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Challenger Tragedy - In Depth, and Deeply Felt

Posted by Zonk on Sat Jan 28, 2006 08:34 PM
from the /salute dept.
Patchw0rk F0g writes "On this, the anniversary of the Challenger disaster, Jay Barbree has a moving and in-depth piece on this international disaster." From the article: "During several earlier shuttle missions, disaster did everything it could to crawl into the shuttle launch system and turn it into tumbling flaming wreckage. The primary O-rings on those flights suffered severe erosion from superheated gases, sometimes accompanied by lesser erosion. And the erosion had occurred after launch temperatures much higher than on this freezing Florida day -- 53 degrees was the lowest launch-time temperature up to that time. The booster engineers felt helpless. For months, they had been studying the O-ring seal problem. They knew a disaster was coming, but no one stepped forward and said, 'Stop this train until it's fixed.'"
+ -
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  • by orangeguru (411012) on Saturday January 28 2006, @08:36PM (#14591044) Homepage
    Aha. Very international.
    • by Anonymous Coward on Saturday January 28 2006, @08:45PM (#14591095)
      Space ship blows up with schoolteacher and first civilian on board, I'd call it pretty international even if it's an American ship.

      I like the ever-so-impartial wording implying that they should have been able to see it coming. It's easy to talk like that afterwards but obviously they did not know or it wouldn't have happened. People who write this kind of journalistic sensationalism by exploiting human tragedy disgust me.
        • An American space shuttle, with an all-American crew, including an American civilian blowing up is a tragedy, but it's not an "international" tragedy.
          Does that mean the US gets to keep the moon?
  • by ezratrumpet (937206) on Saturday January 28 2006, @08:44PM (#14591088) Journal
    in making purchases based on the lowest possible price. Sooner or later, it all catches up at once. I'm reminded of the phrase, "Pay now, or pay later. Either way, sooner or later, payment is necessary."
    • by darklordyoda (899383) on Saturday January 28 2006, @10:04PM (#14591450)
      So when NASA tries to keep costs down, people say they're cutting too many corners and endangering lives, and when they spend extra for the quality, people say they're too bloated and need to run things more like a business.

      People will complain no matter how NASA runs things, I say give them a bigger budget than the measly amount they get now and see what they can do with it.

      And yes, 16 billion is measly when you consider that it seems sometimes like they're our NIH for everything not health-related; that is, they have a finger in every stewing "pot" of research.
    • by Sebby (238625) on Saturday January 28 2006, @10:30PM (#14591560)
      in making purchases based on the lowest possible price.

      Exactly. That reminds me of the joke in Armegeddon:

      Rockhound: "You know we're sitting on four million pounds of fuel, one nuclear weapon and a thing that has 270,000 moving parts built by the lowest bidder. Makes you feel good, doesn't it?"

       
      • by jnik (1733) on Sunday January 29 2006, @09:34AM (#14592997)
        Exactly. That reminds me of the joke in Armegeddon:
        Which is a rip-off/homage of a joke I heard from Charlie Duke (don't know if it was his originally) about the Saturn V--something to the effect of "Then you realize you're sitting on top of something with the explosive potential of a small atomic bomb, that has hundreds of thousands of parts that all need to work perfectly--and it's all been built by the lowest bidder."
  • by voss (52565) on Saturday January 28 2006, @08:50PM (#14591115)
    I was in class, when they announced it over the intercom. For the Generation X'ers this was our 9/11. The moment that replayed in our minds for years to come.

    I suppose I'll remember those last words

    "Go at throttle up"
    • by mtaht (603670) * on Saturday January 28 2006, @09:36PM (#14591311) Homepage
      I was sitting at the top of a flight of stairs when I saw Challenger explode. I slowly slid down the stairs, and then watched the video again and again, again, until every frame was burned into my memory.

      And although the last words on the black box might have been "uh, oh", the last words heard over the air were: "Go for 104 percent".

      Then there was this horrible "Snick!" as the radio went dead.

      There's a sample of the last sounds from the shuttle on this song [ackley.net].

      I saw Richard Feynman's eloquent demonstration of why the boosters failed, and watched him be ignored by the other members of the commission. I learned of the group of engineers at Thiokol that were overrulled by their management to give the "Go" to this mission...

      I visualize these moments in time every time I am given management directives that attempt to contravene physical law, and to this day I stay true to my profession as an engineer, and do the right thing by the physics. It's the only way I can sleep at night.

      Still, I remain haunted.
      • by Discopete (316823) on Sunday January 29 2006, @07:28AM (#14592740) Homepage
        I was at home, getting ready for school. I had stopped for a moment to watch the launch with my parents.

        When the shuttle came apart the first words that my father said were "It was too cold, the rings didn't seal right."
        It was a haunting utterance, sort of under his breath as if he were talking to himself.

        Dad's an Aero Engineer with a company that makes some of the analysis software that NASA and the manufacturers of the shuttle parts use to determine what happens to various objects under various stresses. He said rubber couldn't be properly analyzed as there are too many different variables going on with it at any given time. And as it chills all of it's properties change from fluid to solid or somewhere in between.

