Latest Columbia News 624
Russia is suspending its space tourist program, for fairly obvious reasons. An NYT story notes that the obsolete but reliable computers driving the shuttle are to be examined as part of the inquiry. But most interestingly, a story in Aviation Week claims that a tracking camera trained on the shuttle detected damage to the wing prior to the breakup.
Re:Expect fianl report in 6 months (Score:5, Informative)
no black box (Score:5, Informative)
Thanks! (Score:5, Informative)
Re:Expect fianl report in 6 months (Score:5, Informative)
1) The black box would have to have a much higher tolerance than airplanes (200k ft traveling at 18kmph).
2) (almost?) all the data that would be recorded by such a black box is already being transmitted to the ground. While the 30 seconds of garble (after voice comm. was lost) can tell more about what happened, it won't tell where the problem started. NASA has FAR more data about what happened than a black box can provide.
In addition, such a black box could only monitor a few systems. In the event of a micrometeorite hit (there is the suggestion this happened), it would not be known until it was too late unless the impact site was being montiored. If a monitored system was hit, then the ground would know about it as well as the pilots.
Re:Expect fianl report in 6 months (Score:5, Informative)
From the Shuttle Loss FAQ [io.com]: While there is a flight recorder on board the Shuttles, it's not exactly a "Black Box" as you'd find on a commercial aircraft. Once the power is pulled, all data collection stops. This is not considered a problem as almost all of the valuable data is downlinked anyway. What little the onboard flight recorders may contain that wasn't downlinked may or may not be relevant to the mishap, and the only way to know for sure is to locate a surviving unit on the ground. However, one should probably not hold their breath for one to turn up. As noted by the shuttle program manager during the first press conference, there is no *hardened "Black Box" on board any of the Shuttles. At the same time, it's also worth noting that since commercial hardened "Black Boxes" have had difficulty surviving airplane crashes, surviving reentry without special protection is almost an impossibility.
Cached link's links don't work... (Score:2, Informative)
Obvious reasons (Score:5, Informative)
Re:In Orbit Inspections? (Score:3, Informative)
Re:No Rescue? (Score:3, Informative)
I do not believe the shuttle can remain in orbit long enough to wait that long.
Re:In Orbit Inspections? (Score:3, Informative)
And on top of that, the person answering said that having an astronaut detect a flaw in the vehicle, or do an in-flight repair of the heat shield tiles was currently infeasible. So, it sounds like this sort of thing would require a load of new technology, procedure, and (for lack of a better term) gumption. If only we had the time, money, and world cooperation to make the ISS into something of an emergency shuttle repair station. Stupid worldwide economical slump....
--Mid
Re:No Rescue? (Score:5, Informative)
As it happens, Atlantis was on the pad already, but it still would've taken nearly a week to launch with minimal crew (pilot and engineer). Columbia had enough food and water to last half a week... although with rationing they may have been able to extend that sufficiently.
Even so, what do you do then? There's no way to "dock" two shuttles and Columbia didn't have jetpack suits onboard, and I don't believe everyone was rated for EVA. You can make a "jump" from one ship to another, but that's trickier than it sounds... fortunately if you do it right and have the supplies on board then only one person has to do it - you can tether the ships together, as long as their orbits are precisely matched and close enough together. The precisely matched bit is the hard part really - it's going to take several hours to transport crew from one shuttle to the other.
It'd probably be an effort on the level of Apollo 13.
Afterwards you have a shuttle in a slowly degrading orbit that's going to do an uncontrolled burn up in the atmosphere -- although perhaps you can set a navigation program to activate after the crew is saved to ensure splashdown in a safe area (like the Pacific ocean). Dunno. Of course, this would have been better than what did occur.
Re:We probably won't see the AF images (Score:5, Informative)
Contact NASA (Score:4, Informative)
Re:No Rescue? (Score:5, Informative)
They can't do it (Score:5, Informative)
1) They Can't Do It
2) They Can't Fix Anything They Find
First off to fully survey the Shuttle, and its most critical heat protection tiles, you need to go 'over the side'. Now cast your mind back over all the EVA's taken in missions so far, they have all been in the arc of the cargo bay, usually with the assistance of the remote manipulator arm (which wasn't fitted on Columbia as it wasn't needed and the weight budget was better spent on lifitng more science to orbit, which was the whol point) Going 'over the side' of the shuttle means you are out of view of the crew, and its a very dangerous thing to do. In the history of shuttle flights it has never been done, nor are there any procedures to do it as it is considered too dangerous. That is not my opinion, that is the opinion of Ron Dittmore of NASA.
