

    Just search the BBC [bbc.co.uk] to see that you really do need batteries in your alarm clock. Even if the supergrid stays up, you will always have local failures. (My power was intermittent this weekend, due to the bad weather)

  • by Anonymous Coward on Wednesday March 24, 2004 @09:32AM (#8655070)
    ... some of the real problems don't involve hardware, they involve corruption and malfeasance. [dissidentvoice.org]

    No amount of hardware fixes will overcome sheer greedism as a business model, with government oversight being the foxes guarding the hen house.

    zogger

  • valid concern (Score:1, Informative)

    by Anonymous Coward on Wednesday March 24, 2004 @09:46AM (#8655223)
    -- home radio reception would be dramatically altered with adoption of IP over electrical wires. Shortwave already sucks enough during the daytime with the interference existing, adding to it would be disastrous, IMO. I find shortwave to be a breath of fresh air in getting a more varied news/information resource, a decent addendum to the internet, and retaining the ability to communicate during crisis times is a great boon. A transceiver with the addition of your own stable power supply that is independent of the grid (me -> some solar) is a decent backup.
  • by MalaclypseTheYounger ( 726934 ) on Wednesday March 24, 2004 @09:47AM (#8655239) Journal
    Slightly offtopic, but I recently purchased one of those Phone-Line through the Power Lines adapters from Radio Shack.

    What you do is plug one adapter into the wall circuit in a room with a phone jack, and hook the phone line up to it. Then, in another room without the phone jack, you plug the 'receiver' into the wall, and you can plug a phone into it.

    Strangely enough, it works. I can even connect to the internet (at 28.8 or less, usually) through this circuit.

    BUT - and a big BUT at that, is I keep on getting mixed lines, I hear other people talking on the line, and the most annoying part of it is that whomever's line I am crossed with, when they make a phone call to somewhere else, MY phone number shows up on that person's caller ID. So then I get phone calls at 1am from shady people asking me "Did you call here?!?". At first it was fun listening to their phone calls, apparently someone's boyfriend got caught in a drug deal and needed to be bailed out, but after 4 or 5 of those 1am calls I decided to ditch the whole thing.

    So, I for one would not be too interested in this technology unless I see it proven first. In someone else's house. And knowing how bad it worked for the phone, I'm scared stiff to know what people could grab off my line if I use it for the internet.

    $.02
  • by Tau Zero ( 75868 ) on Wednesday March 24, 2004 @10:09AM (#8655447) Journal
    Moreover, grids are deliberately designed (1950s or not) to channel energy where it's needed. This prevents overloading or underpowering.
    I'm sorry, but the second sentence is just false. The assumption of the grid is that there is always sufficient generating capacity to meet the instantaneous demand. If demand exceeds supply for any reason, part or all of the system can be under-powered. This is what happened on 8/14/2003: lines carrying power to portions of Ohio went down, causing local plants to overload and trip off-line and beginning the cascade of failures.
    When ever there is a power outage, a grid must be brought back up slowly.
    This is why it is so important to prevent large outages. Small-scale load shedding is a vast improvement over any big failure. Systems which can react to an under-power situation fast enough to dump a few neighborhoods or plants before the generators or lines have to trip off will prevent outages from growing larger.

    Cutting off customers is a poor substitute for demand-side management [doe.gov]. When there's a run on, say, toilet paper or gasoline, prices rise or suppliers run out. Latecomers delay their consumption and everyone has an incentive to decide how important it is to have the goods right now vs. later; there is no way to bring down the toilet-paper supply system. We have no such buffer like this for electricity; because of the false assumption that electricity will always be available when you flip the switch, too many people flipping the switch can cause everyone's power to go down. We need to address this sooner rather than later.