        For my generation (I'm 34), I won't say this was our 9/11, but that this was our Kennedy.
        9/11 belongs to my childrens generation.
      • by isomeme (177414) <cberry@cine.net> on Sunday January 29 2006, @10:28AM (#14593175) Homepage Journal
        I once managed to deflect a corporate decision that seemed certain to lead to disaster by saying in a meeting with the CEO and other bigwigs "Guys, I'm having a Morton Thiokol moment, here." Enough of them got the reference (and saw that I meant it) that they actually started listening to me.
    • by Anonymous Coward on Saturday January 28 2006, @10:17PM (#14591500)
      For the Generation X'ers this was our 9/11.

      That is asinine.

      -Gen X

    • by thesandtiger (819476) on Saturday January 28 2006, @11:16PM (#14591699)
      9/11 was our 9/11.

      Challenger was Challenger.

      The two aren't similar in any way, shape or form, except that people who shouldn't have died, did.
        • by Tony Hoyle (11698) <tmh@nodomain.org> on Sunday January 29 2006, @05:37AM (#14592559) Homepage
          For me it was Tianemen Square (I was a student at the time watching it unfold on my small portable TV). I still can't look at a chinese person without thinking of it half the time.

          Challenger didn't even phase me... it was just a rather spectacular traffic accident. Not on the radar, sorry.

          You can't really say something affect 'an entire generation' without interviewing *everyone* from that generation (or at least a reasonably representative sample).
  • Feynman's account (Score:4, Informative)

    by acidblood (247709) <decio.decpp@net> on Saturday January 28 2006, @09:07PM (#14591188) Homepage
    An excellent account (and really, one should expect no less from Richard Feynman) of the Challenger disaster was given in the book `What do you care what other people think?' It highlights the political and managerial problems at NASA. If you enjoy this book, I highly recommend grabbing the rest of Feynman's books as well, such as `Surely you're joking, Mr. Feynman' and of course the Feynman Lectures on Physics.

    Feynman was by far one of the greatest minds of our time. Too bad he died fairly young (70 years), he still had a good 10 or 20 years of time to contribute to human knowledge.
  • by reality-bytes (119275) on Saturday January 28 2006, @09:08PM (#14591192) Homepage
    A fact often missed by the popular media when dealing with the Challenger accident is emergency egress provision.

    The 'big step' taken moving from the Saturn V launcher to the Shuttle for manned flight was not just moving from expendable to [partially] re-usable vehicles but the total reliance in the new vehicle for launch safety.

    If practically *anything* were to go wrong during the launch of a Shuttle, it would be curtains for the vehicle and crew whereas the Saturn V had the 'option' of the Launch Escape Tower [wikipedia.org] which could (in theory) give the crew one last chance of getting clear of the failed vehicle using it's relatively small solid rockets.

    I've often imagined what could go wrong with a shuttle launch, there are possibilities such as:

    *Catastrophic multiple SME failure just after SRB ignition leading to an over-rotation heads-down
    *A Mis-light of an SRB on the pad (prior to launch) - Apparently NASA takes huge precautions with their SRBs due to volatility of the solid fuel.
    *A Mis-light of an SRB on launch causing over-rotation of the vehicle away from the lit SRB(NASA *says* this is of infinitely small chance tho)
    *Failure of the SRB release system on the pad (the tie-downs which hold the vehicle in place prior to launch)
    *A simple bird-strike causing damage to the orbiter's pressure hull.

    And of course, there is the failure of components leading to rapid combustion of the LOX/Hydrogen fuels.

    Perhaps none of the above could realistically happen, perhaps some could. (I'm no expert, just a fan of manned spaceflight).

    What I do know is that I'll be happier about people sitting on top of massive potential energies when they give them a Launch Escape System again. It's not a certainty but it's nice to know that the Astronauts get one last chance if the rest of the vehicle falls to bits.


    Disclaimer: I am not one of these people who thinks that spaceflight is, should be, or can be as safe as say civillian aviation.
    • The entire problem with the Shuttle was that it abandoned the vertical stack design of previous spacecraft in favor of a "paralllel" stack. The Apollo program had the escape tower because the humans were on top. Ice and debris from the stack could not hit the heat shield and cause injury. The Shuttle is right next to the rocket and cryogenic fuel tank. No escape systems, no protection of the heat shield against debris strikes. The next generation of planned manned craft will revert to the entire vertical stack concept.
    • First, multiple SME failure just after SRB ignition was problematic, but it has never been problematic due to over-rotation---there is sufficient steering ability even with just the SRBs. The problem is that multiple SME failure causes too much of a difference in thrust between the shuttle and the boosters, which would overstress the struts attaching the SRBs to the shuttle. In addition, a failure of two or more (of the three) SMEs would result in insufficient power to attain orbit.