Secondly NASA believe that the wash of the gasses from the EVA system and the likelyhood of impact when attempting the manouever would do MORE damage to the tile system than the damage you were trying to attempt to survey. (Remember the underside of the shuttle is almost totally black, as is space that it hangs again - orienting yourself is going to be astonishing difficult, not accounting for the fact you're in a bulky space suit, the EVA gear and a mutlilayer filter helmet)
Thirdly each area of tile on the shuttle is made of a different combination of material according to the heat environment it is expected to be in, each tile is near enough individual in its shape and size, each tile is shaved to fit the craft at that point, and the tile system as a whole is designed so that minor damage to the surface does not result in the loss of the whole tile, neither does the loss of a single tile result in a loss of vehicle scenario - just localised structural damage. Replaceing the tiles is not possible due to thier uniqueness - and the likely hood of repair is poor as the repair material coming loose may damage further tiles.
Fourthly taking images of the shuttle in orbit has been tried before when they lost the drag chute door. None of the images they got in that incident, taken at great hassle, were of sufficient resolution to add anything at all to thier analysis. Given that there is no way of repairing a damaged tile, why even look for it - what are you going to do if you could see it, which you probably can't. Some people have suggested that it would allow you to fly a 'kinder' profile back into the atmosphere.
Well Ron Dittmore reported they had considered that, trying to think about what if thier analysis of the foam impact was wrong. And the answer is that as a reusable cratf the shuttle already flies the absolute best profile it can on re-entry - it can't be bettered.
NASA considered tile repair and under shuttle EVA's early in the program and concluded that it was near enough impossible and the effort was better spent in making the tiles stronger and more effective, and tracing the causes of debris impact and limiting thier effects.
Effectively NASA decided that the tile system is non repairable in flight, accepted that and instead spent thier effort in making it as good as possible.
Until now that has been good enough - on average each mission has 100 discernable impact points on the tile system and its not had any effect.
Even now, when it looks likely that some abnormal thermal event happened in the left wing, maybe coupled with a drag event, it is by no means certain that the tile system failed. Whilst the evidence seem to suggest this is a strong possibility, to concentrate wholey on that would be to close your mind to other reasons, and for the good of the shuttle program that is not good enough. We need to know exactly what went wrong so we can move on and continue exploring space.
The tile system was a revolutionary step change in heat protection systems, and allowed a radical change in the type of vehical that can reach orbit. In 20 years of flight it has only been improved, not bettered, and its an engineering triumph that Amercia should be proud off.
Flying in space is real and deadly. Between them the US Shuttle System and the Russian Vostock system have had over 100 succesful launches, something of a record for space launch systems, but both have suffered a couple of failures (I forget the exact numbers for Vostock - my apologies)
As a planet we have probably put people into orbit less than a 1000 times - despite doing it for 30+ years its still a very young technology and is not anywhere near routine.
Speaking as one person over here in the UK that watched the dawning of a new age with the launch of Columbia, I hope we are all back up there real soon, pushing the boundaries of science, engineering and knowledge, whatever our nation.
Re:We probably won't see the AF images (Score:3, Informative)
http://www.de.afrl.af.mil/Factsheets/35meter.ht
These telescopes (or ones similar to them) are used by the scientific community for published research, so I doubt that their capabilities and locations are secret.
I find it hard to believe that stills from this video will not be included in the final report about the disaster.
Re:Obvious? (Score:5, Informative)
Did you actually read the article? Or are you just making assumptions based on the synopsis, which on this site are known to be highly inaccurate?
Quote the article: Plans to send tourists into space have been frozen by Russia after the Columbia shuttle disaster left its Soyuz capsules as the only working link between Earth and the International Space Station.
The point is not that space is any more dangerous as a result of the Columbia disaster. Since NASA has put flights on hold, Russia needs to use more room on the Soyuz capsules to pick up the slack. That leaves less rooms for space tourists. As quoted in the article, a Russian space agency spokesman said, "Space tourism is not a priority. State interests must come first, then commercial interests."
I know that many people on Slashdot don't actually read the articles, but it sure helps to clear up a lot of confusion.
Clear picture of the crack (Score:0, Informative)
Re:Soyuz safety record (Score:3, Informative)
That would be Soyuz the launch rocket, as opposed to Soyuz the manned spacecraft. The booster is used to launch both manned and unmanned cargo. While there have been no fatalities with the capsule since the '70s, the booster crashed on launch sometime during the last year, and there were fatalities, IIRC.
Re:Obsolete Computers (Score:3, Informative)
James Tomayko has written an excellent book entitled "Computers in Spaceflight: The NASA Experience". It appears to be available online - Computers in Spaceflight: The NASA Experience [nasa.gov].