    Although I hate calling a bug a "feature", the fact is that blackouts are often a testament to fault-detection which could otherwise overload a grid and cause more substantial problems that would take longer to resolve.
    Fault detection is one thing. A faulty response to detection of a fault is another; if the system reacts to a shortage of generation capacity by cutting off generation rather than consumption, the protective systems act to decrease reliability. We may need measures such as mandatory utility control over air-conditioners (the major loads during summer demand peaks) in order to get a handle on this problem.
  • Vehicular generation (Score:3, Informative)

    by Tau Zero ( 75868 ) on Wednesday March 24, 2004 @10:26AM (#8655608) Journal
    If every car parked at home or work plugs into the grid, you have more generating capacity than you will need in the near future. (It is quoted that the power output of one year of US car sales exceeds the installed generating capacity of the entire world).
    If not true, it's pretty close. If you assume sales of 1.2 million units/month [66.102.9.104] and an average of 100 KW (134 HP) per unit, annual engine power would be 1.44 terawatts; total nameplate electric generation capacity in the USA is around 700 gigawatts.

    The problem with any such scheme is that current motor fuel is derived from a commodity which is rising rapidly in price, and the future panacea-fuel (hydrogen) has very difficult unsolved problems with production and also storage suitable for vehicles.

  • by celerityfm ( 181760 ) on Wednesday March 24, 2004 @11:01AM (#8655974) Journal
    Check it out, its real:

    http://www.arrl.org/tis/info/HTML/plc/#Video [arrl.org]
  • by Genom ( 3868 ) on Wednesday March 24, 2004 @11:19AM (#8656180)
    Indeed. IIRC the problem is that when a node goes down, the "lines" it feeds are rerouted to the working "lines" of the neighbor nodes -- but because everything is run at, or very, very close to capacity, the resulting surge in demand causes the neighbor nodes to trip...and thus it cascades down the line.

    The entire system was designed around the notion that each node would have a signifigant surplus of available power, and would thus be able to "take over" for a faulty neighbor-node. Since the power companies, in an effort to maximize profit, simply used the existing surplus power to feed increased demand, instead of upgrading and/or adding new nodes (an expensive process, I'm sure), the system doesn't work as well as it should. That's how that debacle in NYC last year happened, IIRC.
  • by ImpTech ( 549794 ) on Wednesday March 24, 2004 @01:33PM (#8657942)
    Power companies can and DO run their own fiber. National Grid USA (who I recently interviewed with, hence why I know) recently rolled out their own fiber loop in Massachusetts. Probably paid way too much for it too, but there you have it. After the NY blackout there's a *lot* of pressure to make everything more distributed, responsive, and secure, regardless of cost, and thats the way they're going.
  • Dumb article (Score:4, Informative)

    by Animats ( 122034 ) on Wednesday March 24, 2004 @01:39PM (#8658029) Homepage
    The Economist, which I've read for many years, used to be scrupulously neutral and very accurate. Then, a few years ago, articles started to appear which sounded like they came from the Heiritage Foundation. Like this one.

    The "electricity internet" scheme comes from the people who think free markets are the answer to everything. When free markets fail, they say they weren't free enough.

    That group architected California electricity deregulation, with a power auction every half hour around the clock. Nobody was held responsible for electrical reliability,; the "market" would insure there was enough supply.

    This was an absolute disaster. We had blackouts. The biggest electric utilities in California went bankrupt. Rates went up. Even the major energy trader, Enron, went bust. And we're still paying for the mess.

    The "electricity internet" scheme is a plan to provide more transmission facilities. But not because they're needed for power engineering reasons. The extra capacity is to facilitate energy trading.

    The basic trouble with electricity deregulation is that it encourages building inefficient power plants. Traditionally, regulated electric utilities build mostly "base load" plants, intended to run 100% of the time at high efficiency, plus some less efficient "peaking" plants brought up during peak periods. In a deregulated environment, wholesale electricity prices change by several orders of magnitude throughout the day. The optimal strategy for a generation company is to target only the peak periods, using low-cost plants burning high-cost fuel. (These are usually natural-gas fired turbines.) And there's no money in having excess capacity that's only used a few times per year. A few blackouts a year are to be expected. That's the result of a free market solution.

    In Californa, energy traders figured out how to create shortages. Buying, but not using, electrical transmission and natural gas pipeline capacity was one way used to drive up prices.

    The fanatical free-market types claim the problem is that the huge variation in daily rates isn't pushed all the way down to residential customers. You'd set your thermostat in dollars per day, and when the power price went up, the air conditioning would turn off. Bigger customers would have energy storage facilities. Most people would just suffer. That's the plan.

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