      Since Challenger, the struts were strengthened, so they can now survive even a three-out situation. A two-out failure can now be dealt with without loss of life throughout the launch (although it would require a ditch and loss of the vehicle through some portions). A three-out failure is still problematic, but should be survivable for the crew after 90 seconds, and might be survivable just after launch.
      • One of the reason more failure modes are now survivable for the crew is that post-Challenger a bailout ability was added: If the shuttle is stable and under control and still not too high, but has insufficient power to either attain orbit or reach an emergency-landing airstrip, the crew can put it on autopilot and bail out with parachutes, using an egress pole that allows them to clear the left shuttle wing.
  • by Corf (145778) on Saturday January 28 2006, @09:10PM (#14591201) Journal
    Oh! I have slipped the surly bonds of Earth
    And danced the skies on laughter-silvered wings;
    Sunward I've climbed, and joined the tumbling mirth
    of sun-split clouds, --and done a hundred things
    You have not dreamed of--wheeled and soared and swung
    High in the sunlit silence. Hov'ring there,
    I've chased the shouting wind along, and flung
    My eager craft through footless halls of air....

    Up, up the long, delirious, burning blue
    I've topped the wind-swept heights with easy grace
    Where never lark nor even eagle flew--
    And, while with silent lifting mind I've trod
    The high untrespassed sanctity of space,
    Put out my hand, and touched the face of God.

    High Flight
    John Gillespie Magee, Jr.
    June 9, 1922 - December 11, 1941 (age 19)

    • High Flight
        John Gillespie Magee, Jr.

      Oh, I have slipped the surly bonds of earth(1),
      And danced(2) the skies on laughter silvered wings;
      Sunward I've climbed(3) and joined the tumbling mirth(4)
      Of sun-split clouds(5) and done a hundred things(6)
      You have not dreamed of -- Wheeled and soared and swung(7)
      High in the sunlit silence(8). Hov'ring there(9)
      I've chased the shouting wind(10) along and flung(10)
      My eager craft through footless halls of air.
      Up, up the long delirious(12), burning blue
      I've topped the wind-swept heights(13) with easy grace,
      Where never lark, or even eagle(14) flew;
      And, while with silent, lifting mind I've trod
      The high untrespassed sanctity of space(15),
      Put out my hand(16), and touched the face of God.

      FAA Supplement to "High Flight"
        (1) Pilots must ensure that all surly bonds have been slipped entirely before aircraft taxi or flight is attempted.
        (2) During periods of severe sky dancing, crew and passengers must keep seatbelts fastened. Crew should wear shoulder belts as provided.
        (3) Sunward climbs must not exceed the maximum permitted aircraft ceiling.
        (4) Passenger aircraft are prohibited from joining the tumbling mirth.
        (5) Pilots flying through sun-split clouds under VFR conditions must comply with all applicable minimum clearances.
        (6) Do not perform these hundred things in front of Federal Aviation Administration inspectors.
        (7) Wheeling, soaring, and swinging will not be attempted except in aircraft rated for such activities and within utility class weight limits.
        (8) Be advised that sunlit silence will occur only when a major engine malfunction has occurred.
        (9) "Hov'ring there" will constitute a highly reliable signal that a flight emergency is imminent.
        (10) Forecasts of shouting winds are available from the local FSS. Encounters with unexpected shouting winds should be reported by pilots.
        (11) Pilots flinging eager craft through footless halls of air are reminded that they alone are responsible for maintaining separation from other eager craft.
        (12) Should any crewmember or passenger experience delirium while in the burning blue, submit an irregularity report upon flight termination.
        (13) Windswept heights will be topped by a minimum of 1,000 feet to maintain VFR minimum separations.
        (14) Aircraft engine ingestion of, or impact with, larks or eagles should be reported to the FAA and the appropriate aircraft maintenance facility.
        (15) Aircraft operating in the high untrespassed sanctity of space must remain in IFR flight regardless of meteorological conditions and visibility.
        (16) Pilots and passengers are reminded that opening doors or windows in order to touch the face of God may result in loss of cabin pressure.

      • Thank you for posting that. I hadn't read it before.

        entire poem located here [rice.edu]...

        The arching sky is calling
        Spacemen back to their trade.
        ALL HANDS! STAND BY! FREE FALLING!
        And the lights below us fade.

        Out ride the sons of Terra,
        Far drives the thundering jet,
        Up leaps a race of Earthmen,
        Out, far, and onward yet --

        We pray for one last landing
        On the globe that gave us birth;
        Let us rest our eyes on the friendly skies
        And the cool, green hills of Earth.

        -- Robert A. Heinlein

  • Feynman (Score:5, Informative)

    by Errandboy of Doom (917941) on Saturday January 28 2006, @09:21PM (#14591235) Homepage
    The Challenger disaster sparked a lot of insightful commentary [fotuva.org] about the shuttle program from Richard Feynman [wikipedia.org].

    The Rogers Commission [wikipedia.org] relegated the bulk of his thoughts to an "Appendix" because no one wanted to release a report that was too critical of the space program (even though that's exactly what they were appointed to do). It almost wasn't included at all, but for Feynman's dogged insistence.

    He deals with his role in the Rogers commission in No Ordinary Genius [google.com] (that's a link to the beginning of the Chapter from Google Print).