Of particular interest would be Chapter Four: Computers in the Space Shuttle Avionics System [nasa.gov]
Re:Expect fianl report in 6 months (Score:5, Informative)
That's no longer a problem. Since the TDRS were launched, they can send up to TDRS during the "blackout phase" and have it relayed to Houston. There's no longer any loss of contact.
composites don't shield lightnining well! (Score:3, Informative)
I haven't seen anyone try and connect the "purple streak" [sfgate.com] picture and the break-up, so i'll post my theory references again and hope it gets considered. [netfirms.com]
New image evidence shows damage to the composite section of the wing. [spaceflightnow.com] An increasing reliance on composite materials in aircraft construction creates the potential for additional problems because the composites can allow a connection between lightning and airplane electrical circuits [ufl.edu]The tiles were damaged heavily at launch [cbsnews.com], scratched deeply as in previous incidents. [floridatoday.com]
The roughtiles heated and shed, leaving a trail of debris plasma.
The plasma trailacted as a conduit [bbc.co.uk] for an electrical arc [sfgate.com] from charged particles in the high upper atmosphere,similar to the Ben Franklin kite legend.
A huge bolt travelled along the plasma trail to the left wing where it caused severe damage, enough to cause a cascading failure over subsequent minutes. Blue jets [cnn.com], elves and sprites are large atmospheric electrical phenomena which occur at the altitude the space shuttle was passing thru and were being studied by Ramon in the MEIDEX dust experiment [tau.ac.il].
My,My, Hey, Hey
Compare air traffic control (Score:3, Informative)
On a similar note, I know of a Fortune 500 corporation that was still running its accounting system on early-60s RCA mainframes in the mid 80s. It wasn't worth it to recreate the software - which worked fine - until financial execs who were starting to put PCs on their desks got too frustrated about not being able to access the data directly.
You can build an airframe requiring extraordinary processing power just to keep it stable in flight - our newest fighters are of the sort. But the shuttle's not. And maybe it shouldn't be - since if it was there'd be no possibility of a human pilot subbing for a down computer. In combat, if the computer's down, the craft's toast anyway.
Re:Were they really doomed? (Score:1, Informative)
If the Russian capsule was modified to reach the space shuttle orbit, there would still be no way for the crew to go out and get the food/water/air without an air lock.
If Atlantis was to be used for a rescue mission they would first have to unload all the payload for her ISS mission, then reload it for a rescue. By then Columbia would have run out of supplies. Even if they Columbia crew had enough food/water/air to wait that long the would still have to find a way to get the Columbia crew out without depresuization. Without that air lock there aren't many options.
Re:Soyuz safety record (Score:2, Informative)
70s. In both cases the rocked blowed up and
safety system worked, ejecting cosmonauts,
who experienced 20g forces on arrival.
In one situation cosmonauts were pulled to
a mountain slope.
No casualties, fortunately and because of
a good safety system.
Wings are better (Score:3, Informative)
Why this matters:1. More L/D means you can control descent rate better. You can control it somewhat by steering the Soyuz using the attitude control jets, but only to a limited degree. So the Soyuz generates about 8-9 G of acceleration during descent. The Shuttle only generates a comfortable 3-4 G.
2. Equally important: lateral control gives the Shuttle and other lifting bodies significant crosstrack steering capability. This means that precision landing is possible, and also offers far more flexibility for contingency landings. With Soyuz/Apollo style entry, you get a large landing footprint, which is why the Russians land in the relatively empty steppes and the Apollos landed in the ocean.
Those are the options that are available today for hypersonic reentry. Parachutes are only used for the latter portions of the descent (typically subsonic).
The recently mothballed X-38 uses both. For the high-speed reentry, the lifting body is used to control the descent rate and to provide cross-track steering. At landing speeds, the lifting body doesn't have much lift, so a parachute is used.
Re:old computers (Score:4, Informative)
But not the most important requirment. Amongst the most important requirements is that the system should be able to perform all the tasks it needs to, faultlessly and reliably.
The shuttle avionics exist and survive in one of the harshest environments available. The suffer heavy vibration and heavy radiation compared to other avionics such as used in military jets. More modern avionics are less suited to survive either.
Having a lighter faster computer that needs more radiation shielding to ensure reliable operation does not gain you much.
The flight system in the shuttle was fully capable of flying the craft when it was first launched, and until proved otherwise it remains fully capable of doing the job.
Why replace an avionics system that has returned the craft without fault over a hundred times, with one that never has? Do you have any idea the cost and development time of developing 5 multiple redundant intrinsically safe mission computers is likely to be - and is replacing a functioning avionics system at such a cost a good use of budget that could be better spent on science?