    That chapter is filled with funny anecdotes, and enraging stories about the bullheadedness of beaurocracy, told by one of the most charismatic geniuses of our time about one of the most important events from my childhood.

    Highly recommended.
  • "tragedy" (Score:5, Insightful)

    by bcrowell (177657) on Saturday January 28 2006, @09:21PM (#14591238) Homepage
    "Tragedy" is one of those words that gets thrown around too lightly. These were people who knowingly took a risk in order to do something they believed in. They wound up losing the bet, and getting killed. That's not a tragedy. A tragedy is Romeo and Juliet, or a 10-year-old factory worker in Thailand getting killed while working to pay for medicine for his sick mother. A tragedy is not astronauts getting killed in an explosion, or mountain climbers getting killed by bad weather, or a volunteer soldier getting killed in a war he believed in.
    • Well, classically, tragedy dealt with the fall of a hero due to an innate flaw, usually that of hubris (excessive pride). Hmmm... seems like it pretty much nails NASA prior to Challenger.
    • Re:"tragedy" (Score:5, Insightful)

      by pjt48108 (321212) <pjt48108@nosPam.yahoo.com> on Sunday January 29 2006, @12:23AM (#14591898) Homepage
      You are correct, even though people are flaming you. 'Tragedy' IS a word too freely used, as is 'hero.'

      You correctly note that they were aware of the risks, they took the risks, and lost. It's not technically 'tragic' or 'tragedy,' but that doesn't at all dismiss the deeply sad, unfortunate nature of the accident, despite the binary view some are ascribing to your comments.

      The accident itself is just one in a larger series of events which might collectively be considered 'tragic." As someone noted in comments, there is usually a tragic flaw--such as hubris--giving rise to the tragic events, collectively known in literature as 'tragedy.' In this case, the tragedy is the larger story of humans defying nature and assuming nature had been conquered. This is hubris, on the part of American administration officials, members of Congress, engineers, management officials, and contractors, etc., across decades, culminating in the Challenger disaster.

      The 'Challenger Tragedy' is what you could call the story leading from the end of Apollo to the loss of Challenger, and its immediate aftermath, such as the hearings, etc.

      Likewise, the 'Columbia Tragedy' would have a similar narrative background, with its own tragic flaw: management deciding to eschew on-orbit imaging because there was "nothing we can do," if damage was found, anyhow."

      Both are sad, dramatic events, but not tragedy. I take a contrary view to what yet another commenter wrote, that it was offensive for you to compare real loss of life to fictional loss of life. To be more accurate, people calling the loss of either shuttle a tragedy are themselves using literary terminology to oversimplify a complex series of decisions and actions into a cable news soundbite, and this oversimplification ("The astronauts' deaths were tragic") cheapens, in my view, the loss of seven Americans engaged in the noble pursuit of knowledge and understanding.

      And with that, I shall adorn myself with aerogel pants and await the flaming...
    • Re:"tragedy" (Score:4, Insightful)

      by MrPerfekt (414248) on Sunday January 29 2006, @04:17AM (#14592426) Homepage Journal
      In the respect that they were killed in the vain of trying to push our boundaries of what we can do as humans, this accident qualifies as a tragedy.

      Just because you accept risk doesn't mean you waive all rights to sympathy, especially in light of more "noble" causes.
  • Am I callous? (Score:5, Interesting)

    by Anonymous Coward on Saturday January 28 2006, @09:27PM (#14591270)
    I was in preschool or something when the disaster happened. I had no awareness of it until many years later.

    But when I think of the disaster now, I have the somewhat odd reaction that I don't really feel that the real tragedy was the loss of Challenger and its crew.

    When I think about the 20th anniversiary of Challenger, the tragedy I feel is that it seems like NASA has done almost nothing of note since then.

    It seems like somewhere around the Challenger disaster, the pioneering attitude of NASA that had been its hallmark up until then took something of a backseat. Somewhere around 20 years ago, probably not at Challenger or because of it but certainly sometime around then, NASA changed from being a truly important thing of importance to the public to just being something the government does. 20 years later, the manned space program has not progressed one single step beyond where it was when Challenger blew up; we're still stuck using the exact same shuttle fleet, and the manned program has been entirely preoccupied with the maintenence of a couple of space stations that aren't really that far beyond SkyLab and whose crews are preoccupied just keeping the things in the sky. NASA has had a small handful of true triumphs with its unmanned probes since that time, but the successes have been far between and have tended to receive only a fraction of the attention given in the public eye to NASA's failures.

    And when I think about this, and realize that it represents, essentially, the loss of the nation's manned space program sometime about 20 years ago, it tends to overshadow entirely in my mind the tragedy of the loss of Challenger's intrepid crew sometime about 20 years ago.

    Is this a callous response, or a reasonable one?
  • by mswope (242988) on Saturday January 28 2006, @09:31PM (#14591290) Journal
    Crap. This is still taught as an ethics lesson. An engineering manager (Roger Boisjoly) was told to think like a manager rather than an engineer (I believe the term was "take off your engineering hat and put on your manager hat") and the process was approved. I feel for the guy that had to make this decision, because it occurs on the knife-edge that most of us engineers are taught about, but never experience. However, he came to that point, and history will record that he MADE THE WRONG DECISION.

    "The booster engineers felt helpless ...'No one stepped forward and said, "Stop this train until it's fixed,"'" IS CRAP. Someone said "Stop." Then, he said, "okay," after he switched hats and the world has never been the same since.

    The reason I'm so harsh about this is that it could've been any one of us that call ourselves "engineers." We should NEVER forget the lesson from this. Someone went against his training AND his instincts and, as a result, PEOPLE DIED.
  • by llZENll (545605) on Saturday January 28 2006, @09:41PM (#14591341)
    "but no one stepped forward and said, 'Stop this train until it's fixed.'"

    And if anyone had, we would have never known about it, and they probably would have been fired.
  • by StressGuy (472374) on Saturday January 28 2006, @09:42PM (#14591347)
    First off, I actually read the article - all eight pages of it. I was also a college student attending Purdue the day of the crash studying, oddly enough, aeronautical engineering and taking a class in propulsion with a proffessor who was a consultant for Morton-Thiokol (just Thiokol soon after). I remember a few things about this in particular.

    It seemed that, almost as soon as the camera crew realized what had happened, they zeroed in on McCauliff's family. It took a while for the cameraman to get his payoff though, she didn't really react for quite some time. No doubt not fully able to comprehend what just happened.

    When I got to my class that morning (psychology), I found the professor had also just seen the footage, he cancelled the class. None of us were really into it at that point.

    The local news was all over the propulsion professor asking him for theories/insight. At that point though, nobody really knew what had happened and speculation is foolish.

    By the end of that day, I was hearing "Need Another Seven Astronauts". In contrast, I've yet to hear any such wise-assed remarks about the Columbia reentry disaster.

    ===

    It's easy to second guess NASA's decision making but, when you are in that moment, it's a hard trigger to pull. I've no doubt that engineers were concerned about the integrity of the O-ring seal. However, when they launched, they were within published spec. Sadly, the spec was wrong. In that situation, it becomes your (expert) opinion vs. established data. You might be right, but it's hard to push through.

    I say all of this because I'm right in the middle of something similar. I see a situation that management characterizes as "agressive" and I would call "reckless" - but it's just my opinion. I can't go to the appropriate regulating agencies with anything that would stick. All I can really do is what I've done, I resigned. On paper, I said the recent benefits change was not meeting my needs. Behind close doors, however, I went into very frank detail about how I felt their current philosophies could put people at risk, and how I could no longer represent them in good faith.

    I looked for a way to compel the needed changes from my position, but was unsuccessful. I was well respected there, perhaps by resigning and making sure they understood why, they will be motivated to re-evalute. I don't really know.
    • by lord sibn (649162) on Saturday January 28 2006, @10:13PM (#14591487)
      You do not hear jokes about Columbia's re-entry because the topic has faded from the limelight. People are not all up at arms (bad joke) about the space race. People generally do not care about the shuttles, about the stardust probe, or about anything space related any more. We are entering another dark age; people had been told of the great things the future could hold. And it didn't. So no, they do not care about the current shuttle program. Where is my flying car? Why don't I live on a moon base? Remember that geeks don't rule the world. Regular people do. As a direct result, nobody cares about nasa. Not any more. they bought the snake oil the first time, and lost 7 astronauts. They are not interested in another round of bus fare, as it were. I am seriously trying to not sound like a troll here, but honestly, normal people don't care about probes hovering over the north pole, collecting stardust, or another failed shuttle mission. They are used to being disappointed by nasa so much, that they no longer pay attention to nasa at all. You just have to remember, normal people don't care about nasa any more. They grew up with dreams of exploring space. Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice... can't get fooled again.
  • by EBFoxbat (897297) on Saturday January 28 2006, @09:48PM (#14591379)
    Am I the only one that thinks that Columbia was the worse of the 2 shuttle crashes? I mean really, Challenger was catostrophic but was unsurvivable once the SRB ignited. Columbia was in orbit for weeks with its fatal problem in view of the entire planet had anbody thought to look. They say nothing could have been done had they found the damaged in orbit, but I have this funny feeling that we, as a planet, probabaly would have come up with something and not let them run out of O2.
  • by seven of five (578993) on Saturday January 28 2006, @11:06PM (#14591681) Homepage
    I didn't see the live event but I saw the replays soon after... I may be wrong but this might have been the first time news networks replayed a live disaster over and over. The disaster was bad enough but the replays made it hypnotizing, overwhelming.

    The same thing happened on 9/11 with jets crashing.