They could do more calculations. When trying to compensate
The limiting factor of any avionics system is the response rate of the air frame itself and then the response rate of the mechanical systems themselves - in the shuttle's case the aero surfaces and the thrusters.
The important point of an avionics system is to keep the airframe in the zone of expected operation, you should never allow the airframe to get near the edge of the envelope where you might not be able to command it back in time.
The most important thing here is not the raw commputational power, but rather very accurate sensors so you can detect anomolies as soon as possible, and fast control reactions so you can correct them as quickly as possible. This is true of any closed circuit negative feedback control system that tries to minimise the error between the actual state of the system and the desired state of the system. These are all around us in the traction control systems of cars, the ABS, autopilots on planes. They don't need a lot of computing power, but they do need absolute reliability.
I'm guessing that the software may have failed to consider that a part that is not performing upto specifications is likely to have reduced structural integrity
Software is NOT intelligent, it doesn't make considerations. Engineers and software programmers make considerations. The software will be designed to cope with all the predicted conditions. If the engineers never considered the possibility of a damaged flight surface to be likely, then they wouldn't have required the software to cope with it.
At best you use your knowledge as an engineer and programmer to do your best that should the software experience conditions it was never desing for it does the best it can, but what "best it can" means is a decision of the humans that wrote the software.
Personally if I'm at Mach 20 balanced on a knife edge with plasma at 2300 Celsius a few feet away in a craft that needs reactions and senses far sharper and faster than a humans can every be to keep up this delicate dance on the edge of survivablity - then I don't want that system to go all 'fuzzy logic' on me and make guesses. I want a system that is utterly reliable and predictable, and for my guys on the ground to ask it to fly an utterly predicatble route.
What ever did happen to Columbia to the best of our knowledge the flight control system was within the range of its capability. The system would have been seeing the same readings as mission control could see in the telemetry. It was unusual in that in the final moments it was working harder than it had need to on any other flight, but according to NASA it was well within limits. It was in fact responding to the situation that the aero srufaces may not be giving it the response it needed and started to use the thrusters - an event that had been predicted, accounted for and planned for 30 years earlier when the avionics system was defined.
The avionics on the shuttle are just as capable today as they were when it was launched, if they were not up to the job then Columbia would have not made it back the first time.
Unfortunately, Feynman died in 1988. (Score:3, Informative)
He was a truly unique individual, and will be missed.
Jon Acheson
Bogus (Score:2, Informative)
Yes. It's not the wing and it's not a crack.
No, I mean fired (Score:2, Informative)
That is a scapegoat.
The Thiokol engineers were "whistle blowers." They pissed of their employer. Their employer fired them.
A scapegoat is one who is unjustly sacrificed to prevent or ausage public embaressment. The firing of the Thiokol engineers actually *added* to the embaressment because the cat was already out of the bag.
They weren't sacrificed. They were executed.
KFG
Re:Carbon-carbon trouble-trouble? (Score:4, Informative)
Re:In Orbit Inspections? (Score:3, Informative)
Re:Expect fianl report in 6 months (Score:3, Informative)
Re:In a pinch (Score:3, Informative)
A Progress could not dock with Columbia; no matching docking ring. Which means EVA.
I also doubt one could make Columbia's orbit: the Russian launch complex is much higher in latitude than KSC, and so their orbits have much steeper angles. It would need a lot of fuel to match orbits, and may not carry enough.
You'd need 3 Soyuz to rescue the crew: Soyuz only carry 3 passengers, and there were 7 aboard. You'd probably also have to have pilots in each Soyuz, since you wouldn't have months to write the encounter software.
Anyway, it would take a VERY long time to get 3 Soyuz prepped for launch. And then there's the same pesky orbit thing.
Links to Photo & Sensor Schematics (Score:3, Informative)
Problems with the foam in 1995 (Score:2, Informative)
Firstly, my sympathy to all involved.
Next. Has anyone seen the SPIE Proceedings Vol. 2455 (b=abstracts) [spie.org] particularly Paper #: 2455-23 Shearographic nondestructive evaluation of Space Shuttle thermal protection systems
The abstract says
TPS - Thermal Protection SystemSOFI - spray-on foam insulation
This paper is in the proceedings of the SPIE meeting in 1995 on "Nondestructive Evaluation of Aging Aircraft, Airports, Aerospace Hardware, and Materials"
Re:Doh! (Score:1, Informative)
Its only practical to sue if NSAS doesn't come up with the compensation. Federal laws require any group that luanches spacecraft to have insurance which implys NASA has a liability. NSAS's attept will be to only pay once per claim and make sure there aren't any fraudlent claims ('cause we all know there will be)