    I hope when the next thing happens I'll have enough self control to shut the damn tv off. I sure didn't those 2 times.
  • by JetScootr (319545) on Saturday January 28 2006, @11:20PM (#14591711) Journal
    It was a tragedy, an accident, a misfortune.
    A tsunami that kills 125000 people and makes millions homeless is a disaster. A hurricane and weak levees that kill hundreds, combined with a helpless Department of Homeland Security that unhomes 1.3 million, that's a disaster.
    An earthquakeor volcanic explosion that kills hundreds or thousands and destroys entire towns, that's a disaster.
    A vehicle accident that kills 7 people is not a disaster, no matter how expensive the vehicle is or how famous the people are.
    It is the "Challenger Accident", not the "Challenger Disaster".
    Keep some perspective.
      • Dictionary: (Score:4, Informative)

        by JetScootr (319545) on Sunday January 29 2006, @01:16AM (#14592062) Journal
        Sorry to be a grammar Nazi on this. The media uses such hyperbole that words change meanings based on the emotional cliches spewed by the plastic hairdos on the news networks. Remember when there were no bad connotations to the word "hacker"? I do.

        From: http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=disaster [reference.com]

        disaster n.

        1. An occurrence causing widespread destruction and distress; a catastrophe.

        Challenger accident was not a disaster. To say that money makes the difference between a tragic accident and a disaster is to devalue the real disasters - such as tsunamis.

        I was working in the astronaut training facility in 1986 when Challenger blew up. Like many others that day, I didn't see it live, but I did see it on the first replay. My desk didn't have a line-of-site to the office TV and I was plinking away at some code on a 8088 PC.
        The sound of a dozen coworkers watching friends die got me up and to the TV.

        To those of us at NASA who worked with the crew, it is and will always be an accident.

        Because accidents can be prevented, but disasters can't.

  • A small Tragedy (Score:4, Insightful)

    by kevinbr (689680) on Sunday January 29 2006, @06:07AM (#14592609)
    It is of course sad that these people lost their lives, but this article highlights a big problem with the American Media. All over the world people die everyday. People die from natural disaster and others die from wars. The problem is this: the US Media NEVER delves into any foreign deaths to any degree like this. Imagine this articles depth and emotion aimed at:

    A Dead Palestinian Child ( Killed by an American funded missile - what went wrong to cause this death, why was this death wrong)
    A Dead Iraqi Child ( Killed by an American funded missile - what went wrong to cause this death, why was this death wrong)
    etc etc

    Coming soon the never written article about dead Iranian Children.

    So we navel gaze about this death or that death and was it preventable. If we perhaps demanded from our media to delve with such detail and emotion into the thousands and thousands of deaths that we either cause directly or indirectly every day by our misadventurous policies around the globe.

    Every page we write and view about past events ( well past and well covered by now ) is one page less for the voice of those innocent dead that have no voice.

    In the end with people resorting to "terrorist" violence as a reaction to attacks or injustice on them and their children, our lack of attention the root causes of these LARGE tradegies has and will continue to come back and bite us.

    Sadly the Challenger explosion attracks the lazy voyeur in us all, easy to see and watch, compelling.......but in the overal scheme of things essentially meaningless except as a symbol of corporate greed and cost cutting which leads to short cuts. But we all know this and still do nothing.

    So perhaps in the end, even if the American people were subjected to detailed heart wrenching stories of dead foreign babies, they would just yawn and turn the channel.

    But who knows?

    we do know that when there is a disease, failure to treat the root causes often leads to deaths. In simple terms we kill them they kill us and the cycle of ignorance revolves round and round.

    Meanwhile, apologies for spoiling the feel good sadness over 7 deaths.......7 deaths that have had enough column inches by now.
  • by superultra (670002) on Sunday January 29 2006, @09:50AM (#14593050) Homepage
    I was 4 when Columbia launched on April 12, 1981. I remember having to wake early to watch it. It was 4am in Edmonton, and the living room and house were still dark. But when the shuttle's engines ignited, the bridal white smoke from the shuttle's boosters filled our living room with light. Those same boosters propelled Columbia upwards, leaving a bright yellow trail of still burning fuel in the sky and on our tv screen.

    I was tired. It was magnificent.

    I had probably seen a rocket launch before, and I'm sure its raw power impressed me. But I think what drew me to the shuttle was its streamlined, white grace.

    STS-1 was the first full launch and mission of a space shuttle, and it is one my first memories.

    I have another space shuttle memory just as vivid. I am at the part of my daily journey from school to home where the park's sidewalk meets the street's. I am staring up, wondering if I can see the white "horns" of the Challenger explosion from the blue of the sky.

    I am afraid that a piece of debris will land on me.

    My childhood is filled with references to space. I devoured space books. I vastly preferred space Lego to the plain city bricks. When my friends and I played, we imagined we were in space more often than not. My parents raised me on a steady diet of television and film science fiction, not the least of which were Star Trek and Star Wars.

    I'm not the only to have a space-filled childhood. Look no further than the 1986 film Space Camp. The movie is really just a series of plot devices so as to create a childly plausible situation in which a few kids get to pilot a space shuttle. In the end, the boys get the space shuttle, the girl, and the robot. You can't argue with that. It's a horrible movie actually, but I remember my friends and I seeing it several times, and re-enacting its scenes. It was cool.

    My brother believed he would turn his room into a spaceship. Even though I frequently teased him about it, I secretly admired his tenacity. He studied schematics of spacecraft, starcharts, and physics. He's still working on it.

    This month's Wired features an amateur spy satellite tracker named Ted Molczan. He is older than I am, but his childhood sounds similar, only with Apollos instead of Columbias and Challengers.

    There are many of us, to us space meant more than emptiness. It was an ideal. Space represented progress, hope, and nobility. To think about space was to wonder. Culture reinforced this. Star Trek was perhaps the best example, with its frontiered hyperbolic optimism. But even the fairly vapid Star Wars infused space with adventure and excitement. Planetside was filled with moisture vaporators and blandly colored sandstorms. Space was permeated with color and sound, excitement and destiny.

    Last night I had another visceral memory. When I threw the newly-purchased baby clothes into the washer, time stopped. The collective white of onesies and soft blankets froze in mid-air and I realized that I was washing a child's clothes - my child's clothes - for the first time.

    Having recently read the Wired article, my immediate second thought was that my son or daughter would never know the wonder of space like I did, like we did.

    I was sad.

    This is how it is: space is now empty, dirty, and dark. The space shuttle is an antique. The laptop that I write this blog post on is incredibly more powerful than the ones that control the space shuttle. NASA is a joke. Americans see space more as a source of tourist dollars than a place to find ourselves. Bush's announcement of a moonbase and a trip to Mars was more political foliage than inspirational provocation. Culture is either ignorant or apathetic of space. It is merely a place where things happen, a set, and little more. And, of course, we have no room for something as ridiculously triumphant as Star Trek. Fifty years of unrequited romance has fundamentally changed our perception of the big black.

    What kid wants to be an astronaut anymore?

    I'd like to say mine, but I've changed too.

    • Re:NASA... (Score:3, Insightful)

      Feh! Let's drill right down to the basics. Remember that old engineering chestnut, Pick any two: - Good - Fast - Cheap You certainly don't understand anything about reality: Discovery has risk.
    • Re:Motivation (Score:5, Informative)

      by Anonymous Coward on Saturday January 28 2006, @09:10PM (#14591198)
      Are you forgetting that NASA, and Morton Thiokol management is solely responsible for the disaster, the engineers protested [onlineethics.org] the launch.
    • Re:Motivation (Score:5, Informative)

      by pallmall1 (882819) on Saturday January 28 2006, @09:19PM (#14591232)
      Obviously this wasn't a big enough motivation and it should be a wake up call for anyone who trusts that a contractor or engineer will tell you that there is something wrong with a product on their own.
      Spoken like a true non-engineer. It was at the urging of Nasa officials that the launch was approved to take place. Here's a quote [nasa.gov] from the Nasa website relating the facts that you have conveniently overlooked in your rush to condemn engineers and manufacturers:
      However, in a closed meeting at the Kennedy Space Center on February 14, Commission members were "visibly disturbed" to learn that engineers from the firm that manufactured the SRM, Morton Thiokol Inc., had the night before recommended against launching Challenger in the cold temperatures predicted for the next morning; that their managers, at the apparent urging of NASA officials from the Marshall Space Flight Center, had overruled their recommendation; and that more senior NASA managers responsible for the launch commit decision were unaware of this contentious interaction. --bold added
      There's nothing insightful about the parent post, except for the insight gained into the readiness of some to unfairly accuse an entire profession they know nothing about of what basically amounts to murder. I'd like to know what the parent poster's motivations are, other than to try to sound cool on slashdot.
        • If you think that the step directly above you is doing something foolish, you have the right to call that person's boss.

          Hmm, you mean like notifying the NASA officials from the Marshall Space Flight Center who were higher in the chain of command than the engineers' direct managers? Furthermore, there was no way for the engineers to know that "more senior NASA managers responsible for the launch commit decision" weren't told of their objections to the launch after the objections had been raised with th
    • by mangu (126918) on Sunday January 29 2006, @05:19PM (#14594948)
      it should be a wake up call for anyone who trusts that a contractor or engineer will tell you that there is something wrong with a product on their own


      Yes, they will. Any product will have intrinsic linmitations. Every user's manual has a list of limitations on that product, telling you which ways you shouldn't use it. Of course, the stupidity of user's sometimes exceeds the foresight of documentation writers, and someone misuses a product in a way no one had foreseen. In the shuttle's case it was a record low temperature.


      Edward Tufte, in his book "Visual Explanations" has a chapter dedicated to the Challenger disaster. There he shows how the report presented by the engineers the day before the launch was insufficient to convince the managers, because it didn't display properly the correlation between low temperatures and O-ring failures.


      There was too much extraneous information on that report. For instance, there were diagrams showing the position of each failure in each flight. That was totally unnecessary to show the correlation. Tufte, in his book, presents an example on which kind of diagram should be in the report. In page 45 there is a diagram showing the temperature on each launch, with the severity of O-ring failures, if any. Below 66 degrees Fahrenheit, every launch had had O-ring problems. The predicted temperature the day before the Challenger disaster was in the 26 6o 29 degrees range.


      However, despite what Tufte says, engineers are neither salespeople nor diplomats, it's not their duty to convince anyone. They should just present the facts. It's the managers' job to be able to understand what the team they lead are trying to say. And I wouldn't blame managers either. They have so many factors to ponder that, if they stop the launch on any possibility of failure, no one would have ever flown an airplane, much less a space ship.


      I believe the real culprits in the Challenger disaster are all the people who say "Oh, why explore space? Think of the children! We should never go to space while there are hungry children on Earth!", and so on, ad nauseam. To counteract that kind of corny non-argument the politicians invented such stunts as sending teachers to space, stunts that make it very difficult to cancel a launch that has political implications, even if the circumstances all point to the dangers in launching at that exact moment.

    • Re:Wow (Score:3, Informative)

      The temperature was actually in the low 20's (-6.67 degrees celsius) that morning. I think they let it warm up a bit before the launch, but it was still much colder than any of the other launches. From what I remember, no testing had really been done at that temperature.
    • by eclectro (227083) on Saturday January 28 2006, @09:51PM (#14591391)
      Generally large fireballs are associated with explosions, which this seemed to be. More specifically, the shuttle was wrenched off course suddenly by the disintegrating and burning fuel tank (i.e. the exploding (or as others will be sure to point out to me-rapidly burning) part). While the crew cabin survived and plummeted to the ocean at more than 200 mph. It has been heavily rumored that buried in a secret safe in NASA is a tape recording from one of the astronauts (who had a recorder running during takeoff in his pocket) muttering the Lord's prayer during the descent.

      There is sufficent evidence that the bodies of the astronauts were put in barrels on the back of a flatbed when brought ashore as to not raise any suspicion

      Pieces of Challenger still occasionally wash up on the beach, with a large wing portion showing up on the beach in the late nineties. Pieces of the wreckage of the shuttle are "entombed" in a missile silo on Cape Canaveral.

      There is this very prescient article [washingtonmonthly.com] written while the shuttles were being built. He also wrote an excellent followup [earthisland.org] after Columbia. Personally, I thought Challenger was a "one-off" and that things had been fixed, but I lost all faith in the space agency (and its subsequent funding for the expensive shuttles).

      There never been an exact cost released by NASA for what it takes to launch a shuttle, but I'm quite sure that it is very much more than the 500 million they said before the Columbia disaster. Some say more than a billion dollars.

      Which I believe would be the cost to build a decent Hubble replacement and launch on an unmanned rocket. Food for thought.
      • by MurphyZero (717692) on Saturday January 28 2006, @10:34PM (#14591570)

        The Shuttle is expensive to launch. When we lost the Titan IV in 1998, the rocket itself was valued at 400 million (by far the most expensive expendable rocket) and the satellite was estimated at around 800 million. Shuttle costs probably would exceed 1 billion per ignoring all the return to flight issues.

        This is why whenever I hear space advocates and astronomers whining about trying to get the Hubble fixed using the shuttle, I want to grab them by the throat and throttle them. It would be much cheaper and would stop diverting valuable resources to focus their energies on getting the next generation Hubble replacement into space on an expendable rocket. With the savings they could get ITS replacement into space. An expendable launch on an Atlas V or Delta IV would run less than 200 million, possibly less than 100. Plus, now they would have a presumably better satellite in space. Also, the satellite would not have to be designed so that an astronaut could fix it.

    • by Deadstick (535032) on Saturday January 28 2006, @11:04PM (#14591675)
      Hot gas from the leaking O-ring burned through a structural member,which caused a partial structural collapse, which caused the spacecraft to yaw violently, which caused it to disintegrate under aerodynamic loads. The main fuel tank ruptured and the contents burned, while the solid rocket boosters continued to climb by themselves. The orbiter, with crew inside, fell to the surface mostly in one piece.

      It was not an explosion in the literal sense of the word...it would have been merciful for the crew if it were.

      rj
    • by jnik (1733) on Sunday January 29 2006, @09:59AM (#14593080)
      I just finished watching an interview with Roger Beausolai (sp?).

      I checked my Challenger file; the spelling is Boisjoly. Unfortunately I don't have a citation written on my photocopy of the interview with him: "Some of the things NASA booster manager Larry Mulloy said ... went beyond probing; it was the start of intimidation. But even with that, our chief engineer said he would not recommend launching."

      I was just flipping through a 1990 Miami Herald article on Bill McInnis, who made repeated claims of a hydrogen fuel line leak with the shuttle (visible, he said, with Challenger). NASA grounded the fleet for a fuel line leak about two weeks after he committed suicide. The chilling part of this article: "He talked, too, of failures in the thermal protection tiles that keep the shuttle from burning up on re-entry, and of what he believed to have been a lack of proper testing..." The reason I was flipping through the article was to get Mike Clemens' name right. He was a Cape engineer who warned his boss about the O-rings; his boss didn't pass it up. Mike committed suicide after Challenger, feeling responsible for not successfully persuading his boss. I had a list somewhere--I think it had three names on it--of people who warned about the O-rings and killed themselves out of a feeling of responsibility later.

      To claim "They knew a disaster was coming, but no one stepped forward" is inaccurate, irresponsible, and horribly unfair to people who lost their jobs over this. Furthermore, it continues to obscure the root cause of the accident. Of course, MSNBC doesn't have a link for feedback about the article.